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This paper examines the market penalties levied by shareholders against firms that are alleged to have 
violated securities laws within the U.S. Using a sample of private securities class action cases brought 
against foreign firms that cross-list on the major U.S. exchanges, this paper presents evidence that the 
enforcement risk criticism may not be as severe as initially thought. I examine market penalties at alleged 
violation disclosure dates and securities class action filing dates and find that each event corresponds to 
an economically and statistically significant loss of value for the accused firm. On average I find that the 
violation results in a loss of more than eighteen percent of market value, corresponding to an average of 
almost $600 million in dollars lost on the U.S. markets alone. When violation and filing date losses are 
taken together these losses average more than $700 million for foreign cross-listed firms. Further, an 
examination of the determinants of the reputational penalties assessed during this period indicates that 
reputational penalties are greater in cases where investors perceive the minority shareholder protection to 




Table of Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2: Cross Listing Literature and Securities Class Actions Review ........................................... 6 
I. Review of cross-listing literature and enforcement criticism ............................................................ 6 
II. U.S Securities Laws and Shareholder-initiated securities class action filing ................................. 11 
III. Hypotheses and Methodology ...................................................................................................... 18 
Chapter 3: Market Reactions to Securities Class Actions ..................................................................... 26 
IV. Sample Collection ......................................................................................................................... 26 
V. U.S. Market Penalties .................................................................................................................... 31 
VI. Foreign Market Penalties .............................................................................................................. 36 
VII. Event Study Robustness Measures .............................................................................................. 42 
Chapter 4: Determinants of Reputational Losses .................................................................................. 46 
VIII. Legal and Reputational Penalties ............................................................................................... 46 
IX. Cross-Sectional determinants of reputational penalties Tobit regression ..................................... 48 
X. Regression Robustness Measures .................................................................................................. 57 
XI. Size-Matched Logit ...................................................................................................................... 63 
Chapter 5: Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 65 
References .................................................................................................................................................. 68 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................................. 72 
Appendix A – Example Securities Class Action Lawsuit .................................................................. 73 
Appendix B – Variable Definitions .................................................................................................... 74 
Appendix C – Tables and Figures ....................................................................................................... 75 
Vita……….. ............................................................................................................................................. 107 
v 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1A: Securities Class Action Filings by Year ..................................................................................... 75 
Table 1B: Country of Incorporation, headquarters and primary sales segment ........................................... 76 
Table 2: Case Characteristics ....................................................................................................................... 77 
Table 3: Firm Level Descriptive Statistics by Company Year .................................................................... 78 
Table 4: Change in Market Capitalization Around Event Dates .................................................................. 79 
Table 5: CARs Associated with Announcements of Alleged Securities Law Violations, Securities Class 
Action Lawsuit Filings and Resolution Announcements .............................................................. 80 
               Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around case event dates ....................................... 80 
               Panel B: Dollars Lost (in thousands) at case event dates .................................................... 81 
Table 6: Sample Firm Market Reactions at Significant Case Dates for U.S. and Home Market  ............... 82 
Table 7: Market Value Conversion at  Significant Case Dates for U.S. and Home Market ........................ 82 
Table 8:  Differences in the Number of Shares Held in the Home Market and the U.S. Market ................. 83 
Table 9:  Geographic Differences in CARs at Significant Case Dates ........................................................ 84 
Table 10:  Exchange Control Subset Comparisons ...................................................................................... 85 
            Panel A: U.S. Market Comparison Between Exchange Control Subsets ................................. 85 
            Panel B: Home and U.S. Market CAR Comparisons ............................................................... 85 
Table 11:  Size-Matched Case and Firm Level Descriptive Statistics by Company Year ........................... 86 
Table 12:  Size-Matched CARs Associated with Announcements of Alleged Securities Law Violations, 
Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings and Resolution Announcements .................................. 87 
              Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around case event dates ........................................ 87 
              Panel B: Dollars Lost (in thousands) at case event dates ..................................................... 88 
Table 13: CARs for Dismissed and Settled Subsets  ................................................................................... 89 
             Panel A: Foreign Firm CARs by Outcome ............................................................................. 89 
             Panel B: U.S. Firm CARs by Outcome ................................................................................... 89 
Table 14: Cumulative Abnormal Returns winsorized at five percent  ......................................................... 90 
Table 15: Sample with Post-Filing Plus-Ten Day Event Cases Removed   ................................................. 91  
Table 16: Changes in U.S. market value at violation disclosure and legal and reputational penalties ........ 92 
Table 17: Determinants of Reputational Penalties ....................................................................................... 93 
Table 18: Marginal Effects of Reputational Penalties ................................................................................. 94 
Table 19: Winsorized Reputational Penalties Results ................................................................................. 96 
Table 20: Largest Settlement Amounts from 1996-2009 ............................................................................ 97 
Table 21: Truncated Legal Penalties Results ............................................................................................... 98 
Table 22: Changes in U.S. market value and legal and reputational penalties after readjustments for 
financial misrepresentations .......................................................................................................... 99 
Table 23: Determinants of Reputational Penalties after readjustments for financial misrepresentations .. 100 
Table 24: Marginal Effects after readjustments for financial misrepresentations ..................................... 101 
Table 25: OLS Regression Results ............................................................................................................ 102 




List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Abnormal returns for sample and control firms in the +/- 10 day window ....................... 104 
Panel A: Abnormal returns around the disclosure event ................................................................... 104 
Panel B: Abnormal returns around the filing event ........................................................................... 104 
 
Figure 2: Abnormal U.S. and home market returns for sample firms in the +/- 10 day window  .... 105 
Panel A: Abnormal returns around the disclosure event ................................................................... 105 
Panel B: Abnormal returns around the filing event ........................................................................... 105 
 







The potential benefits of cross-listing on major U.S. exchanges are well-documented in previous 
academic literature. Even though recent evidence suggests that involuntary listings may cause declines in 
valuation (Iliev, et al. 2011), the decision of a firm to voluntarily list through U.S. exchanges is largely 
considered to be value enhancing via benefits such as lower costs of capital, increased access to capital, 
increased liquidity and bonding (Doidge et al., 2004; Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Reese and Weisbach, 
2002; Lambert et al. 2007; Merton 1987; Karolyi, 1998; Karolyi and Stulz, 2002; Errunza and Miller, 
2000; Karolyi and Foester, 1993; Roell, 1995). Cross-listing in the U.S. has been suggested as a bonding 
mechanism by which firms in weak legal systems can reassure outside investors of their intention to act in 
the best interest of shareholders. As first proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), bonding to a 
strong legal system such as the United States signals a desire to improve corporate governance and limit 
expropriation by insiders through increased disclosure and richer financial information as well opening 
themselves up to actions based on the enforcement powers of the SEC, private class actions and 
derivative actions in response to violations of the stricter standards.  
Though some research finds support for the bonding hypothesis, critics of the hypothesis argue 
the effectiveness of U.S. securities regulation on foreign firms. One of the primary criticisms of bonding 
is the lack of any real enforcement threat to foreign firms. The SEC does not prosecute foreign firms often 
for violations of securities laws and any settlement amounts for public or private cases tend to be low. 
Therefore, there is a lack of any perceived threat of punishment for U.S. law violations (Siegel, 2005; 
Licht 2003). Given this debate about whether cross-listings can effectively bond to the U.S. legal system 
or whether enforcement is so weak that bonding is ineffective, analyzing the impact of private securities 
class action lawsuits as a possible enforcement mechanism is a potential avenue to provide additional 
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evidence of whether the enforcement of securities law violations by foreign issuers are as limited as 
previously thought.1 It is possible that the reputational and legal penalties assessed for securities laws 
violations and subsequent shareholder initiated actions are large enough to serve as a disincentive for 
violations by foreign firms in spite of any lack of SEC enforcement against such firms. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically examine total market losses suffered by cross-listing firms 
in the U.S. markets during the process of a securities class action lawsuit. I also present the first 
examination of the determinants of the reputational penalties imposed on foreign firms for violations of 
U.S. securities laws. Though prior literature has suggested that settlement amounts for private class 
actions are too low to serve as a violation deterrent alone (Siegel, 2005), the size of the total market 
penalties and the resulting reputational penalties associated with U.S. securities violations on foreign 
cross-listing firms has yet to be empirically examined. By analyzing these penalties and filling this 
empirical gap, this paper adds to the debate surrounding the effectiveness of bonding in the cross-listing 
literature as well as providing additional evidence of the severity of market penalties for securities law 
violations that may serve as a supplement for the limited SEC regulatory enforcement of foreign firms. 
It is important to note that the criticisms of effective enforcement associated with foreign firms 
primarily stem from arguments concerning the leniency of reporting requirements for foreign firms and 
the effectiveness of the SEC in enforcing its policy on foreign issuers. These studies tend to discount 
private enforcement as a mechanism for enforcing bonding in the U.S. regulatory system. In contrast, I 
focus this study specifically on private enforcements by examining private shareholder initiated class-
actions, which are being used with increasing frequency in response to violations of U.S. securities laws 
for foreign firms. Rather than focus solely on legal penalties, I examine the overall market penalties 
associated with private shareholder-initiated cases of securities law violations. Not only do I document an 
economically and statistically significant negative reaction at the filings of such lawsuits of over $185 
                                                            
1 Securities class action lawsuits are those class actions that are brought by shareholders against the corporation, its officer and directors, and 
others on behalf of a group of investors who have suffered an economic loss in a security as the result of fraudulent stock manipulation or other 
violations of securities laws by the issuer.  
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million lost but, using a methodology similar to Karpoff and Lott (1993), I also demonstrate that the total 
losses from the violations that lead to such suits average more than $700 million to the foreign firms in 
the U.S. markets alone. These losses correspond to an average eighteen percent loss in market 
capitalization. Furthermore, the significant losses are not limited to the U.S. I find that firms listing in 
their home markets also suffer severe losses during these events with an average total of sixteen percent 
decline in market capitalization in the home market over the events.   
 Comparing these losses to those of a control sample of domestic firms subject to private 
securities class action lawsuits indicates that there is no significant difference in market reaction around 
the announcement of various case dates. Thus it appears that foreign firms are not punished less than 
domestic firms by shareholders, as would be argued by critics of legal bonding, but are in fact punished in 
equal measure for their violations of securities laws by U.S. shareholders.  Furthermore, by separating the 
legal and reputational penalties of these market reactions, I examine the determinants of reputational 
losses for foreign issuers. Using two different measures of reputational penalties I find that foreign firms 
suffer greater reputational penalties in cases where investors perceive the minority shareholder protection 
in the home market of the firm to be greater. These results are robust to the addition of several controls. I 
also find some limited evidence that the economic situation of the home market for a firm has some 
determinant power on reputational losses, though this result is only significant at the ten percent level.  
In an independent and contemporaneous study, Gande and Miller (2011), also document market 
reactions at the news of a securities class action lawsuit filed by U.S. shareholders against foreign firms. 
Their study is similar to mine in sample periods and research methods employed. However, there are 
several important differences between the two studies. The first difference is that, unlike Gande and 
Miller, I initially restrict my sample to include only firms that trade on the major U.S. exchanges and are 
not incorporated in Bermuda at the time of the lawsuit filing. I restrict my sample in this manner to 
provide a more direct measure of the penalties assessed against foreign firms that voluntarily choose to 
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list shares in the U.S. markets as a bonding signal for two reasons. First, Level I ADRs can be 
involuntarily listed through the OTC-BB and the bonding hypothesis applies more directly to firms that 
voluntarily choose to list on U.S. exchanges. Second, a majority of Bermuda firms with lawsuits filed 
against them were previously incorporated in the U.S. and maintain headquarters and most assets within 
the U.S. Thus these firms are less likely to be cross-listing for bonding purposes. Using this restricted 
sample, I document an average of $185 million in U.S. dollars lost in the three days surrounding the 
announcement of the filing of a securities class action lawsuit, while the less restrictive sample used by 
Gande and Miller documents $392 million in U.S. dollars lost on average. The second difference is that, 
while both papers examine the market reaction at the news of the filing of a securities class action lawsuit, 
I extend my analysis to cover several other key event dates for the lawsuit including the announcement of 
the initial violation of U.S. securities law and the announcement of any settlement of the lawsuit. In 
addition, I examine the determinants of the reputational penalties imposed at the initial violation 
announcement. This provides a more cumulative measure of the market penalties assessed from the U.S. 
securities law violation than a sole focus on filing date and it allows for an examination of the differences 
in reputational and legal penalties assessed at the news of a securities law violation for foreign cross-
listing firms.  The last difference is that, while Gande and Miller examine the characteristics of securities 
class action and characteristics likely to result in a lawsuit, I focus on an examination of these foreign 
firms as compared to all U.S incorporated firms that are subject to a class action lawsuit during the 
sample period. This approach allows me to compare both the market reaction at several case dates and the 
determinants of the market penalties for the foreign firms to that of all other domestic cases to establish 
whether any differences exist in market penalties and whether the determinants of these penalties differ 
based on whether a firm is a U.S. incorporated firm or a foreign incorporated firm.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on cross-
listing, discusses the securities laws of the United States, and introduces the hypotheses and general 
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methodology that will be employed to test the hypotheses. Within this Chapter, Section I reviews the 
relevant literature on cross-listing and bonding criticisms, Section II reviews the securities laws as they 
apply to foreign firms and the process of shareholder-initiated securities class action lawsuits and Section 
III discusses the hypotheses presented and the methodology used. Chapter 3 presents the initial sample 
collection method and the univariate analysis of the firm characteristics and market reactions between the 
sample and the control group of U.S. firms. Within this Chapter, Section IV presents the data collection 
method. Section V presents the results of empirical tests using U.S. market reactions at various 
announcement dates while Section VI presents the foreign market penalties associated with these 
announcement dates for the sample. Section VII verifies these results with several robustness measures. 
Chapter 4 presents the regression model for the multivariate analysis of reputational penalties. Within this 
Chapter, Section VIII discusses the method of separation of legal and reputational penalties, Section IX 
examines cross-sectional determinants of these reputational penalties and Section X presents the 
robustness measures employed to verify the regression results.  Section XI presents an alternate test of 
reputational penalties using a logit regression followed by the conclusion of the results of the paper in 




Cross Listing Literature and Securities Class Actions Review 
 
I. Review of cross-listing literature and enforcement criticism 
 
A firm that wishes to cross-list shares on a U.S. exchange may do so by employing one of two 
methods. The firm can either list its shares directly on the exchange or use an American Depository 
Receipt (ADR). First issued in 1927 by JPMorgan, ADRs are securities issued by a U.S. depository bank 
to domestic buyers and serve as a substitute for direct ownership of stock in the foreign corporation. A 
sponsored ADR is created at the request of a company by an American broker purchasing the company’s 
shares in their home market and establishing them at a custodian bank, which in turn issues the depository 
receipts. ADRs were created to circumvent difficulties in dealing with various currencies in foreign 
markets as investors are able to diversify their portfolios into foreign markets while trading in the U.S. 
stock markets. Each ADR represents either a fraction of a foreign share or one or many shares (known as 
the ADR ratio). This ADR ratio is decided upon by the depository institution. Currently there are four 
major commercial banks that provide depository services: JPMorgan, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and the 
Bank of New York Mellon.  
The use of ADR programs has increased dramatically in the past two decades. According to the 
Bank of New York Mellon database,2 there were over 700 shares of ADRs trading OTC or on the major 
exchanges at the end of 2009 as opposed to 215 shares in 1992. Currently, firms from 40 countries list 
ADR programs and the total global market capitalization of companies issuing depository receipts 
exceeded $12 trillion at the close of 2009. ADRs are listed as Level I, Level II, or Level III and each level 
has differing disclosure requirements from the SEC with increasing requirements and disclosure costs at 
each level. Level I ADRs are exempted from the SEC reporting requirements yet still incur listing fees 
                                                            
2 Bank of New York ADR Fact Sheets can be found at http://www.adrbnymellon.com/classic_index_factSheet.jsp 
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and legal fees. In addition to the fees and the loss of private control benefits, Level II and Level III ADRs 
are required to have reconciled with U.S. GAAP concerning disclosure of nonfinancial items and firms 
that trade on the major stock exchanges must comply with full registration and reporting standards of the 
exchanges.  
Level II and Level III ADRs trade on the NYSE/NASDAQ while Level I ADRs typically are 
traded on the over-the-counter markets via Pink Sheets or NASDAQ Bulletin Board. The majority of 
foreign firms cross-listing in the United States choose to do so via ADR programs. There is the option of 
direct cross-listing on a U.S. exchange that is utilized by some firms, primarily those from Canada or 
Israel.3 Since direct cross-listing and listing via an ADR program on the major U.S. exchanges involve 
essentially the same listing and reporting requirements and the same level of information disclosure, I 
examine both direct cross-listing and Level II and Level III ADRs in this paper. I do not include Level I 
ADRs in the sample as, in addition to not reconciling with GAAP, these firms may not even be listed 
voluntarily in the U.S. markets due to the recent amendment of Rule 12g3-2(b) by the SEC that allows for 
automatic exemption from U.S. registration requirements.4 
The motivation behind the decision for a firm to cross-list is one that has been extensively 
covered in academic literature. Research has pointed to several potential benefits of cross-listing for firms 
including increased access to capital, lower costs of capital, increased liquidity and firm visibility, and 
bonding (Doidge et al., 2004; Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lambert et al. 2007; 
Merton 1987; Karolyi, 1998; Karolyi and Stulz, 2002; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Karolyi and Foester, 
1993; Roell, 1995). The decision of if and where to cross-list depends on a cost-benefit analysis of these 
potential benefits against any additional direct and indirect costs, such as extra reporting requirements, 
registration and listing fees, and increased potential legal liability. If a firm believes the benefits will 
outweigh these additional costs then they will choose to cross-list on a foreign exchange.  
                                                            
3 Israeli firms tend to directly list shares on the U.S. stock exchanges as a response to a 2000 ruling by the Israeli Parliament that made it easier to 
list on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange based on voluntary disclosures or disclosures they make under U.S. Law (Licht, 2002). 
4 17 CFR 240.12g3-2 
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Prior research has found that firms that voluntarily cross-list tend to have higher valuations 
(Bianconi and Tan 2008; King and Segal, 2003), higher Tobin’s q ratios (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 
2004), and experience favorable stock price reactions to announcements of cross-listing, though there is 
some debate as to whether this is a permanent or temporary effect (Karolyi 1998; Sarkissian and Schill, 
2004; King and Segal, 2009).  The improved information availability and investor recognition from 
listing in the U.S. helps explain the higher returns a firm experiences after cross-listing. Firms that cross-
list on U.S. exchanges typically have an increase in secondary market liquidity, increased total trading 
value, decreased home market spreads, and fewer trading costs which contribute to higher visibility of the 
firm and better analyst coverage and forecasts (Merton, 1987; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998; Pagano, Roell, 
and Zechner, 2001; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003; Bancel and Mittoo, 2001; 
Karolyi and Stulz, 2002). Additionally, upon cross-listing in the United States, U.S. ownership of a 
foreign firm roughly doubles, particularly in the case of firms from countries with weak accounting 
backgrounds, suggesting that the improvement in disclosure is valued by U.S. investors (Ammer et al 
2006). 
This increase in disclosure also signals a firm’s desire to act in the best interest of shareholders 
that is central to the bonding hypothesis. As first proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), the 
bonding hypothesis applies to firms that need enhanced access to external finance and explains how these 
firms attempt to convey to potential investors their promise to improve their corporate governance and 
forgo private benefits. If a resolution is not available in the firm’s home market, then a company will be 
able to list shares abroad to “bond” itself to a country with better minority shareholder protection, such as 
the U.S. stock exchanges. This forces the firm to respect minority shareholder rights, increases the 
amount of information disclosed about the firm, and serves as a signal of the firm’s desire to act in the 
best interest of shareholders. The bonding hypothesis applies most directly to firms from emerging 
markets; however, it is also a potential reason for cross-listing for firms from various developed markets. 
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In his discussions of bonding, Coffee (2002) emphasized the legal bonding mechanism and argued that 
there are three mechanisms of U.S. listings that bond a firm to the legal system.5 Specifically, he stresses 
that cross-listing bonds firms in the U.S. because (1) they are subject to enforcement powers of the SEC, 
(2) investors can exercise low-cost and effective actions that are not available in the home market (such as 
class actions and derivative actions) and (3) the firm commits to providing fuller financial information in 
response to SEC requirements and reconcile its financial statements with GAAP.  
Bonding has found support in academic research (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge, 2004; 
Ayyagari, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller and Stulz, 2007; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Gande 
and Miller, 2011) but it has also found some critics. The main argument against the bonding hypothesis is 
that the risk of enforcement associated with cross-listing in the U.S. is immensely overstated by its 
supporters. In several papers Licht (2001a, 2001b, and 2003) argues that the SEC does not enforce the 
corporate governance rules for foreign issuers and is therefore relatively inefficient because of this 
“hands-off” policy as well as having less stringent disclosure requirement for foreign firms as compared 
to domestic firms. The largest differences in disclosure requirements between foreign and domestic 
issuers in the U.S. pertain to conflicts of interest and corporate governance matters. Rather than having to 
disclose individual transactions, foreign issuers may only disclose aggregate remuneration and options to 
purchase securities, do not have to disclose data concerning material transactions with officers, and are 
allowed up to six months to file annual reports after the close of the fiscal year. Additionally, rather than 
reporting owners of more than five percent of voting securities, foreign issuers are only required to report 
owners of more than ten percent, are exempted from some proxy reporting requirements, and, in some 
situations, can avoid disclosure of business segment information. When violations of disclosure 
requirements are found, they are rarely punished by the SEC. In fact, Frost and Pownall (1994) do not 
find any instances where disclosure violations by foreign issuers were subject to enforcement actions by 
                                                            
5 A second form of bonding is reputational bonding which proposes that firms develop a reputation for good governance in the host country 




the SEC. In a similar argument, Siegel (2005) also addresses the lack of SEC enforcement and highlights 
several instances of flagrant fraud by cross-listing firms that are not pursued by the SEC. He considers 
cases of asset tunneling from a sample of Mexican ADR firms and finds that SEC response to these cases 
is weak. In a later study, Licht, Li, Poliquin and Siegel (2011) also argue that the positive market response 
to a recent Supreme Court decision that weakens SEC enforcement authority could be due to “the 
deficiencies in the current design of the U.S. civil liability regime, by which insiders accused of civil 
misconduct rarely pay out of pocket to compensate outside investors effectively.”  
These challenges by Siegel, Licht, Frost and Pownall, and others emphasize the fact that legal 
enforcement in the U.S. is not perfect and possibly weaker than thought by those who initially argued for 
the bonding hypothesis and, at a minimum, casts some doubt on the efficacy of legal bonding. 
Interestingly, a vital point for the arguments for/against legal bonding is that these criticisms tend to focus 
on disclosure requirements or enforcement by the SEC and not on private legal enforcement. Legal 
bonding as proposed by Coffee is a larger issue than just SEC enforcement as bonding occurs not only 
from the threat of SEC enforcement but also from the fact that investors gain access to low-cost securities 
actions and gain access to fuller financial information of a firm, even if this increased disclosure is less 
than for U.S. firms because of exceptions. According to Coffee (2002), bonding occurs regardless of SEC 
enforcement because, when entering major U.S. markets, foreign issuers face strict liability for material 
statements or omissions and there is the presence of readily available private enforcement, such as 
contingent fees and class actions, which serve as a legal threat in the U.S. for violations. Typically in 
criticisms of bonding, private legal enforcement is discounted as a potential mechanism for legal 
enforcement against foreign issuers. Siegel (2005) does address the possibility of private class-actions as 
an enforcement mechanism but restricts his empirical analysis of these cases to that of documenting 
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settlement amounts and concludes that the actions were limited.6 Thus the legal threat of private securities 
litigation to U.S. cross-listing firms remains a largely unexplored area in academic research.  
Given this debate between the effectiveness of cross-listing firms bonding  to the legal system of 
the U.S. or the weak enforcement of the SEC, analyzing the impact of private securities class action 
lawsuits is important as it may shed some light on whether the enforcement of securities law violations 
are as limited as thought. This paper seeks to answer the question of whether private securities class 
action lawsuits are serving as a mechanism for enforcement of securities class actions by analyzing the 
market reaction and the legal and reputational penalties assessed at the announcement of securities law 
violations for cross-listing firms on the major U.S. exchanges. By comparing these reactions to that of 
domestic firms and examining the determinants of these penalties, I am able to establish whether these 
reactions are significantly less for foreign firms or whether the market enforcement of violations is similar 
between foreign firms and domestic firms when violations of securities laws are disclosed. The analyses 
provide support to Coffee’s argument that access to low-cost private actions for investors could 
potentially be functioning as an effective legal bonding mechanism for cross-listing firms in the United 
States and that firms are not “getting away with it” when they break laws. 
 
II. U.S Securities Laws and Shareholder-initiated securities class action filings 
 
U.S. securities regulation is one of the most comprehensive in the world with the most important 
statutes governing U.S. securities laws being the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities 
Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). Under Rule 12b-1 of 
the Exchange Act, a foreign issuer must register its securities if it lists them on a U.S. stock exchange.7 
Once a company is listed in the U.S. it is subject to SEC regulations. Additionally, Rule 12g-3 of the 
                                                            
6
 Licht et al. (2011) do briefly mention that private enforcement of securities laws may have some potential benefits. 
7 17 C.F.R.§ 240.12b-1 
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Exchange Act requires foreign issuers that meet certain criteria to register their equity and provide an 
annual report containing GAAP reconciled financial statements within six months of the end of each 
fiscal year.8  
 
a. Securities laws as applied to foreign firms 
Though the Securities Act and the Exchange Act define jurisdiction to cover domestic and foreign 
private issuers and does not make a distinction between them, in an effort to maintain attractiveness to 
foreign investors, the SEC provides a number of exemptions of reporting requirements for foreign issuers 
to decrease the costs associated with listing in the United States. As Licht (2003) discusses, there are five 
major differences related to disclosure of conflicts of interest and corporate governance matters between 
the 10-K annual report required of domestic issuers and the 20-F annual report required of foreign issuers. 
The first difference is that, rather than having to disclose individual transactions, foreign issuers only have 
to disclose aggregate remuneration and options to purchase securities. The second difference is that 
issuers do not have to disclose data concerning material transactions with officers and the third is that 
foreign firms are allowed up to six months to file annual reports after the close of the fiscal year rather 
than the 135 days required of domestic issuers. Rather than reporting owners of more than five percent of 
voting securities, the fourth difference results in foreign issuers are only required to report owners of 
more than ten percent.  Lastly, unlike U.S. firms, foreign firms are exempted from some proxy reporting 
requirements, short-swing trading rules, and they can avoid disclosure of business segment information in 
some situations. A more recent development in regards to securities laws applied to foreign firms comes 
from the exceptions made in SOX for foreign issuers. The SEC determined that a foreign firm would be 
                                                            
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-3. Exemptions to this are for firms with equity held by less than 500 shareholders of which less than 300 reside in the U.S 
and total assets under $5 million. Additionally, non-U.S. firms are exempt from filing if they do not list their shares on a U.S. securities exchange 
so firms listing on the pink sheets or OTC-BB will be exempt from reporting other than providing the SEC with copies of material information 
made public in their home market. 
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exempt from any law provisions of SOX that generates a conflict of interest with the foreign firm’s home 
country laws.9 
Critics of bonding argue that because of these exemptions foreign firms are not actually bonding 
to a stricter corporate governance system (Licht, 1998). In opposition, supporters of bonding argue that 
even though U.S. listings are not deterring the expropriation of all private benefits, the more relaxed 
standards of governance and disclosure for foreign firms does not change the fact that foreign issuers are 
still bound by relatively strict rules and thus are still bonding to a strong legal system with reliable 
underwriters and auditors, strict liability for misstatements and omissions, and the threat of private 
enforcement for violations (Coffee, 2002). 
 
b.  Legal Enforcement 
Even though they have a lower burden of proof than private plaintiffs, the SEC does not file as 
many securities cases as private plaintiffs due to limited resources and rarely files against foreign firms. 
In fact, a search of cases from 1996-2009 finds that only six foreign firms that cross-list on the major 
exchanges have actions filed against them by the SEC pertaining to their securities and all six are in 
addition to ongoing private class actions.10 In contrast to the limited SEC filings, the amount of private 
litigation against foreign issuers under federal securities laws has grown to represent approximately 
fourteen percent of cases filed each year and can therefore reasonably be considered the primary 
enforcement mechanism against foreign firms accused of securities law violations. 
Class actions are defined as any “civil action brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by one 
or more representative persons”.11   The provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act that give 
                                                            
9An example would be German firms and the differing definition of independent board members on the supervisory board. 
10 The firms charged with securities violations by the SEC are Vivendi Universal, S.A. (2003), Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (2003), 
Koninklijke Ahold N.V. (2002), TV Azteca S.A. (2003), Bre-X Minerals, and Barclays Bank PLC (2007). Four additional ADR firms are subject 
charges of violations of the anti-bribery regulations by the SEC during this period but are excluded as this is not related to company securities.  
11 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as listed at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1332.shtml.  
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rise to civil liabilities against foreign issuers are  provisions  §§ 11, 12 of the Securities Act,  and § 
§10(b),  29(b) of the Exchange Act. 12 For domestic issuers, §16(b) of the Exchange Act would also be 
applicable.13  The SEC, Justice Department, or private plaintiffs can file complaints against companies 
under any combination of these section violations in the Securities Act or the Exchange Act if they feel 
that manipulation of securities and deception of investors occur within the markets covered by these 
Acts.14  
The focus of this paper, securities class action lawsuits, are those class actions that are brought by 
shareholders against the corporation, its officer and directors, and others on behalf of a group of investors 
who have suffered an economic loss in a security as the result of fraudulent stock manipulation or other 
violations of securities laws by the issuer. Typically these actions involve a plaintiff or a group of 
plaintiffs that allege a company has caused its securities to become overpriced either from failure to 
disclosure material information to investors or from distribution of misleading or false information to 
investors. In general, securities class actions consist of actions that allege misrepresentations or omissions 
in registration statements (Section 11 of the Securities Act), prospectuses (Section 12(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act), and/or other SEC filings, as well as those actions that allege violations of the anti-fraud 
provision of the federal securities laws (Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act).  These 
claims encompass actions such as investment fraud and manipulation, pricing violations, and improper 
execution of trades. In a federal class action a “lead plaintiff” consisting of one or more investors is 
typically assigned to the case to represent the entire class of investors who suffered financial loss as a 
result of the legal violation. The lead plaintiff represents only those persons who purchased stock during 
the court-certified class period. The "class period" is the time frame during which it is believed the 
alleged fraud or other securities law violation(s) artificially inflated the price of the stock in the case. 
                                                            
12 § 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C. §78cc(b)) is a provision purporting to affect legal relationships between 
private parties, but not explicitly creating a right of action. 
13 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) 
14 There is a time limit for charges of misconduct as charges must occur within two years of the date of discovery or within five years after the 
violation occurs, whichever is earlier.  
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Typically about one-third of securities class action lawsuits are dismissed and two-thirds settle with 
plaintiffs being granted relief in the form of financial recovery to the class members in the settlement.15   
Most of the private securities suits filed are brought under the anti-fraud provisions Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 under it of the Exchange Act, which prohibits omissions of material fact, dissemination of 
any untrue statement, or the use of any manipulative device in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. Claims are filed under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act if the plaintiff believes 
the defendant had malicious intent by way of a desire to deceive or commit fraud and these claims can 
apply in connection to proxy, voting, tender offer, or going private actions as well as basic sales of 
securities. Section 10(b) pertains to the purchase/sale of any security regardless of issuance and thus 
includes securities bought and sold in the aftermarket.16 Under Section 10(b) is Rule 10b-5 which 
specifically prohibits misstatement and omissions to state material facts and states that: 
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud  
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security”17 
The parties liable under Section 10(b) include anyone who has a duty to disclose but instead knowingly 
employs a manipulative (defined as exploitative conduct that manipulates the whole market) or deceptive 
                                                            
15 http://law.freeadvice.com/litigation/class_actions/securities_class_action.htm. 
16 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b‐5 
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(defined as dishonest conduct such as omitting something investors need in order to make a good 
decision, including half-truths, instead of full disclosure) devices in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security.18  If this action deceives investors or manipulates markets regulated by the SEC then the 
responsible party is liable to any purchasers/sellers of the security, the SEC, or the U.S. Attorney 
Department of Justice.19  Further, many securities class action lawsuits are also filed alleging violations of 
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, which deals with the liability of the controlling persons. Violations of 
Section 20(a) concern the officers, controlling shareholders, board members, etc. that are liable for the 
fraudulent statements.20 
Many securities class action cases are also filed alleging violations of one or more of Sections 11, 
12(a)(2) or 15 of the Securities Act and are filed in connection with security issuances. Cases filed 
alleging violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act are alleging fraud in the registration documents in 
conjunction with the issuance of a security.21 Section 11 covers misstatement or omission of material facts 
so that it is misleading in some way in any of the registration documents. Information is considered 
material if there is a substantial likelihood of it being significant to an investor. Those potentially liable 
under Section 11 are the issuing company, officers, underwriters, and company directors at the time of 
filing, any person named as a new director, and experts such as accountants. These parties are liable to 
any person that bought the security covered by the registration statement at the time it becomes effective. 
Purchases do not have be the initial purchase, just any purchase that could reasonably be bought under the 
false or misleading statements on the registration.  
Cases filed alleging violations of Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act are specifically focused 
on misstatements or omission of facts in the prospectus itself.22 There is a separate burden of truth with 
Section 12(a)(2) than in Section 11. This is because Section 12(a)(2) violations cover more documents 
                                                            
18 Knowingly means the act is undertaken with scienter which means that the offending party has knowledge of the wrongness of the act prior to 
engaging in it.  
19 Approximately 80percent of these suits are settled before any ruling is made (Martin et al., 1999).  
20 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) 
21 15 U.S.C. § 77k 
22 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) 
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than just the final prospectus and if earlier available versions of the registration documents contain the 
misstatement or omission and purchasers can prove that they used this earlier document as a basis for 
purchase then the company is liable under Section 12(a)(2). Under Section 12(a)(2) it is stated that any 
person who sells securities is liable for any known untruths or omissions in the prospectus as long as the 
plaintiff is not aware of the false or misleading statement in the prospectus. Cases filed alleging violations 
of Section 15 of the Securities Act pertain to the controlling person.23 While Section 11 and Section 
12(a)(2) list a set of liable parties for misstatements and omissions from various registration documents, 
Section 15 expands this definition to include any controlling persons (officers, controlling shareholders, 
board members, etc.) who controls the person that manages the questionable company registration 
documents. To illustrate a typical scenario, Appendix A provides two examples of cases that allege 
violations of these securities laws.  
 
c. Regulation changes due to Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
On June 24, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the extraterrestrial reach of Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (and Rule 10b‐5 as adopted by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission under Section 10(b)), in Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd.  Specifically, the Court 
held that “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase 
or sale of any other security in the United States.”24 
Prior to this opinion, U.S. courts typically used two tests to determine whether the U.S. courts had 
jurisdiction with respect to foreign firms and satisfaction of either test would confer jurisdiction. The 
“effects” test considers “whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or 
                                                            
23 15 U.S.C. § 77o 
24 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010). 
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upon United States citizens.”25 The “conduct” test, considers “the nature of conduct within the United 
States as it relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent scheme.”26  
Post-Morrison, a U.S. investor may not bring a securities fraud action under Section 10(b) in the 
United States if the investor purchased shares in a foreign market or country unless the shares are listed 
on an American stock exchange. In this one opinion, the Court has significantly altered the complexion of 
securities fraud enforcement involving foreign firms. However, Morrison has few (if any) effects on the 
utility of the findings in this paper. With the exception of one case, all of the sample cases in this study 
involve transactions affected on or securities listed on U.S. securities markets. 27 Even after the Morrison 
decision, U.S. courts would still have jurisdiction over the cases in the sample.  
 
III. Hypotheses and Methodology 
 
Shareholder-initiated lawsuits typically receive extensive coverage in the business press, but there 
has been much less coverage of shareholder suits in published academic work. Of the existing literature, 
several papers examine the characteristics of the firms most likely to face securities class action lawsuits 
and the outcomes of these cases (Strahan, 1998; McTier and Wald, 2009; Martin et al., 1999; Cox and 
Thomas, 2008; Cheng et al. 2010). Additionally, the losses surrounding lawsuit announcements have been 
examined in previous literature (Griffin, et al., 2000; Gande and Lewis, 2009). However, none of these 
previous empirical studies have examined the differences between losses or characteristics based on 
country of incorporation and many prior studies focus solely on domestic firms rather than separating and 
examining foreign firms from the sample. The question of what specifically happens to international firms 
                                                            
25 SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003) 
26 Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983). 
27 The exception is the 2005 case against Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V. This case is filed on behalf of purchasers of the Company 
stock from April 28, 1998 through November 8, 2000 on the EASDAQ. Additionally, of the sample cases which clearly list the residence or 
address of the lead plaintiff, approximately 90 percent of cases have U.S.-based investors serving as a lead plaintiff while 10 percent of cases 
have a foreign listed investor serving as one of the lead plaintiffs.   
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around the events that lead to a lawsuit filing is largely unexplored in the literature and is the subject of 
this paper. 
 
a. Hypotheses  
The first question of interest in this paper is whether or not international firms are subject to 
similar punishments as domestic firms when they are faced with securities class action lawsuits. This 
paper attempts to determine these differences by comparing foreign cross-listed firms subject to securities 
class action lawsuits to the general population of domestic firms subject to securities class action lawsuits.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Market reaction at the disclosure of violations of U.S. securities laws and at the filing of a 
shareholder-initiated class action will be an economically and statistically significant event for the 
foreign firm. 
 
 Initial research into the events around class actions finds evidence that there is a significantly 
negative short-term price response to the announcement of a securities class action. Griffin, et al. (2000) 
find statistically significant negative responses to the litigation announcement as well as a persistent 
negative stock response for several weeks after the securities class action filing announcement, which is 
more pronounced when the firm is smaller or is covered by fewer analysts. Later research also finds 
evidence of even larger initial stock price reactions when partial anticipation is accounted for. Gande and 
Lewis (2009) report a significantly negative stock price reaction to the news of a securities class action 
filing and they document evidence of an industry spillover effect where investors partially anticipate 
future lawsuits based on the firm’s propensity to be sued. If private enforcement of securities laws is to be 
considered an effective mechanism for enforcement against foreign issuers, I expect to find similar 
statistically and economically significant market reactions at the disclosure of securities law violations 
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and the announcement of a private securities class action lawsuit against foreign issuers. Alternatively, it 
is possible that U.S. shareholders react significantly less negatively to the announcement of a violation of 
U.S. securities laws for a foreign firm based on the perception that it will be difficult for U.S. 
shareholders to bring actions against foreign firms when the firms do a substantial portion of business 
outside of the U.S. and thus an expected class action and potential settlement is not likely for these firms. 
This argument is common. In fact, many firms emphasize this view in their SEC registration statements 
by stating that there is a risk to U.S. investors that they may not be able to enforce actions against the firm 
in the event of a U.S. securities law violation.28 
 
Hypothesis 2: Reputational penalties assessed for violations of securities laws will be determined not only 
by the firm and case characteristics found in previous literature, but also by country specific 
characteristics that may indicate the likelihood of obtaining adequate compensation from the firm. 
 
In terms of firm characteristics and case outcomes of securities class action lawsuits, early 
literature on the characteristics of firms likely to face securities class actions finds that those firms that are 
more likely to suffer from agency problems are the ones that tend to face securities class actions. In 
particular, Strahan (1998) reports that large firms, young firms, risky firms, non-dividend paying firms 
and low market-to-book firms are more likely to be the subject of a securities class action. Additionally, 
firms that overinvest are more likely to face securities class action lawsuits (McTier and Wald, 2009). 
Post suit, firms tend to decrease any overinvestment activities and increase leverage and cash holdings, 
which is consistent with the view that firms attempt to at least partially resolve agency problems due to 
the increased scrutiny they receive during a securities class action case (McTier and Wald 2009). 
                                                            
28 For example, Lipman Engineering, an Israeli firm, states in their F-1 form that “It may be difficult to enforce a U.S. judgment against us, our 
executive officers and directors and the selling shareholders. Because substantially all of our assets and the assets of a substantial majority of our 
directors and executive officers and the selling shareholders, are located outside the U.S., a judgment obtained in the U.S. against us or any of 
them may not be collectible within the U.S. Furthermore, service of process upon these individuals, a substantial majority of whom reside outside 
the U.S., may be difficult to obtain within the U.S. In addition, there is doubt as to the enforceability of civil liabilities under the Securities Act 
and the Securities Exchange Act in original actions instituted in Israel.” 
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Generally speaking, class actions appear to concentrate in technology, healthcare, retail, and 
financial services industries and settlements are the largest in healthcare cases (Beasley et al., 2000; 
Martin et al., 1999; Francis et al., 1994) with median settlement amounts being larger and class periods 
being shorter for firms operating in technology industries (Carlton et al., 1996).  According to Martin et 
al. (1999), eighty-three percent of securities class action cases eventually settle and most cases that are 
appealed are settled before resolution of the pending appeal. Rather than being attributable to the case 
merits, settlement size appears to be determined by the amount of provable investor losses, the 
availability of assets from the defendants, whether or not the defendant operates in the health services 
industry, and the length of the class period, while the existence of an institutional investor, an SEC 
investigation, or a bankruptcy filing has not been found to have significant effect on case outcome and 
settlement size (Martin et al. 1999; Cox and Thomas, 2008; Cheng et al. 2010). 
Based on this prior research, I expect to see similar determinant power for the characteristics of 
firms subject to securities class action filings for the foreign sample in terms of firm size, firm 
performance, and case characteristics. However, in the case of firms incorporated in the United States, the 
enforcement of a judgment against a firm for a violation of U.S. securities laws is less risky than that of a 
foreign firm since a majority of the firm’s assets and majority of executive officers and directors will also 
typically be located in the United States. Unique to the sample in this paper is the fact that in many cases 
the firm will have a substantial amount of assets and shareholders outside the United States which may 
make it more difficult to obtain a judgment against the firm. Thus, market penalties may also be 
determined by characteristics that indicate how easy it will be to bring a class action against the foreign 
firm and the likelihood of obtaining a settlement.  
Specifically, I hypothesize that the level of prosperity in the home country, as measured by GDP 
and market capitalization, will impact the perception shareholders have of the firm’s ability to pay and 
effect the penalties assessed at disclosure of a violation of securities laws. The potential of additional 
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class actions in the home country may also impact the reputational penalties measure as shareholders may 
adjust their expectation of future lawsuits based on whether there may be legal penalties in other 
countries. Additionally, the strength of corporate governance standards and protection of minority 
shareholder interests in the home market for foreign firms may influence the perception of whether the 
firm would be likely to violate securities laws.  I hypothesize that firms coming from countries with 
strong corporate governance or strong minority shareholder protection will be perceived as less likely to 
violate securities laws and therefore may be subjected to larger reputational penalties in the event of a 
violation. Moreover, since firms in weaker governance countries or those with less protection of minority 
shareholders would be thought to be more likely to violate securities laws, shareholders may already have 
partially discounted this risk into the stock price prior to the disclosure of the malfeasance. In this 
situation the reputational penalties assessed in the days surrounding the disclosure of the violations from 
these firms will be less severe than firms coming from stronger shareholder protection countries.  
The alternative would be that the country-level characteristics have no explanatory power on the 
size of the reputational penalties assessed. Since the difficulty of enforceability of violations of securities 
laws for cross-listing firms is often discussed as a risk even for firms coming from countries with strong 
governance and shareholder protection, the reputational penalties assessed at the news of a U.S. securities 
law violation may be similar across all foreign firms regardless of country of origin as investors may have 
partially discounted this risk into the stock price prior to the disclosure for all foreign firms.29      
 
                                                            
29 Firms from countries with no exchange controls and strong governance, such as Canada or the United Kingdom also list the difficulty of 
enforcing U.S. federal securities laws as a risk. For example, Corel Corp, a Canadian firm, listed in their 2006 Prospectus that “You may be 
unable to enforce actions against us, certain of our directors and officers or our independent public accounting firm under U.S. federal securities 
laws. A majority of our directors and officers, as well as our independent public accounting firm, reside principally in Canada. Because all or a 
substantial portion of our assets and the assets of these persons are located outside the U.S., it may not be possible for you to effect service of 
process within the U.S. upon us or those persons. Furthermore it may not be possible for you to enforce judgments obtained in U.S. courts based 
upon the civil liability provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws or other laws of the U.S. against us or those persons. There is doubt as to the 
enforceability in original actions in Canadian courts of liabilities based upon the U.S. federal securities laws, and as to the enforceability in 
Canadian courts of judgments of U.S. courts obtained in actions based upon the civil liability provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws. 




Hypotheses 3: When the announcement of a violation occurs, the abnormal returns in the home market of 
a sample firm will be significantly negative and CARs will closely mirror the reaction in the U.S. markets, 
particularly in home markets where information asymmetries are less pronounced or exchange controls 
do not exist. 
 
 Several empirical studies have found that in the absence of exchange controls there are no 
arbitrage opportunities with regards to stocks listed on multiple-exchanges (e.g. Pagano and Roell, 1991 
and 1993; Chen and Knez, 1995; Ben-Zion et al. 1996; Domowitz et al. 1997).30 As a result, I expect that 
the negative news concerning violations of U.S. securities laws will be quickly reflected in foreign 
markets as well as the U.S. markets. When global price movements from the U.S markets and the firm’s 
home market are considered, I expect the combined penalties associated with violations of U.S. securities 
laws to represent very economically significant losses for cross-listing firms. 
However, in addition to documenting the full effect of the penalties imposed by shareholders for 
violations of U.S. securities laws, determining whether prices change equally for markets with differing 
geographic distances or in those countries with exchange controls may yield additional insight into capital 
market integration. A well-known event concerning cross-market arbitrage is that of dominant and 
satellite markets where cross-market arbitrage is found to not be fully effective in the short-term due to 
information segmentation.31 Though market participants will act quickly to close the gap in prices 
between markets, prior research finds that as information is revealed in the dominant market the satellite 
markets will “chase” the dominant one due to information asymmetries (e.g. Nuermark et al., 1991; Ben-
Zion et al. 1996). Since research has found evidence of geographic information asymmetries (e.g. Hau, 
2001; Choe et al., 2000) and exchange controls can create arbitrage opportunities, I expect to see larger 
                                                            
30 This is because of the economic "law of one price" which holds that two assets with identical payoffs in all states of the world should sell for 
the same price, barring transaction costs. In terms of capital market integration, markets are perfectly integrated if the law holds across all 
markets.  




reaction differences in home market and U.S. market CARs from firms that have home markets with 
either condition. Though the market reaction is predicted to be significantly negative in all markets, I 
expect firms coming from countries with no exchange controls and geographically close, such as Canada, 
to have more similar home market reactions as compared to the U.S. market reaction than firms coming 
from countries with exchange controls or large geographic distances, such as China or India. These types 
of countries are expected to have less negative reactions in the home country as compared to the U.S. 
market around the disclosure of U.S. securities law violations.  Alternatively, it could be that there are no 
noticeable differences between market reactions from firms based on country of incorporation or 
headquarters. Finding that there are no differences in market reactions based on these differences in 
country characteristics could be attributed to either the fact that many cross-listing firms are large 
multinational corporations which are well covered in the press no matter what country they are 
incorporated in or that the presence of exchange controls or distance does not impact market reactions for 
the disclosure of violations of securities laws or the news of securities class action filings. 
 
b. Methodology Overview 
To test these hypotheses, I use a methodology similar to that found in other papers that examine 
penalties associated with corporate misconduct. To measure the market reaction around incidents of 
securities class action lawsuits, I follow standard event study methodology similar to those employed by 
Karpoff and Lott (1993) where U.S. market reactions are measured for various event dates pertaining to 
the securities law violation events as discussed in Chapter 3. The abnormal returns are then cumulated 
into a single enforcement measure and compared to that of a control sample of domestic cases to 
determine whether there are differences in penalties assessed by the market based on foreign or domestic 
firms, as one would expect if enforcement of foreign firms is weak. I repeat this process for reactions on 
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the home markets where information is available for the sample firm to determine a measure of foreign 
market losses as well as U.S. market losses and compare the differences between the different markets. 
I separate out the legal and reputational penalties following a similar methodology of measuring 
reputation loss as utilized in studies such as Peltzman (1981), Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Karpoff and 
Lott (1993), Karpoff, Lee, and Vendrzyk (1999), and Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) in Chapter 4. I 
compare these penalties to those of domestic firms to determine whether they are significantly different as 
critics of enforcement would most likely believe. Additionally, I examine possible determinants of 
reputation loss to determine if country-level legal environments and governance indicators are related to 





Market Reactions to Securities Class Actions 
 
IV. Sample collection 
 
a. Summary statistics  
The initial sample of cross-listing firms subject to securities class actions is collected from the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance 
Analytics Class Actions.32 To collect both the sample and the control, I merged the securities class action 
lawsuits listed from 1996-2009 in the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse with the listing of 
class actions in Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance Analytics Class Actions. Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance Analytics Class Actions database contains federal, SEC, state, 
and international court records and, as I am only interested in securities class action cases, I restricted 
filings the sample cases to those filed in or transferred to the federal courts.  Since numerous studies have 
shown there is a significant difference between the types and outcomes of cases before and after the 
passing of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) I do not include cases prior to 
1996 (Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard, 2006; Talley and Johnsen, 2004; Helland, 2006). The initial merge 
from these sources consists of 3,411 cases at 2,726 unique organizations.  
From the sample of foreign firms, firms that list in Bermuda are excluded because these firms 
often are U.S. firms incorporating in Bermuda primarily for tax benefits. Level I ADR programs are 
excluded because firms that cross-list on the OTC Bulletin Boards/Pink Sheets are not required to 
reconcile with U.S. GAAP and their accounting statements would not be comparable. Additionally, Level 
I ADR programs are not considered since the recent amendment of Rule 12g3-2(b) by the SEC that 
                                                            
32 The Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse can be found at http://securities.stanford.edu/index.html and ISS Governance Analytics 
can be found at https://ga.issproxy.com/. 
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allows for automatic exemption from U.S. registration requirements creates an avenue that allows for 
depository banks and stock markets to establish unsponsored/involuntary Level I ADRs. 33 The bonding 
hypothesis and the associated criticisms more directly apply to firms that voluntarily choose to list on 
U.S. exchanges so this exclusion guarantees no involuntary listings are included in the sample. In total 
this process excludes 101 cases.  After merging the databases and excluding the firms as discussed above, 
in total there are 3,320 cases filed in the federal courts from 1996-2009 at 2,655 unique defendant 
organizations named as the primary defendant firm.  Case characteristics are determined from 
examination of Bloomberg, the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) Governance Analytics Class Actions, and filings in EDGAR. After excluding those cases 
that are missing information from these sources, the initial sample of cross-listed firms subject to 
securities class action lawsuits consists of 234 cases at 193 unique firms while the control consists of 
3,088 cases filed at 2,464 unique U.S. firms from 1996-2009.  
The cases filed per year against the sample and control firms are presented in Table 1A.34 As 
evidenced in Panel A of Table 1A, an average of eight percent of cases are filed against firms that cross-
list on the major U.S. exchanges per year and in the last five years of the sample period approximately ten 
percent of cases files are against sample firms.35  Panel B lists the number of firms that cross-list on the 
major U.S. exchanges (NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ) per sample year and the number of cases filed per 
year against firms on these exchanges. An average of 2.5 percent of firms listing each year on these 
exchanges have a securities class action lawsuit filed against them by shareholders with the latter years of 
the sample increasing to more than three percent of foreign firms cross-listing on major exchanges.36 Of 
cases filed, the number against firms listing on NYSE or NASDAQ is roughly the same where 50 percent 
                                                            
33 17 CFR 240.12g3-2. The rule provides automatic exemptions for firms that make material information available on its website and maintains a 
listing on one or more non-U.S. exchanges. http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch021308ebs-fhk.htm. 
34 All tables and figures are located in Appendix C  
35 When all foreign firms are considered the cases against foreign firms average approximately 14% of cases filed per year (See Clearinghouse 
Research at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research.html) 
36 This is similar to the percent of U.S. firms with securities class action filings each year. Gande and Miller (2011) find that an average of 2.41 
percent of U.S. firms listing on U.S. exchanges are the subject of securities class action lawsuits from 1996-2009.  
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list on the NYSE and 49 percent list on NASDAQ. The remaining one percent of sample firms list on 
AMEX.  Table 1B lists the country and region of incorporation for firms in the sample alongside the 
country and region of primary headquarters and primary sales as determined from company annual 
reports in the year of the lawsuit filing. Almost half of the sample firms list the United States as the 
country of primary sales and the majority of cases are filed against firms incorporated and headquartered 
in developed markets with approximately 64 percent of sample cases being filed against firms that are 
incorporated in either Western Europe or Canada. The numbers of firms incorporated and headquartered 
in most regions are similar with the exception of emerging Asia and the Caribbean as only four percent of 
sample firms are incorporated in emerging Asia Pacific but almost 13 percent of sample firms are 
headquartered there. This is due primarily to several sample firms that incorporate in the Cayman Islands 
but are headquarters in China.  
- Insert Table 1 about here- 
Next, firm financial information and stock price information is collected from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP where available. Foreign home market stock price information is collected using DataStream where 
available. Any information on cases, firm governance, and shareholders not available from these sources 
is collected from the firm’s website information, Bloomberg Law, and Lexis-Nexis searches. Of the 
control and sample firms, 2,457 are corporations that list identifiers in CRSP. The organizations that do 
not have records in CRSP are excluded from the analysis as the vast majority of them are LLC, LLP, or 
various mutual funds. Due to missing data from the listed sources, an additional 41 cases are excluded 
from the analysis and the final sample consists of 191 cases at 160 unique firms.  
- Insert Table 2 about here- 
Case characteristics for these sample firms are listed with the information for domestic firms in 
Table 2 alongside tests for differences in mean and median values. The violation period and delay for 
shareholder initiated securities class action filings after the disclosure of the violation are not significantly 
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different between domestic and foreign cases. Violation periods have median values of approximately one 
year and the median case filing delays of approximately one month after the disclosure of the violation. 
Almost half of the cases filed allege violations of GAAP while approximately twenty percent allege 
violations in the registration documents or prospectus of an equity issuance. Lead plaintiff identity is 
significantly different between foreign and domestic firm cases as over forty percent of foreign cases have 
one or more institutional lead plaintiffs on average while only thirty-five percent of domestic cases have 
an institutional investor serving as a lead plaintiff.  Additionally, foreign firms tend to have more analysts 
following them at the time of the lawsuit filing, though this is only significantly different in the median 
and is expected due to the typically larger size of cross-listing firms. As expected, cases tend to 
concentrate in the technology, retail and finance industries. Approximately the same percentage of cases 
are against firms in these industries between the sample and control though there is a slightly higher 
percentage of technology firms in the sample of foreign firms and a higher percentage of retail firms for 
the domestic firms.  
- Insert Table 3 about here- 
Table 3 compares accounting and U.S. market performance indicators for the sample and control 
in the year prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Typical of cross-listing firms, the sample firms are much 
larger than the domestic firms in terms of total assets held, market capitalization, and sales. Additionally, 
domestic firms tend to have lower free cash flows and higher Tobin’s q with more leverage than sample 
firms while market performance measured in terms of prior one- and three- year market adjusted 
compounded returns are similar between the control and sample. In unreported tables the same statistics 
are also calculated for the year prior to the disclosure event and domestic and foreign comparison results 





b. Event Dates 
To determine market penalties for the securities law violations, I separate each case into three distinct 
events which are cumulated into an overall reaction. The first event date is the “disclosure date” which 
coincides with the date listed in the complaint document from which the information of the violation 
becomes public.37 Of the sample cases, the alleged U.S. securities law violation was initially disclosed as 
a company issued press release 59.57 percent of the time. The violation was initially disclosed by the U.S. 
press or government 31.3 percent of the time and foreign press or government initially disclosed the 
violation 7.39 percent of the time. The second event date is the “filing date” which is the first date of the 
filed complaint in the first district.38 For many violations, in the days following the initial complaint there 
are other cases filed from other attorney’s offices in other districts that are later consolidated into one 
class action. To avoid double-counting the cases, I only use the first filing date as the event date.39 Lastly, 
for the cases in which an outcome is determined, I capture the date of the decision announcement. If a 
settlement is announced, I capture the “settlement date” as the first date in which the news of a settlement 
is announced in the press. In many cases a tentative settlement agreement is announced prior to the 
finalized settlement. In this case I use the tentative settlement announcement since it would be the first 
notice of the intention of the firm to settle and the probable terms of settlement. If a dismissal is 







37 This is the date listed from the court documents as which the materially false or misleading information becomes public.  
38 There are times when the disclosure date and the filing date are within ten days of each other. Griffin et al. (2000) classify this as a “rapid 
filing.” To avoid any potentially confounding effects in tests, in unreported tables I also exclude cases where the filing date and disclosure date 
are within +/- five days. CAR and economic effect results are unchanged when these cases are excluded.  
39 This approach potentially causes a slight downward bias to results for filing date effects. Since the argument is that the filing date reactions 
should be significant, this biases my results against finding significant reactions.  
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V. U.S. Market penalties 
 
a. Change in market capitalization around event dates 
The change in market capitalization is computed and reported in Table 4 for the domestic and 
foreign firms around significant case event dates. Two commonly computed measures of Maximum 
Dollar Loss (MDL) and Disclosure Dollars Loss (DDL) are presented for domestic firms in the U.S. 
market and for the sample firms in the U.S. market and the firm’s home market if available. The MDL is 
defined as the as change in the defendant firm’s market capitalization from the trading day with the 
highest U.S. market capitalization during the class period to the trading day immediately following the 
end of the class period and the DDL is calculated as the change in the defendant firm’s U.S. market 
capitalization between the trading day immediately preceding the end of the class period and the trading 
day immediately following the end of the class period.40 DDL and MDL are simplified measures of losses 
and are used as estimates of the impact of the information revealed at the end of the class period. 
Additionally, the dollar losses for the remaining case event dates are also reported for the filing date, 
settlement date and dismissal date. Results are presented as both U.S. dollars lost and as a percentage of 
lost market capitalization. As reported in Table 4, for both foreign and domestic issuers, the percentage of 
market value loss averages sixty percent over the violation class period and approximately eighteen 
percent at the disclosure of the violation. As evidenced in Panel B, foreign firms also are subject to large 
changes in market capitalization in their home market at the news of a securities law violation as the 
MDL in the home market is over fifty percent on average and the disclosure results in almost sixteen 
percent loss in market capitalization.  
- Insert Table 4 about here- 
                                                            
40 Cornerstone Research publishes the MDL and DDL measures for all cases each year in the “Year in Review” that can be found in the Stanford 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse research publications.  
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 The announcement of a securities class action filing accounts for between negative 1.99 percent 
(foreign) and 2.44 percent change (domestic) in market capitalization for a firm on average. The 
resolution of the case, whether dismissed or settled, does not result in a large change in market 
capitalization as the average loss or gain is less than one percent. Taken together, all event dates cumulate 
to between sixteen and nineteen percent loss in market capitalization for domestic firms (18.46 percent) 
and foreign firms (17.93 percent). 
 
b. Event Studies 
The MDL and DDL measures in Table 4 indicate that the losses in market capitalization at the 
disclosure of violation information are similar for international cross-listing firms and domestic firms 
subject to securities class action lawsuits. To further examine this, I study the market reaction to the news 
of violations and lawsuit filings by conducting an event study around the various event dates discussed in 
the previous section.   
I follow standard event study methodology and measure the share price response to the lawsuit 
filing date over the event period using the market model as the pricing benchmark. Daily abnormal 
returns are computed as the actual return minus the market model predicted return: 
)ˆˆ( mtjjjtjt RRAR       (1) 
Where j̂ and j̂ are OLS estimates of firm j’s market model parameters ( j and j ), jtR  is the rate of 
return on stock j over day t and mtR  is the rate of return on the value-weighted index companies on CRSP 
over day t. Results are robust to using the market model with the equal-weighted index and using the 
market adjusted returns model.  
Abnormal returns are based on market model parameter estimates over the 125-trading-day 
period from day -135 to day -11, where day 0 is the lawsuit filing date or other event date. Cumulative 
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abnormal returns (CARs) are computed as the sum of the abnormal returns beginning in day 1T and 















    (2) 
A variety of event windows are examined to determine whether there is a difference between 
sample and control firms around the securities law violation dates. The event date is used as day 0 for 
analysis of market reactions around the disclosure, trigger and settlement dates. Similar to Gande and 
Lewis (2009), event windows as far back as [-10, +1] are utilized. A search of Lexis-Nexis around the 
filing date of the lawsuits indicates that using windows that account for more than a week post-filing will 
increase the chance of capturing additional events such as product or earnings announcements that may 
skew results. Thus windows of more than [+1, +10] are not considered in this analysis.  
Using this methodology, market model event studies were performed using the value-weighted 
index for the sample and the control and CARs were compared for differences.41 Results are presented in 
Table 5A. Results are presented for the estimation window of [-135, -11], though all results are robust to 
various other estimation windows used in prior literature on securities class action lawsuits.42  Figure 1 
displays the average daily abnormal returns for the sample and control over the twenty days surrounding 
the event date. As predicted, both domestic and foreign firms follow similar patterns in reaction around 
the disclosure of a malfeasance. The same is true of the filing date, however there is a slight difference in 
pre- and post- for the sample as there are more negative pre-event abnormal returns and more positive 
post-event returns for the sample as compare to domestic filings. I attribute this to the probability of 
information leakage about the filing of the case against the foreign firm since these firms are larger and 
tend to be more visible.  
- Insert Figure 1 about here- 
                                                            
41 Market adjusted model event studies were also conducted and results are robust to either method. 
42 [-171, -11], [-200,-11], [-244, -11], [-244, -6], and [ 351, -51] are other estimation windows examined (see, for example, Doidge 2004, Bhagat 
et al 1998, Gande and Lewis 2009, Niehaus and Roth 1999 and others) and results are robust to other estimation windows. 
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 The first three sections of Table 5 Panel A list the CARs for the case event dates for three 
windows of [-10, +1], [-1, +1] and [+1, +10] surrounding the event date. At the date of disclosure of 
violations of U.S. securities laws both the sample and the control are subjected to significantly negative 
market reactions. In the three days surrounding the disclosure of the violation both the sample and the 
control CARs average approximately -18.5 percent. In the days surrounding the announcement of the 
filing of a private securities class action lawsuit both foreign and domestic issuers suffer additional 
significantly negative market reactions though as indicated by Figure 1 Panel B, the reaction is slightly, 
though not significantly, less in the case of foreign firms. In the three days surrounding the filing CARs 
average -4.23 percent for domestic issuers and -3.22 percent for foreign issuers. These results are similar 
to those found in Gande and Lewis (2009) who find -4.66 percent in the three days surrounding a filing of 
a securities class action lawsuit. The differences in the three days surrounding the event date between 
foreign and domestic firms are insignificant for all four event dates. The only noticeable differences are 
seen in the ten days post event date as foreign firms tend to revert to the mean at a faster pace and rise to 
abnormally positive as evidenced by Figure 1 Panel B on average. This is reaction is explored in more 
detail in section VII.  
 
c. Combined Losses 
Following the methodology of Karpoff and Lott (1993), after determining the market reactions 
for the different event dates, I cumulate the abnormal returns for the three case event dates (disclosure, 
filing, and settlement/dismissal) and different event windows into a single combined CAR measure of the 
losses over the enforcement period related to securities law violations. Since each event date conveys 
additional information to the market about the violation and the subsequent cost to the firms, the 
combined measure will reflect a combination of all these impacts on valuation (Bhagat and Romano, 
2002a; 2002b). It should be noted that this approach will yield conservative estimates of total losses for 
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firms because it is likely that there are times when news about the violation and class action case leaks to 
the market outside of the specific case dates examined. I do not cumulate abnormal returns over the full 
enforcement period because the average enforcement period from disclosure to settlement is more than 
three years and cumulating returns over this period of time would most certainly capture events that are 
unrelated to the securities class action case.43 Therefore, the combined abnormal return for each case 
( eCAR ) is defined as: 







                  (3) 
where d = 1 is the starting event date and n is the final event date of the window.  
The combined CARs for different event windows are also reported in Table 5 Panel A. Cumulated over 
all event dates, the average CAR for both domestic and foreign firms is more than twenty percent 
negative on average in the three days surrounding the event dates. 
- Insert Table 5 about here- 
After creating the combined CAR measure, I convert the valuation effect into dollars  for each 
day in the event period by multiplying each jtAR   by the firm’s market capitalization on date t-1 and then 
cumulate the losses over the event windows of [-1, +1], [-10, +1] , and [+1, +10]  to determine the 
cumulative economic effect for each event date. To illustrate, the cumulative economic effect, jkCEE , for 
lawsuit k for firm j over the event window specified in the tables, 1T , 2T , is calculated as 














DETTCEE            (4) 
where DE is the valuation effect converted into dollars for each day in the event period. 
To get a total measure of dollars lost I then sum each of these event date dollars lost into one 
measure of overall economic effect for each enforcement period. The results of this process are listed in 
                                                            
43 The average length of time from filing to announcement of a resolution is 1151 (3.15 years) days and the median length is 914 days (2.5 years).   
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Table 5 Panel B. As evidenced by this table, the dollars lost in the three days surrounding the disclosure 
and filing announcements are economically significant amounts for the firms in the sample and the 
control. At the disclosure of a violation of securities laws foreign firms lose an average of $575 million 
dollars in the U.S. markets alone and lose an average of an additional $184 million at the announcement 
of a filing of a securities class action lawsuit in the three days surrounding each event. The average losses 
for the sample firms are more than the control firms in terms of dollars lost but this is mainly a reflection 
of the average size of the sample firms as compared to domestic firms as cross-listing firms tend to be 
very large firms. For both domestic and foreign firms the economic losses of the violation of securities 
laws and case events account for over $700 million in losses on average.  
In total, after combining the reactions into total losses, it is clear that foreign firms subject to 
securities class action filings suffer statistically and economically significant losses at the filing of a 
shareholder-initiated lawsuit. As large as these losses are, the losses at the disclosure of a securities law 
violation eclipse the filing date reaction and the two events combine into more than twenty percent 
negative abnormal returns on market value in the U.S equity markets. As compared to domestic filings the 
losses are insignificantly different at disclosure and filings, which, consistent with the predictions of 
Hypotheses 1, indicates that foreign firms are not receiving a “break” in the U.S. market penalties 
assessed for violations of U.S. securities law and are in fact being penalized in equal measure in the U.S. 
markets.   
 
VI. Foreign Market penalties 
 
Results presented thus far have only utilized information from the U.S. exchange in which the 
foreign firms in the sample trade. Results from this analysis of U.S. market reactions surrounding the 
event dates indicate that foreign firms suffer substantial losses at the announcement of violations of U.S. 
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securities laws. However, this reaction is only a measure of the punishment of U.S. market shareholders 
and does not reflect changes in market value for those markets outside the United States. The vast 
majority of foreign firms that cross-list on major U.S. exchanges list on multiple exchanges globally and 
thus the U.S. market for the foreign firms only represents a fraction of the shares the company trades. 
Therefore, examining the reaction of shareholders on any foreign market on which the firm lists, 
particularly if the firm lists in its home market, will give additional insight into the total cost of violations 
of U.S. securities law for foreign firms and will also yield a measure of insight into the level of 
responsiveness at negative news announced in the U.S. markets to foreign investors.   
To explore the extent that foreign investors penalize the foreign firms in the sample for the events 
that lead to securities class actions, I examine the reaction of the foreign markets around the disclosure 
and filing of the lawsuits to determine whether the punishment is more or less severe than that of the U.S. 
market and if there is a delay in reaction due to information asymmetry between the home market and the 
U.S. market.  To measure the market reaction at the news of securities law violations and subsequent 
securities class action lawsuits, prices and returns are obtained from DataStream for the home market of 
each firm if it is available during the event windows. Those firms that do not have data available in the 
home market are primarily are incorporated in the Caribbean or elsewhere that is not covered in 
DataStream or do not trade in their home markets during the event windows and therefore a home market 
analysis is not possible. Returns for each security are calculated from the TDS return index as the 
percentage change in the return index. As Ince and Porter (2006) note, these returns are occasionally 
incorrect. To verify my results for this I also calculate returns from prices and compare them to the 
returns index as a robustness check. After collecting the home market stock information from DataStream 
and calculating the market return index from the indices total return index, the returns on the securities in 
the sample are checked for data problems as discussed in Ince and Porter (2006). Any nonlocal firms and 
types not equal to EQ are removed and names are checked for key words or phrases that indicate that the 
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security is not common equity. Additionally, any returns that are above 200 percent that are reversed in 
one month are set to missing. After all filters are accounted for and returns checked for the lawsuit event 
dates, the subsample for this section consists of 129 cases that have both home and U.S. market 
information available.  
-Insert Figure 2 about here – 
I calculate the market model returns for estimation periods of [-135, -11] similar to that 
performed in Section VI. Since I utilize the DataStream calculated market returns index (TOTMK) from 
the home market of the firm to perform the event study, I also utilize the DataStream calculated market 
returns index for the United States for the U.S. market reaction comparison rather than the CRSP 
calculated value- or equal-weighted returns. Abnormal returns over the twenty days surrounding the 
disclosure and filing dates in the home markets are displayed in Figure 2. As compared to the U.S. market 
returns, the abnormal returns at the disclosure of the violation follow a similar pattern to that seen in 
Figure 1 where the largest reactions tend to occur at day 0 and day 1 of the disclosure. Filing abnormal 
returns show a slightly smaller reaction in the days leading up to the lawsuit filing than in the U.S. market 
but the overall pattern of negative returns in the days prior to the lawsuit remains the same.  
- Insert Table 6 about here- 
Cumulative abnormal returns for the home markets are listed in Table 6 alongside the cumulative 
abnormal returns in the U.S. markets for the same firms as a comparison. In general, as compared to the 
U.S. markets, the CARs around the event dates are slightly less in the home market. The reactions are 
compared for each firm and the differences are statistically significant in the days surrounding the 
disclosure announcement but are insignificantly different at the announcement of a securities class action 
lawsuit.  In the home market the disclosure of a violation of U.S. securities laws results in an average 
negative abnormal return of almost sixteen percent in the three days surrounding the announcement and 
the announcement of the filing of a securities class action is met with an additional loss of almost five 
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percent on average. Following the same methodology as Section VI, the combined abnormal return for 
each case ( eCAR ) are computed as: 







                  (3) 
where d = 1 is the starting event date and n is the final event date of the window. The combined CARs are 
also reported in Table 6. When reactions to disclosure announcement, filing announcement and 
settlement/dismissal announcements are combined, the average CAR for the sample foreign firms is 
between negative eighteen and nineteen percent on average in the home market and the U.S. market. To 
better demonstrate the magnitude of these losses, I also calculate the valuation effect into dollars by 
multiplying each jtAR  by the firm’s home market capitalization on date t-1 and then cumulate the losses 
over the various event windows to determine the cumulative economic effect for each event date in the 
home market. To get a total measure of dollars lost I then sum each of these event date dollars lost into 
one measure of overall economic effect for each enforcement period.  The results of this process are listed 
in Table 7. Consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 3, when the home market is considered, market 
value changes around the disclosure of a violation of U.S. securities laws cause an average of $3.486 
billion in lost market capitalization and a the subsequent lawsuit filing results in an additional $925 
million in lost market capitalization.  
- Insert Table 7 about here- 
As Table 8 demonstrates, the significant differences reported in Table 8 between economic losses 
in the home and U.S. markets is unsurprising when considering that the number of shares traded in the 
home market on average represent nearly seventy percent of the combined shares of the two markets for a 
firm. When Canadian firms are not considered this difference in number of shares held between the two 
markets is nearly eighty percent on average and over ninty percent in the median.   
- Insert Table 8 about here- 
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To determine whether there are differences between geographically separated markets I separate 
the sample by regions of incorporation in Table 9. To distinguish between geographic locations, I separate 
the sample into firms incorporated in Europe, Canada or elsewhere. As evidenced by Table 9 Panel B, the 
home market reaction for Canadian incorporated firms is virtually indistinguishable from the U.S. market 
reaction with both markets averaging approximately twenty percent negative CARs in the disclosure date 
and five percent at the filing date. As predicted, firms that are incorporated further geographic distances 
have significantly less severe market reactions in the home market in the days surrounding the event dates 
with firms from the European region and from Asia and the Middle East having significantly less negative 
reactions in their home markets at the announcement of a U.S. securities law violation. It is interesting to 
note that, in the ten days following the announcement of a securities law violation, firms from Europe 
tend to have similar CARs in the home and U.S. markets while firms from Asia and the Middle East 
continue to have more negative CARs in the home market as compared to the U.S. This pattern could be 
the result of the information asymmetries and exchange controls that tend to exist in these markets as the 
news would be slower to reach the home market. 
- Insert Table 9 about here- 
To explore this reaction further, I separate the sample based on whether or not the firm is 
incorporated in a country with exchange controls at the time of the securities class action filing. The 
results of a comparison between these subsets are presented in Table 10. Panel A contains a comparison 
of the U.S. market CARs between firms incorporated in countries with exchange controls and those 
without exchange controls while Panel B compares the home market reaction to the U.S. market reactions 
for each subset. Inconsistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 3, there are no significant differences in 
market reaction between the home and U.S. markets for the firms in the subsets in Panel B. Though firms 
incorporated in countries with exchange controls generally have more negative reactions at case event 
dates than those not incorporated in countries with exchange controls, in the three days surrounding the 
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case event dates there is no significant difference in the mean or median CARs in the home and U.S. 
markets for the sample firms. The only significant differences are presented in Panel A with the 
disclosure CARs for the comparison of firms incorporated in a country with and without exchange 
controls. Firms incorporated in countries with exchange controls have an average of negative twenty-five 
percent cumulative abnormal returns in the three days surrounding the violation disclosure while those 
sample firms incorporated in countries without exchange controls have an average of 17.5 percent 
negative cumulative abnormal returns, though this is only significantly different at the 10 percent level.  
-Insert Table 10about here- 
 The evidence presented in this section is partially consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 3. 
Without question there are significant losses for firms accused of violations of securities law violations in 
both their home and U.S. markets and in many cases they are as severe in the home market as they are in 
the U.S. market for the firm.  However, the second prediction of Hypothesis 3 is a little less clearly 
supported. As evidenced in Tables 9 and 10 whether or not the country-level characteristics of distance 
and exchange controls create differences in reaction is less clear on a univariate level. Table 9 presents 
some evidence that reactions from geographically close markets are most similar to U.S. market reactions 
but there is less evidence that exchange controls potentially impact the market reactions at the news of 
violations. Unfortunately, the separation into subsets in this section yields subsamples that are too small 
to reliably examine for differences with a multivariate study. Thus, this analysis will have to be left to 
future research when the sample number of firms receiving securities class action lawsuits is large enough 







VII. Event Study Robustness Measures 
 
a. Size Matched  
As previously discussed in Table 3, foreign firms subject to securities class action filings in the 
U.S. are significantly larger than the average domestic firm subject to securities class action filings in 
terms of total assets, market capitalization and sales. To verify that results are not driven by size, I match 
each firm based on total assets and industry in the year of the lawsuit filing with a domestic firm that is 
subject to a securities class action lawsuit rather than the entire securities class action domestic firm 
universe.44 Table 11 displays the summary statistics for the sample and the matched control. 
-Insert Table 11 about here- 
Similar to that of Table 2 and Table 3, case characteristics and descriptive statistics are similar between 
the matched sample and control firms with the exception being the number of analysts following the firm 
at the time of the violation, the size of the firm as measured by market capitalization and the log of sales, 
and the performance as measured by Tobin’s q. The number of analysts following the firm remains 
significantly lower for foreign cross-listing firms as compared to domestic firms. The size of the sample 
firms as compared to the matched control is significantly lower and Tobin’s q remains significantly lower 
for the sample firms as compared to the matched control in the year prior to the violation.  
 Market model event studies are performed for the sample and matched firms for the dates 
surrounding the lawsuit and results are displayed in Table 12. As Panel A demonstrates, similar to the 
unmatched sample, the CARs at disclosure, filing, settlement and combined announcement dates remain 
fundamentally similar between the sample and the matched control with the exception being in the [+1, 
+10] window where, as before in the unmatched sample, the sample firms tend to perform better.  The 
only noticeable difference between the sample and the control firms is seen in Panel B as the conversion 
                                                            
44 Matches are determined based on +/- 25 percent and within the same 2-digit SIC code. If a match is unavailable then a firm is matched based 
on +/- 35 percent and within the same 1-digit SIC code. A matching firm was unavailable for one firm in the sample and thus only 190 firms are 
examined in this section. 
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to market value losses displays a much larger economic loss for domestic firms as compared to foreign 
firms in the disclosure and combined measures. However, this difference is expected as it is primarily due 
to the number of shares outstanding that a large domestic firm has on U.S. markets as compared to a 
foreign cross-listing firm on the major U.S. exchanges.45  
-Insert Table 12 about here- 
 As additional robustness tests of results, firms that have trading prices of less than one dollar 
during the event periods are dropped to verify that the any large percentage changes reported for small 
increases or decreases in prices are not driving results. Results remain unchanged after these firms are 
dropped. Lastly, to determine whether corporations that use shell companies in tax haven countries are 
not skewing results, sample firms that are incorporated in the Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, 
Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Panama and the Island of Guernsey are dropped and CARs are 
reexamined with results remaining the same when these firms are not dropped from the sample.  
 
b. Market reactions for differing outcomes 
At the time of disclosure is it likely that investors weigh the chances of a securities class action 
filing and other adverse events such as accounting write-offs or legal penalties based on the severity of 
the allegations and the resulting share price drop is a reflection of these expectations as well as the 
reputational loss (Karpoff et al., 2008). To verify that the large losses are not just driven by investor 
expectations of large settlements for severe violations, the sample of foreign firms and domestic firms 
subject to securities class action lawsuits are separated into subsets based on whether they are dismissed 
or settled. Table 13 displays the results of a comparison of CARs for this split. As Panel A demonstrates 
there are no significant differences in the CARs between foreign firm violations that are eventually 
dismissed and foreign firm violations that are eventually settled at the disclosure of the violation. Though 
                                                            
45 In the year of the lawsuit filing, domestic matched firms have a mean of 595 million and a median of 78 million shares outstanding while 
foreign cross-listing firms have a mean of 207 million and a median of 47.8 million shares outstanding on the U.S. exchanges. 
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the differences are significant for domestic firms, the reactions in larger windows around the event dates 
are insignificantly different for both domestic and foreign cases. For both the foreign firms and the 
domestic firms the reaction is larger in the mean and median at the filing of the lawsuit. However, this 
difference is insignificant for the sample firms though it is significantly different for the control of 
domestic firms. This slightly larger effect could be evidence that investors are reacting more to the filing 
of cases that have a higher likelihood of settlement, suggesting there is a market adjustment for the 
severity of violations that leads to cases that are settled rather than dismissed and for expected settlement 
payments. In either case the losses are still significant at disclosure and filing and thus indicative that 
investors punish investors severely for alleged securities law violations regardless of eventual outcome. 
-Insert Table 13 about here- 
 
c. Winsorized CARs 
To verify that outliers are not driving the similarities between the control and the sample, the 
CARs are winsorized at the one and five percent levels and compared similar to the comparison in Table 
5.46 Table 14 presents the results at the five percent level though all results are robust at the one percent as 
well. Though the winsorizing slightly lessens the negative reaction at the event dates, it is still statistically 
significant in the disclosure and filing dates for both the sample and the control and thus it does not 
appear that outliers are driving the CAR comparison results. By comparing Table 5 to Table 14 it can be 
seen that the average CAR at the event dates remain largely insignificantly different from each other in 
the event dates as disclosure CARs still average more than eighteen percent for both the foreign and 
domestic firms and the combined CARs are still around negative twenty percent. Similar to the original 
comparison, the only differences between foreign and domestic cases are found in the [+1, +10] window 
with the foreign firms being less negative.  
                                                            
46 Winsorizing at the five percent level involves replacing five percent of the values from both ends of the data with the observations closest to 
them making this method less sensitive to outliers because it replaces them with less influential values. Values are not dropped with this method.  
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-Insert Table 14 about here- 
 
d. Noisy Events Around the Filing Date 
Lastly, as discussed in section VI and seen in Figure 1 Panel B, the filing dates for the sample has 
an unusual reversion in the ten days post filing in the mean CAR that is not seen in the control. The filing 
date CAR window is more than three percent positive on average in the [+1, +10] window for foreign 
firms. To verify that the market is not actually reacting positively to the news of a securities class action 
filing but rather the positive average CAR is a reflection of other events, a search of Lexis-Nexis is 
conducted for the +/- thirty days around the filing date for each firm. Any event in this window other than 
the lawsuit filing is noted and if it occurs within ten days of the filing it is not included in the analysis in 
this section. Table 15 displays the CARs for the noise restricted sample and Figure 3 shows the mean and 
median abnormal returns for each day in the twenty days surrounding the lawsuit filing for this cleaned 
sample.  
-Insert Figure 3 about here- 
 
The mean and median abnormal returns in Figure 3 follow a similar pattern as that observed in Figure 1 
with the largest mean reactions seen around the -4 to -1 day window. However, the jump in mean 
abnormal return in the post-filing window largely disappears in Figure 3 and, as seen in Table 15, the 
exclusion of the firms with other events in the post-ten days after the filing results in a much lower and 
insignificantly different CAR than the market in the [+1, +10] window.   




Determinants of Reputational Losses 
 
VIII. Legal and Reputational Penalties 
 
Section VI of Chapter 3 presents evidence that the losses associated with violations of securities 
laws are economically and statistically significant events for foreign firms that cross-list on U.S. 
exchanges. Such large losses provide a reasonable argument that the legal system in the United States 
does provide a level of enforcement for foreign firms that violate securities laws. Literature on corporate 
crime often examines the penalties that compose these large losses separately to determine what 
proportion of the market reaction is based on the expectation of upcoming legal penalties and what 
proportion is based on lost reputation. Following the methodology of Peltzman (1981), Karpoff and Lott 
(1993) and others, I also separate the different penalties from the initial adjustment of market value at the 
announcement of a securities law violation. Separating out the penalties in this manner allows me the 
ability to analyze whether or not the legal and reputational penalties assessed by the market are 
substantially different for domestic and foreign firms as well as allowing me to analyze the cross-
sectional determinants of these penalties.  
To start analysis of the separate penalties, I define the change in firm value when news of the 
misconduct is disclosed as: 
           (5) 
  
where MV is the market value of the firm at disclosure date t 
 
11   ttt MVMVMV
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According to Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008), monetary penalties result from shareholder class-action 
suits nearly five times as often as from regulatory actions by the SEC and DOJ. To determine legal 
penalties, monetary settlement amounts are collected for each case in which a settlement is determined as 
listed in Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance Analytics Class Actions.47 A comparison of 
the settlement amounts to those of domestic filings is shown in Table 16. Similar to what has been found 
in previous research, the settlement amounts average to approximately 27 million for the cases that are 
settled and as noted by Seigel (2005), the amounts are insignificantly different for foreign and domestic 
issuers. 
- Insert Table 16 about here- 
After defining legal penalties, reputational penalties (RLoss) are computed as the change in 
market value from Equation 5 minus any legal penalties assessed from the settlement of the litigation. 
RLoss is therefore defined as: 
(6) 
 
Table 16 also lists the summary statistics of the reputation penalties. As seen by Table 16, although the 
legal penalties are sometimes very large, they are very small in comparison to the market value losses 
reported at the disclosure of the securities law violation. Reputational penalties account for more than 
$550 million for both the sample and the control firms and the penalties are insignificantly different from 






47 It should be noted that legal penalties are taken from those reported in the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance Analytics Class 
Actions database. It is possible that additional legal penalties were incurred by firms that were not reported by the firm or captured in this 




IX. Cross-Sectional determinants of reputational penalties Tobit regression 
 
This section examines some possible determinants of the reputational penalties assessed by the 
market at the disclosure of a violation of U.S. securities laws. The univariate analysis presented in the 
preceding chapter demonstrates that there is a significant statistical relationship between the market 
reaction and the news of a violation of U.S. securities laws that leads to a securities class action lawsuit. 
However, this result does not control for other factors that may show a similar relationship. In this 
section, I attempt to explain the cross-sectional distribution of the reputational penalties by including 
several factors that potentially affect investors’ reaction to the news of violations. I separately estimate the 
sample and control in the regressions and compare the coefficients for differences using the natural 
logarithm of the dollar amount of the reputational penalties as the dependent variable in the regressions 
(LNRLoss). Since some firms can have a negative reputational penalty, which makes disclosure of 
violations appear to be actually reputational improving events, I set each negative reputational penalty 
value to zero. I classify the factors that most likely are related to the market reaction around the filing of a 
securities class action into categories based on firm-specific variables, merits and potential damages 
estimates and litigation environment factors. A detailed description of the measurement of each 
independent variable is listed in Appendix B.   
 
a.  Information transparency, reputation and the importance of the firm 
A firm that is visible to investors and of a good reputation to shareholders should have a larger 
reputation loss at the news of a violation of securities laws.  To proxy for size and visibility I use the log 
of total assets in the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the disclosure of the violation (LnAssets) .48 As 
an additional proxy for visibility I first use a measure of analyst coverage (NumEst) defined as the number 
                                                            
48 I use a log transformation for this variable since it otherwise is highly skewed and would lead to unreliable coefficients of the explanatory 
power of the variable.  
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of analysts following the firm in the reporting period prior to the violation disclosure. However, since the 
correlation between LnAssets and NumEst is high, I only use LnAssets in the regressions to proxy for 
visibility measures in the reported regressions.49  Additionally, the reputation of the firm may also affect 
how severely a market judges a securities law violation.  A firm of good reputation could be subjected to 
larger reputational penalties as the news of a violation would be more surprising to investors. On the other 
hand, a firm of poor reputation could be subjected to larger reputational penalties if investors believe the 
poor performance coupled with violation of securities laws is an indication of worsening conditions at a 
firm. To proxy for this reputation effect I use a measure of prior firm performance, return on assets 
(ROA), which is defined as net income divided by sales in the year prior to the violation disclosure. 
 
b. Liquidity, risk and agency costs 
Firms more likely to suffer from agency problems are more likely to face securities class action 
lawsuits. On the other hand, those that do face securities class actions are more likely to take steps to 
resolve agency problems. In fact, Ferris et al. (2007) suggest that shareholders target firms with greater 
agency costs for governance improvement. Since shareholders become more aware of a firm during 
litigation activities, monitoring should increase and it is possible that shareholders react to the news of a 
securities law violation differently based on how strong the agency conflicts are at the time of the 
disclosure. In terms of liquidity, firms with greater exposure to securities litigation have been found to 
hold significantly more cash in anticipation of settlements (Arena and Julio, 2011; Iliev, et al. 2011). To 
measure any potential agency costs and liquidity, I use the measures of leverage (Leverage), free cash 
flow (FCF), and share turnover / liquidity (Turnover) as measured in the reporting period prior to the 
disclosure date. Firms with higher leverage should face lower reputational penalties as they are less equity 
based and those with higher amounts of cash and turnover measures should face higher reputational 
penalties due to the increased agency costs.  
                                                            




c. Merits and potential damage of the lawsuit 
The market reaction around the news of a potential securities law violation may also be different 
depending on how firm shareholders view the damages and the potential for a loss of wealth through 
settlement. Similar to the method of Cheng et al. 2010, I use allegation type, case outcome, and class 
period variables to proxy for case merits. Allegation types are divided into binary variables to indicate 
whether the case contains an IPO violation accusation (IPOVio) or a Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) violation accusation (GAAPVio). Accusations of GAAP violations tend to be more 
severe than other allegations so these should have higher reputational penalties while those of IPO 
violation accusations should have lower reputational penalties. I also include a binary variable for case 
outcome (Settled) that indicates whether the case is settled or dismissed. Though the outcome of a case is 
unknown at the time of the disclosure of wrongdoing, this variable is included to serve as a proxy for case 
merit since cases that are dismissed are likely to be less meritorious than those cases that are eventually 
settled. Since settlement typically includes a large legal penalty I expect settled cases to contain a smaller 
reputational penalty as investors will have taken the legal penalty into account. Length of class period 
(ClassPeriodLength) is calculated as the period of wrongdoing as defined by the lawsuit Complaint. A 
longer class period could indicate to shareholders whether the case has merit and a settlement is likely 
since scienter may be easier to establish with a long window.50 Conversely, a longer class period could 
allow for some information leakage prior to disclosure so the losses in the three-day window could be less 
severe in these cases. As an additional measure of severity of violation, I use a binary measure of ongoing 
investigations by other regulatory commissions (OtherCase) that includes concurrent investigations by 
                                                            
50 Scienter is defined as willingly or knowingly and refers to the state of mind necessary to be legally accountable for actions. To establish a 
Section 10(b) violation a plaintiff needs to establish there was reckless disregard, willingness or bad intent to deceive.  
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either the SEC or the home-market regulatory commission of the foreign firm.51 Since these cases will 
typically be more severe violations I expect a larger reputational penalty. 
 
d. Industry affiliation , litigation environment and year effects 
Prior research has indicated that industry is an important consideration in predicting the 
likelihood of securities class action filings as firms operating in highly volatile sectors and those in 
technology, healthcare and financial services are most likely to be subject to a securities class action and 
settlements are more likely/larger for technology and healthcare firms (Martin et al. 1999; Carleton et al., 
1996). Additionally, for firms that are in industries that are often the subject of securities class actions, 
there is a partial anticipation and a negative effect on stock price in the days prior to the lawsuit (Gande 
and Lewis, 2009) as investors adjust expectations in anticipation of a lawsuit. Thus, I control for these 
industries in which suits are more likely as investors are more likely to adjust expectations prior to any 
disclosure of securities law violations and this may subsequently lessen reputational penalties. I control 
for firms in the financial industry (FIN) and technology (TECH) industries.52 I also use a measure of 
expectations based on whether this is the first securities class action in the sample period for the firm 
(FIRSTCASE). If it is the first malfeasance for a firm, I expect a larger reputational penalty as 
shareholders are not expecting or monitoring for these securities law violations. On the other hand, it is 
possible that lower reputational penalties would be assessed in this situation as firms that are repeatedly 
accused of violations may receive higher reputational penalties than first time offenders. Additionally, I 
control for differences across years and other potential unspecified factors in all regressions. 
For cross-listing firms the characteristics of the firm’s home country are also used as control in 
addition to the firm-specific, litigation environment, and case merit controls discussed above. Since a 
                                                            
51 There are several informal investigations that are concurrent with the securities class action (for example there are several instances of SEC 
informal inquiries that are not filed as cases). In my sample, Canadian firms have 10 such instances (16 percent), Israeli firms have 3 such 
instances (13 percent) and all other firms have 27 instances (19 percent). 
52 I do not control for the healthcare industry because there are no such designated firms in my sample 
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firm’s home market could be considered the country of incorporation or the country of headquarters, a 
binary variable indicating the presence of market exchange controls in the country of incorporation 
(IncControl) or country of headquarters (HQControl) is used as a control for the closedness of each 
economy in different regressions. There should be a positive relationship between the level of closedness 
and the reputational penalties.   Additionally, in some specifications I also control for whether or not the 
home country allows class actions as the expectation of legal penalties in a second country could impact 
the reputation loss at the news of a securities law violation. A binary variable is used to indicate whether 
the firm is incorporated (IncAllowClass) or headquartered (HQAllowClass) in one of the eighteen 
countries that allow some form of class action at the time of the lawsuit filing.53 The expected relationship 
for this variable is not clear. It is possible that the availability of class actions in the home market would 
have a negative relationship with reputational penalties as investors might expect the firm to be subject to 
class actions in the home country for the same malfeasance and thus lower reputational penalties in the 
U.S. markets. The other possibility is that shareholders will expect class actions in the home market and 
believe that legal penalties in this country would also be possible, or that it would be easier to get 
settlements in the U.S., and thus would encompass these expected foreign legal penalties in the 
reputational penalties measure in this study, creating a positive relationship.  
To proxy for economic development, I use the log of the GDP per capita (GDPperCap (Log)) for 
the country in the year prior to the disclosure date and to proxy for financial development I use the stock 
market capitalization (Cstmktcap) of the country in the year prior to the disclosure date. The predicted 
relationship is unclear for economic development variables as operating in a weaker economy could be 
seen as evidence the firm will not be able to pay legal penalties and investors may subject firms to higher 
reputational penalties as a result, or they may subject them to lower reputational penalties due to the lack 
                                                            
53 The relevant countries that allow some sort of class action as of 2011 are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England, Finland, 
France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Sweden. Since many of these countries first began 
to allow class actions during the sample period, the variable AllowClass is only equal to one for the sample firm if the lawsuit filing date if after 
the country began to allow class actions. 
53 
 
of surprise at the violation.  The perception of governance or legal protection in the home country of the 
firm may also influence reputational penalties assessed by shareholders at the disclosure date. Investors 
would be more surprised at violation allegations from firms that come from countries with good 
governance or strong protection of minority shareholders and thus would subject them to larger 
reputational penalties. To proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders in the home 
country for firms in the sample I use the anti-self-dealing index (Antiselfdeal) developed in Djankov et al. 
(2008). To proxy for governance I use the average of the six governance indicators (GovIndex) as 
reported by Kauffmann et al. (2009) for the most recent year available prior to the violation. The 
dimensions measured are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. Though 
Antiselfdeal and GovIndex are related, they are not significantly correlated with each other and therefore 
both measures are included in the model.54   
To avoid treating reputational penalties as value-enhancing, I set any negative reputational 
penalties to zero. Because of this censoring treatment, a Tobit with left censoring at zero to estimate 
determinates of reputational is utilized. Model 1 is listed as Equation 7 and is used as the model for both 
the sample and the control firms as a comparison. Model 2 is the same as Model 1 only the country-level 
variables of AntiSelfDeal, GovIndex, Cstmkcap, LogGDPperCap, AllowClass and Control are added for 
either the country of incorporation (IncAllowClass, IncControl, IncAntiSelfDeal, IncGovIndex, 
IncCstmkcap, and IncGDPperCap(Log)), the country of headquarters (HQCountry, HQAllowClass), or 
the country of primary sales (PriSaleCstmkcap and  PriSaleGDPperCap(Log)) as specified in the results 
tables and this model is only used for analysis on the sample firms. Model 1 and Model 2 are Tobit 
regressions of the basic forms: 
                                                            
54 For the regressions I only use case information for firms that have decided outcomes (settled or dismissed). Excluding those firms and 
collecting the data for the firm-specific, litigation environment, and case merit controls drops an additional 15 cases due to active status from the 
sample leaving 176 sample firms and 1936 control cases for Model 1. For the second regression that includes country-level characteristics an 

































































































































       
Results from the regression models are shown in Table 17. Model 1 results for the sample and the 
control are shown in Columns 1 and 2. Model 2 results are shown in Columns 3-11 in the table. The χ2 
goodness of fit test indicates that a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation is captured in both 
models and several of the individual coefficients are statistically significant. As predicted, firm-specific 
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and case-specific determinants are similar for both foreign and domestic issuers in Model 1. Across all 
columns the coefficient on Settled is negative and significant at the one percent level suggesting that cases 
that are settled are subject to lower reputational penalties as predicted due to a shift in proportion to legal 
penalties. In most columns the class period (ClassPeriodLength) coefficient is negative and significant 
which indicates that smaller class periods are subject to larger reputational penalties for both foreign and 
domestic firms. Additionally, the coefficient on the size of the firm is positive and significant which 
indicates larger firms are subject to larger reputational penalties. As predicted, GAAP violations are 
subject to larger reputational losses and financial firms are subject to smaller reputational losses. For 
domestic cases, the allegation of an IPO violation results in a smaller reputational penalty and firms of 
better reputation as measured by ROA suffer larger reputational penalties though these variables are only 
significant at the ten percent level. Additionally, for foreign issuers, larger reputational penalties exist for 
cases where there is another enforcement action in either the U.S. markets by the SEC or the home market 
securities commission (e.g. OSC or ISA). This measure (OtherCase) needs to be carefully interpreted as it 
serves as a proxy for case merits since the eventual filing of these actions by the regulatory bodies are not 
known at the time of disclosure. Thus, the interpretation of the coefficient would indicate that, as 
expected, cases against foreign issuers where violations are so egregious that regulatory commissions are 
eventually involved are met with higher reputational penalties for disclosure of violations of securities 
laws. 
- Insert Table 17 about here- 
When country-level variables are added to the regression in Model 2 in Columns 3-11, the 
coefficients from Model 1 remain significant for sample firms. Consistent with the predictions of 
Hypothesis 2, there is evidence that the characteristics of the country of incorporation influences the 
reputational penalties assessed by shareholders at the news of a violation of securities laws.  In all models 
that include country-level variables, the anti-self-dealing index is positively significant at the one percent 
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level. As previously discussed, the anti-self-dealing index is a measure of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders developed by Djankov, et al. (2008). Thus it 
appears that firms that come from countries with higher levels of legal protection of minority shareholders 
are subject to larger reputational penalties. A potential explanation for this reaction is that violations from 
firms that come from countries with stronger protection of minority shareholders will come as a larger 
surprise to shareholders when violations are disclosed. A more severe reputational penalty will be 
assessed in this case because shareholders had not anticipated violations from firms in these countries as 
much as they had from firms in weaker legal protection countries.  An alternate explanation is that 
shareholders believe that foreign firms that are incorporated in countries with stronger protection of 
minority shareholders will make it easier to get settlements. Thus the larger market reactions are a 
reflection of the expectation of more and larger settlement amounts, regardless of whether the eventual 
legal penalties are larger.   
The significance of the anti-self-dealing index is robust to the addition of controls for the 
presence of exchanges controls in the incorporation or headquarters country, the addition of an indicator 
of whether or not the home country allows class actions within the foreign country, changing the financial 
and economic measurement to the country of primary sales, and controlling for the region of 
incorporation as demonstrated in Columns 4-11 of Table 17.55 When region of incorporation is not 
controlled for, a one unit increase results in the log of reputational penalties changing ten to eleven units. 
When region of incorporation is controlled for, a one unit increase results in the log of reputational 
penalties increasing twenty-one to twenty-three units.56 In addition to the anti-self-dealing index, the 
economic and financial development measures of country market capitalization and GDP per capita are 
also significant for the country of incorporation, with negative coefficients significant at the ten percent 
                                                            
55 Sample firms are grouped by region of incorporation in Columns 9, 10 and 11 of Table 17. These regions consist of the United Kingdom, 
Israel, China, Other Western Europe (excluding the United Kingdom), Developed Asia, Emerging Asia (excluding China), Caribbean and Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa (excluding Israel) and the Canadian Provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, New 
Brunswick, Yukon, Alberta, and Nova Scotia. 
56 Though this effect seems large, the anti-self-dealing index only varies from 0 to 1 in the sample. 
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level for both variables indicating that firms from countries with weaker economic and financial 
development are subject to larger reputational penalties. The independent variables are significant at the 
ten percent level but the significance disappears once the region of incorporation is controlled for in 
Columns 9-11. 
- Insert Table 18 about here- 
The coefficients of the Tobit presented in Table 17 are the changes in the mean on the latent 
dependent variable.57 For comparison purposes, two additional forms of marginal effects are also 
computed to allow for a better interpretation of the magnitude of changes predicted in this model. These 
additional forms are presented in Table 18 for the changes in the unconditional expected value of the 
observed dependent variable and for the changes in the probability of being censored.58 The coefficients 
on the unconditional expected value calculations in Table 18 are similar to those in Table 17 for all 
models. In particular, the coefficient on the Tobit estimator for the anti-self-dealing index measure is 
similar whether it is expressed as the marginal effect on the latent variable or on the censored dependent 
variable.  
 
X. Regression Robustness Measures 
 
Initial evidence indicates that, consistent with Hypothesis 2, country-level characteristics that 
serve as an indication of the reputation of the firm can have an effect on the reputational penalties 
assessed when news of the violation is disclosed to investors. To verify these results, several robustness 
tests are performed.    
 
                                                            

















, the beta coefficients are the changes in the mean of the latent dependent variable
ii xyE  /)(  
58 The changes in the unconditional expected value of the observed dependent variable is calculated as 
ii xyE  /)(
*  and the changes in the 
probability of being uncensored is calculated as  




a. Winsorized Reputational Penalties 
To verify that outliers are not driving the results of the regressions, the reputational penalties are 
winsorized at the one and five percent levels and results of the five percent winsorized regressions are 
presented in Table 19. As evidenced in Table 19, the result from winsorizing reputational penalties does 
not drastically change the regression results discussed in the previous section. The χ2 goodness of fit test 
still indicates that a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation is captured in both models and 
several of the individual coefficients are statistically significant. With the exception of the length of class 
period, which loses significance for the sample, the sign and significance of the independent variables in 
the regression output does not change substantially from the original regressions. 
- Insert Table 19 about here- 
 
b. Truncated Legal Penalties 
As previously discussed, the average settlement amount for securities class action lawsuits is 
twenty-seven million and the median amount is five million. The large difference between the two 
statistics is primarily due to a few very large settlement amounts from severe cases of violations from 
large firms. To demonstrate, Table 20 lists the top fifteen settlement amounts from cases filed between 
1996 and 2009.  As shown in this table, in the sample period there are only nine cases where the 
settlement amounts were above one billion. The settlement amounts drop dramatically after this and, by 
the time the top one hundred highest settlement cases are excluded, the settlement amounts are at 100 
million or less. 
- Insert Table 20 about here- 
Two sample cases are included in the top fifteen settlements and these and other very large settlements 
could potentially impact regression results. To verify that these outliers are not impacting results, I 
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truncate the top and bottom settlement amounts at the one and five percent level with results presented in 
Table 21 at the five percent truncated level.  
- Insert Table 21 about here- 
  As evidenced in Table 21, the result from truncating legal penalties does not drastically change 
the regression results discussed in the previous sections. The χ2 goodness of fit test still indicates that a 
significant portion of the cross-sectional variation is captured in both models and several of the individual 
coefficients are statistically significant, including the anti-self-dealing index measure. In general, the sign 
and significance of the independent variables in the regression output does not change significantly from 
the original regressions. The exceptions to this are the financial firm control, which loses significance for 
some of the sample models, and the economic and financial country-level variables. The economic and 
financial development variables were significant at the ten percent in the original regression level but lose 
significance once the legal penalties are truncated. 
   
c. Cases that allege financial misrepresentation 
In a recent paper by Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008), it is suggested that movements around the 
disclosure of some violations of U.S. securities laws reflect not only the market adjustment for expected 
legal costs and a punishment of reputation, but also an expectation for future adjustments of financial 
statements in cases where financial statements misrepresentations are alleged. To verify that the 
determinants of the large reputational market penalties assessed by shareholders are unchanged in these 
situations, I utilize the methodology proposed by Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) and create a 
readjustment effect measure to adjust the market value losses based on the write-offs for the cases in my 
sample which allege financial misrepresentation. I define the readjustment effect as the difference 
between the firm value when the financial information available was misstated and what the firm value 
should have been if all financial statement information were correctly known. To estimate this effect I 
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employ the asset restatement measure as proposed by Karpoff et al. (2008) because it excludes fewer 
firms due to data availability issues and produces larger estimates of the readjustment effect, which yields 
conservative reputational penalty calculations than other measures of readjustment. The asset restatement 
approach utilizes a measure of asset write-off that is calculated as the sum of special items, accounting 
changes and, for financial firms, net charge-offs. The readjustment effect (Radjustment) is calculated as 
the book value of assets of the largest incidence of the calculated write-offs during each year of the 
enforcement period multiplied by the median market-to-book ratio for all firms listed in Compustat with 
the same two-digit SIC code for the year corresponding to the write-off. After computing the readjustment 
effects, reputational penalties (RLoss) for each firm are redefined from Equation 6 as: 
(9) 
Table 22 lists the penalties assessed for firms in the sample and the control when the readjustment effect 
has been considered in the calculation of reputational penalties. As evidenced in Table 22, this 
significantly lowers the reputational penalties mean and median though the new reputational penalties are 
still insignificantly different between the sample and the control.  
-Insert Table 22 about here- 
Using the same methodology as Section VIII, I run a Tobit model with left censoring at zero to 
verify that the determinants of the reputational penalties assessed do not change when the readjustment 
measure is utilized. Again utilizing Equations 7 and 8, I separately estimate the sample and control in the 
regressions and compare the coefficients for differences using the natural logarithm of the dollar amount 
of the reputational penalties as the dependent variable in the regressions. Since some firms can have a 
negative reputational penalty, which makes disclosure of violations appear to be actually reputational 
improving events, I again set each negative reputational penalty value to zero. Table 23 displays the 
results of the two models and Table 24 displays the computed additional marginal effects on the 




reputations penalties are mostly unchanged when readjustments for financial misrepresentations are 
considered. 
 -Insert Table 23 about here- 
-Insert Table 24 about here- 
The notable exceptions to this are that operating in the financial industry and size as measured by the log 
of total assets becomes insignificant for the sample and firm reputation as measured by ROA becomes 
significantly positive, indicating that when write-offs are excluded from the penalties measure firms with 
higher ROAs are assessed larger reputational penalties at the news of wrongdoing. Whether the case is the 
first securities class action for the firm (FirstCase) is also significant though the signs are switched for the 
foreign and domestic firms. For domestic firms, larger reputational penalties are assessed if this is the first 
violation for the firm, which can be explained if shareholders are not expecting or monitoring the firm for 
these types of violations. For foreign firms, smaller reputational penalties are assessed if this is the first 
violation for the firm, which is possible as firms repeatedly accused of violations may receive higher 
reputational penalties than first time offenders. For foreign firms the case outcome of settled/dismissed is 
also insignificant in most specifications but remains significant for the domestic cases in Model 1. Of the 
country-level variables of interest, the anti-self-dealing index measure remains a strong predictor of the 
reputational penalties assessed. Additionally, using this measure of reputational penalties, the coefficient 
for the indicator of a possibility of a class action in the country of incorporation or headquarters is 
negative and significant. Thus, reputational penalties are less severe for firms from countries that allow 
some type of class action. This effect could possibly be attributed to expectations from shareholders that 
the firm will also be subject to class actions in the home country and thus lower reputational penalties are 





d. Ordinary Least Squares 
All of the models previously examined were estimated by a Tobit estimator as the reputational 
penalties have been censored at zero to avoid treating securities law violation disclosures and securities 
class action lawsuits as reputationally enhancing. As a verification of these results, I estimate the model 
by OLS using only observations with reputational penalties above zero. 
In the original measurement of reputational penalties for the sample 28 observations are left 
censored out of the 176 non-active cases (16 percent) and when financial misrepresentation cases are 
adjusted approximately 56 observations are left censored out of the 176 non-active sample cases (32 
percent). A Tobit estimator is the primary method employed in this paper because an OLS model on the 
whole sample or just the uncensored sample can provide inconsistent estimates of . However, there is 
such a low percentage of censored dependent variables in the original sample that I next verify my results 























   (10) 
Results from this regression are presented in Table 25 for the original measurement of reputational 
penalties. In this table Panel A presents the OLS estimators of only the observations for which the 
reputational penalties are above the censoring level of zero. Panel B presents the OLS estimators of all 
cases. Since the results for these two estimators are similar, they will be discussed jointly rather than 
separately. In unreported tables the estimators are compiled for OLS using the dependent variable of the 
financial misrepresentation adjusted reputational penalties and results are similar to those in Table 23.  
- Insert Table 25 about here- 
                                                            
59 If y and X are normally distributed with censoring from below, as in this case, the OLS slope parameters converge to k times the true slope 
parameter, where k is the fraction of the sample that is uncensored. This proportionality result provides a good empirical approximation of the 
inconsistency of OLS if a Tobit model is appropriate. https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/tobit1.pdf  
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 Using an OLS model does not significantly alter the conclusions from the Tobit models. In 
general, the coefficients of the independent variables have the anticipated signs though the coefficients 
tend to be less in this model. For the country-level independent variables, though the economic 
development indicator is no longer significant at the ten percent level, the financial development variable 
remains significant at the ten percent level and the anti-self-dealing index measure is still positive and 
significant at the one percent level.  
 
XI. Size-matched Logit 
 
So far all regressions have been estimated separately for the domestic firms and the foreign firm 
sample since country-level controls were being analyzed for predictive power on reputational penalties. A 
separate question that can be asked is whether or not the reputational penalties tend to be more or less for 
foreign firms as compared to domestic firms and whether or not the variables of interest have some 
predictive influence on whether the reputational penalties are more for foreign firms. To measure this, a 
logit regression is run on the size-matched sample as discussed in Chapter 3. The sample is constructed by 
matching each foreign firm based on total assets and industry in the year of the lawsuit filing with a 
domestic firm that is subject to a securities class action lawsuit rather than the entire securities class 
action domestic firm universe.60 The reputational penalties for each foreign firm and its match are 
compared and an indicator is created that is equal to one if the reputational penalty for the foreign firm is 
larger than its domestic matched firm. A logistic regression analysis is conducted based on this match and 
results are presented in Table 26 with alongside the marginal effects of each specification. 
- Insert Table 26 about here- 
                                                            
60 Matches are determined based on +/- 25 percent and within the same 2-digit SIC code. If a match is unavailable then a firm is matched based 
on +/- 35 percent and within the same 1-digit SIC code. A matching firm was unavailable for one firm in the sample and thus only 175 firms are 
examined in this section. 
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When country-level controls are added to the model, the χ2 goodness of fit test indicates that a significant 
portion of the cross-sectional variation is captured in the model, though it is not as strong as in the 
previous analysis. The variable of AllowClass is negative and significant in this table, indicating that it is 
a strong determinant of whether the foreign firm will have a larger penalty than a domestic firm. If a 
country is incorporated in a country that allows class actions then the foreign firm is less likely to have 
larger reputational penalties assessed in the U.S. This effect could possibly be attributed to expectations 
from shareholders that the firm will also be subject to class actions in the home country and thus lower 
reputational penalties are assessed by shareholders of the U.S. Additionally, when the region of 
incorporation is controlled for in the last two specifications, the anti-self-dealing index is positive and 
significant, indicating that foreign firms from countries with stronger minority protection are subject to 






Coffee (2002) argues that there are three mechanisms that serve to bond a foreign firm to the 
legal system of the country in which the firm cross-lists. Specifically, he stressed that cross-listing bonds 
firms in the U.S. because (1) they are subject to enforcement powers of the SEC, (2) investors can 
exercise low-cost and effective actions that are not available in the home market (such as class actions 
and derivative actions) and (3) the firm commits to providing fuller financial information in response to 
SEC requirements and reconcile its financial statements with GAAP. This legal bonding as proposed by 
Coffee has become the subject of some debate. The majority of critics of the bonding hypothesis have 
focused on whether or not the SEC is effective in enforcing securities regulations on foreign firms. These 
critics have argued that the SEC does not file many proceedings against foreign firms that are suspected 
of securities law violations and as a result foreign firms are going unpunished for breaking U.S. securities 
laws.  
Though evidence of SEC enforcement is indeed limited, the critics have tended to ignore the 
potential of private litigations as a way to enforce bonding within the U.S. regulatory system. This paper 
provides evidence that, despite the appearance of a lack of SEC enforcement, foreign firms that violate 
securities law are not given a free pass by shareholders. Using a sample of private securities class action 
cases brought against foreign firms that cross-list on the major U.S. exchanges, this paper presents 
evidence that the enforcement risk criticism may not be as troubling as initially thought. The analyses 
presented here indicate that investors are the exercising low-cost actions as proposed by Coffee’s legal 
bonding theory. Total losses for foreign firms at the disclosure and filing of shareholder-initiated class 
action lawsuits average more than $740 million dollars for the foreign firms in the sample in the U.S. 
markets alone and the CARs and dollars lost are insignificantly different between domestic and foreign 
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issuers. In addition to the U.S. markets, firms subjected to allegations of violations of securities laws also 
average more than $4.37 billion in the firm’s home market in total losses around the case event dates. 
Though there is mixed evidence as to whether the losses are greater based on characteristics of the home 
market such as geographic distance or existence of exchange controls, it is clear that the disclosure of a 
securities law violation is an equally large and economically significant event for the violating firm in 
both the home and U.S. markets. As the sample size is currently too small to further explore the mixed 
results on differing market reactions based on country characteristics, this must be left to future research 
once the numbers of class actions has grown to a large enough sample size.  
For the average foreign firm in the sample, market capitalization drops an average of eighteen 
percent in the three days around the case event dates. Thus it is reasonable to argue that these losses are 
large enough to potentially serve as an effective mechanism for deterrence and provides some evidence of 
enforcement of U.S. securities regulations. At a minimum, documenting this economically significant loss 
at disclosure and filing provides evidence inconsistent with the argument that, because of reluctance of 
the SEC to act as enforcers of U.S. securities regulations against foreign firms, violations by cross-listing 
firms will go unpunished. Thus it appears that the evidence supports the second bonding mechanism 
proposed by Coffee (2002) whereby foreign firms are bonding because investors gain access to the 
potential to exercise private actions.  
Additionally, by separating out the reputational penalties from the market reactions, I am able to 
provide the first evidence that country-level variables have some determinant power in the reputational 
penalties assessed by the market when violations of securities laws by firms are first exposed. The result 
of the regression analysis indicates that foreign firms suffer greater reputational penalties in cases where 
investors perceive the minority shareholder protection in the home market of the firm to be greater. As 
measured by the anti-self-dealing index (Djankov et al., 2008), the level of legal protection of minority 
shareholders in the home country serves as a determinant for the reputational penalties. I posit that this 
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reaction is the result of investor expectations as violations by those firms that come from countries with 
stronger protection of minority shareholders will come as a larger surprise to shareholders when 
violations are disclosed. As a result, a more severe reputational penalty will be assessed by minority 
shareholders because they had not anticipated violations from firms in these countries as much as they 
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Appendix A: Securities Class Action Examples61 
 
Example 1: Gravity Co., Ltd. 
 
 The original complaint against Gravity was filed on May 18, 2005 in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York and charges the Company and certain officers and directors with violations of 
Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) and Rule 
10b-5 promulgated there under of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. The complaint alleges that 
the defendants issued a Prospectus and Registration Statement as well as numerous press releases in connection 
with the Company’s IPO that were materially false and misleading because they failed to disclose decreased 
customer demand for the Company’s core product and a weakening in the Company’s animation business. 
 The Company conducted its IPO on February 7, 2005 and sold shares at a price of $13.50 per share. On May 
12, 2005 the Company announced that its financial results for the first quarter of 2005 were lower than 
expected. On this news the ADR price for the company fell to $5.60 per share, which represents more than 70 
percent decline from the IPO prices.  
 During the following months several additional complaints were filed and on December 13, 2005 the Court 
consolidated these complaints and appointed Pipefitters, Locals 522 & 633 Pension Trust Fund as Lead 
Plaintiff. 
 On July 11, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint and the defendants responded by 
filing a motion to dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint. 
 On June 11, 2007 the Company announced that it had reached an agreement in principle to settle the class 
action litigation for $10 million. 
 On November 21, 2007 the Court approved the settlement. 
 On January 7, 2008 the Company announced that the settlement of $10 million was approved and had passed 
the 30-day appeal period.  
 
Example 2: LDK Solar Company Ltd.  
 
 The original Complaint against LDK Solar Company was filed on October 9, 2007 in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of California. The Complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) and Rule 10b-5 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended and states that defendants knowingly concealed material 
information pertaining to how badly flawed the Company’s internal controls were in accurately reporting 
inventory. According to the Complaint, during the Class Period the Company’s inventories were overstated by an 
estimated 25 percent.   
 The disclosure occurred on October 3, 2007 when the Company announced that the financial controller had 
resigned and that the controller had reported vast inventory overestimation and internal control problems to the 
SEC and the Company’s external auditor, KPMG. The Company also announced an internal investigation in to 
the claims of the financial controller. After the announcement shares fell 24.39 percent during the October 3, 
2007 trading day.  
 In the following months several class action complaints were filed in the U.S. District Courts for the Southern 
District of New York and Northern District of California.  
 On December 14, 2007 the case was transferred to the Northern District of California. 
 On January 4, 2008 the Lead Plaintiff was appointed and the lead counsel was approved on February 8, 2008. 
 On March 10, 2008 a Consolidated Class Action Complaint was filed and the defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss. 
 On March 29, 2008 the motion to dismiss was denied. 
 The plaintiff’s motion to certify the class was approved on January 28, 2009. 
 On February 16, 2010 a proposed settlement agreement was entered to the court and it was approved on February 
17, 2008. 
 On June 22, 2010 the settlement of 16 million was approved and the case was dismissed with prejudice.
                                                            




Appendix B: Variable Definitions  
 
Category Variable Names Pred Sign Definitions 
Information Transparency, Firm Reputation and importance 
  
LNASSETS (+) Log of total assets in the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the disclosure. It is calculated as 
  = log (AT) 
  
ROA   
Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, net of the median for all 
firms in the same two-digit SIC code in the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the filing.  
(?) It is calculated as Net Income divided by Sales 
  = Income Before Extraordinary Items / Total Assets (IB / AT)  




Leverage in the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the filing, calculated as Debt in Current Liabilities + 
Long-Term Debt divided by Total Assets 
(-) = (Debt in Current Liabilities + Long-Term Debt )/ Total Assets 
=(DLC + DLTT) / AT 
FCF 
 
Free Cash Flow in the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the filing, calculated as Operating income 
before depreciation minus total income tax minus gross interest expense minus total amount of preferred 
dividend minus total amount of common dividend.  
(+) = OIBDP – TAX – XINT – DVP – DVC;  
 
where OpIncome= operating income before depreciation (OIBDP or EBITDA), TAX = Total Income 
Taxes - minus change in deferred taxes from the previous year to the current year (TXT-chTXDITC), 
INTEXP = Interest Expense (either TIE or (XINST+XINTD)), DVP = Preferred Dividends, DVC = 
Common Dividends; (Lehn and Poulson 1989)  
TURNOVER (+) 
Volume computed as the average monthly trading volume for the 6 mo preceding the date of the filing 
with NASDAQ trading volume divided by two to correct for double counting. Turnover is defined as 
volume divided by the number of shares outstanding.  
Merits and Potential Damage 
  
IPOVIO (-) One if an IPO violation is alleged and zero otherwise 
GAAPVIO (+) One if a Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) violation is alleged and zero otherwise 
CLASSPERIODLENGTH (?) Length of class period in number of days 
SETTLED (-) One if the case is eventually settled and zero otherwise 
OTHERCASE (+) 
One if another investigation (SEC, OSC, Israeli investigation, etc.) is ongoing at the firm during the same 
time for the alleged violation and zero otherwise 
Industry and Litigation Environment Control 
  
FIN (-) 
One if the firm belongs to an industry in the financial services sector (SIC Codes: 6000-6799 ) and zero 
otherwise 
TECH (-) 
One if the firm belongs to an industry in the technology sector (SIC Codes: 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 
3600–3674, 7371–7379, or 8731–8734) and zero otherwise 
  




Log of GDP per capita of the sample firm country of incorporation in the year prior to the disclosure. 
(IncGDPperCap(Log) is utilized as the GDP of the country of incorporation, PriGDPperCap(Log) is 
utilized as the GDP of the country of the primary sales) 
CSTMKTCAP (?) 
Stock market capitalization of the sample firm country of incorporation in the year prior to the disclosure. 
(IncCostMktCap is utilized as the market cap of the country of incorporation, PriCostMktCap is utilized 
as the market cap of the country of the primary sales) 
  
ANTISELFDEAL (+) 
Anti-self-dealing index measure as defined by Djankov et al. (2008). From 1996-2009 the index ranged 
from 0 to 1. (IncAntiSelfDeal is utilized as the index from the country of incorporation) 
  
GOVINDEX (+) 
Average of the six governance indicators as reported by Kauffmann et al. (2009). From 1996-2009 the 
index ranged from -2.5 to 1.9. (IncGovIndex is utilized as the index from the country of incorporation) 
INCCONTROL (+) 
One if the firms is incorporated in a country with market exchange controls at the time of the lawsuit and 
zero otherwise (HQControl is utilized as one if the firm is headquartered in such a country) 
  
INCALLOWCLASS (?) 
One if the firms is incorporated in a country that allows some form of class action at the time of the 





Appendix C: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1A: Securities Class Action Filings by Year 
Panel A: Securities Class Actions listed by year for the total number of filings, the total number of filings when mutual funds, LLCs and LLPs are 
excluded are presented in Table 1. From the full sample the number of cases filed against domestic firms and foreign firms is reported and the 
number of Canadian firms and other foreign firms that cross-list are separated. Panel B: Number of cases compared to firms listing on the major 
U.S. Exchanges per year. Data from 2000-2009 is from the Securities Exchange Commission Archives of International Registered and Reporting 
Companies.62 
 

















Percent of cases for firms 
listing on exchanges 
1996 119 118 113 96% 5 4% 
 
1996 696 5 0.72%  
1997 195 193 186 96% 7 4% 
 
1997 756 7 0.93% 
1998 274 270 255 94% 15 6% 
 
1998  N/A 15  N/A 
1999 231 225 219 97% 6 3% 
 
1999  N/A 6  N/A 
2000 238 236 224 95% 12 5% 
 
2000 825 12 1.45% 
2001 516 506 470 93% 36 8% 
 
2001 812 36 4.43% 
2002 285 275 260 95% 15 6% 
 
2002 765 15 1.96% 
2003 250 243 225 93% 18 8% 
 
2003 739 18 2.44% 
2004 260 244 219 90% 25 11% 
 
2004 745 25 3.36% 
2005 193 185 168 91% 17 10% 
 
2005 751 17 2.26% 
2006 133 129 120 93% 9 8% 
 
2006 739 9 1.22% 
2007 206 201 177 88% 24 14% 
 
2007 707 24 3.39% 
2008 276 268 243 91% 25 10% 
 
2008 675 25 3.70% 
2009 246 229 209 91% 20 10% 
 
2009 644 20 3.11% 
Total 3422 3320 3088 93% 234 8% 




62 Figures taken from SEC market summaries at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml. Numbers for 1999 and 1998 are 
not reported by the SEC.  
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Table 1B: Cases filed against sample firms by country of incorporation, headquarter, and primary sales segment.  
Securities class action lawsuits filed against foreign firms by country of incorporation and principle headquarters as reported on company annual reports in the year of 
the lawsuit filing as reported from the firm annual report. The country of primary sales are determined from the firm annual reports Segments information in the year 
of the lawsuit filing as reported in Compustat or the 10-K, 40-F, or 20-F SEC filing. 
 
Incorporation Headquarters Primary Sales Incorporation Headquarters Primary Sales 
Western Europe 86 36.75% 82 35.04% 44 18.80% United States 0 0.00% 13 5.56% 115 49.15% 
Belgium 4 1.71% 5 2.14% 0 0.00% 
Cyprus 1 0.43% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% Canada 65 27.78% 60 25.64% 16 6.84% 
England 25 10.68% 23 9.83% 18 7.69% Ontario 43 18.38% 43 18.38% 
Finland 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% Quebec 5 2.14% 6 2.56% 
France 8 3.42% 7 2.99% 6 2.56% Vancouver 4 1.71% 5 2.14% 
Germany 11 4.70% 11 4.70% 10 4.27% Yukon 3 1.28% 0 0.00% 
Greece 0 0.00% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% Nova Scotia 2 0.85% 1 0.43% 
Guernsey 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% New Brunswick 2 0.85% 0 0.00% 
Ireland 7 2.99% 5 2.14% 1 0.43% Alberta 6 2.56% 5 2.14% 
Italy 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% 
  
Luxembourg 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% 
 
Latin American & 
Caribbean 
35 14.96% 10 4.27% 6 2.56% 
Netherlands 12 5.13% 11 4.70% 2 0.85% Argentina 1 0.43% 2 0.85% 1 0.43% 
Spain 2 0.85% 4 1.71% 3 1.28% Brazil 2 0.85% 2 0.85% 3 1.28% 
Sweden 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% British Virgin Islands 7 2.99% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Switzerland 11 4.70% 10 4.27% 4 1.71% Cayman Islands 19 8.12% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
      
Mexico 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 
Developed Asia 
Pacific 
9 3.85% 9 3.85% 12 5.13% 
 
Panama 4 1.71% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% 
Australia 2 0.85% 2 0.85% 2 0.85% Puerto Rico 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% 
Hong Kong 0 0.00% 2 0.85% 1 0.43% Bermuda 0 0.00% 3 1.28% 0 0.00% 
Japan 3 1.28% 2 0.85% 4 1.71% Uruguay 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.43% 
Singapore 4 1.71% 3 1.28% 5 2.14% 
  
Middle East and Africa 27 11.54% 27 11.54% 5 2.14% 
      
Ghana 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 
Emerging Asia 
Pacific 
10 4.27% 30 12.82% 29 12.39% 
 
Israel 24 10.26% 24 10.26% 1 0.43% 
China 1 0.43% 21 8.97% 21 8.97% South Africa 2 0.85% 2 0.85% 2 0.85% 
India 3 1.28% 3 1.28% 1 0.43% Africa General 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.43% 
Korea 4 1.71% 4 1.71% 1 0.43% 
  
Marshall Island 1 0.43% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% Eastern Europe 2 0.85% 3 1.28% 3 1.28% 
Philippines 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 0 0.00% Russia 1 0.43% 2 0.85% 2 0.85% 
Taiwan 0 0.00% 1 0.43% 4 1.71% Turkey 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 1 0.43% 
Asia General 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.43% 
  





Table 2: Case Characteristics 
This table presents case characteristic information for both sample and control with p-values of differences between the groups. The class period 
is the length of time between the start of the wrongdoing by the corporation and the date which the information is discovered. Wherever possible, 
the court certified class period was used. The filing lag represents the number of days between the end of the certified class period and the 
original complaint filing in the securities class action lawsuit. IPO Violation is a dummy variable equal to one if the case alleges violations in the 
IPO. GAAP violation is a dummy variable equal to one if the case alleges GAAP violations. Inst Lead Plaintiff is the percentage of cases that 
have one or more institutional investors serving as a lead plaintiff. Number of Analysts is the number of analysts reporting as following the firm 
in the period prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Finance is the percentage of firms in the financial industry. Technology is the percentage of firms in 
the technology industry and retail is the percentage of firms in the retail industry. Settled is the percent of cases that are settled and dismissed is 
the percent of cases dismissed.    
 
  
Non-Sample firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits 
from 1996-2009 (N = 2268) 
NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to 
lawsuits 1996-2009 (N = 191) 
Difference  
(P-Value)  
Variable Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Class Period (days) 520.90 371 501.621 196 676 518.90 371 461.083 204 702 0.9562 0.9451 
Filing Lag (days) 95.03 29 216.643 2 196 108.28 30.5 203.807 5 211 0.4012 0.2440 
IPO Violation 18.73% 0 0.390 0 0 22.28% 0 0.417 0 0 0.2169 0.2168 
GAAP Violation 48.46% 0 0.500 0 1 43.56% 0 0.497 0 1 0.1810 0.1809 
Inst Lead Plaintiff 34.98% 0 0.477 0 1 42.08% 0 0.495 0 1 0.0425 0.0425 
Number of Analysts 10.01 7 8.221 4 15 9.39 6 10.076 3 12 0.3307 0.0087 
Finance 16.12% 0 0.368 0 0 14.07% 0 0.349 0 0 0.4485 0.4484 
Technology 22.55% 0 0.418 0 0 29.65% 0 0.458 0 1 0.0222 0.0223 
Retail 4.72% 0 0.212 0 0 0.50% 0 0.071 0 0 0.0053 0.0053 
Settled (%) 59.09% 1 0.505 0 1 62.38% 1 0.525 0 1 0.3750 0.3750 




Table 3: Firm Level Descriptive Statistics by Company Year 
Firm characteristics from Compustat as measured for all firms subject to a securities class action lawsuit as reported on the Stanford Clearinghouse for the years 1996-
2009. Accounting information is reported for the year prior to the filing of the lawsuit. The p-values of t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median 
respectively are shown in the difference columns. Firm characteristics from Compustat as measured for all firms subject to a securities class action lawsuit as reported 
on the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse for the years 1996-2009. To capture all firms independently, unconsolidated cases were used to determine 
firms. Accounting information is reported for the year prior to the filing of the lawsuit. The p-values of t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median 
respectively are shown in the difference columns. ROA is calculated as Net Income divided by Sales. ROE is calculated as Net Income divided by Shareholder Equity. 
Leverage is calculated as Debt in Current Liabilities + Long-Term Debt divided by Total Assets. Market to Book is calculated as Market Capitalization divided by 
Stockholders Equity where market capitalization is the market price times common shares outstanding.  Operating Return on Sales is calculated as EBITDA divided 
by Sales. Price to Book is calculated as market price divided by total assets minus intangible assets. Change in sales is calculated as Current year’s sales minus last 
year’s sales divided by last year’s sales. Free cash flow is calculated as suggested by Lehn and Poulson (1989) where free cash flow is equal to operating income 
before depreciation minus total income tax minus gross interest expense minus total amount of preferred dividend minus total amount of common dividend.  
 
 
Non-Sample firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits 
from 1996-2009 (N = 2218) 
NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to 
lawsuits 1996-2009 (N = 191) 
Difference 
(P-value) 
Variable Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
TA ($mil) 38261 473 189625 123 3227 138499 1358 519964 234 14512 0.0000 0.0000 
TA (Log) 6.62 6.16 2.61 4.81 8.08 7.70 7.21 2.96 5.45 9.58 0.0000 0.0000 
Sales ($mil) 5920 349 18966 84 2155 16414 800 37270 144 9950 0.0000 0.0001 
Sales (Log) 5.93 5.67 2.50 4.24 7.52 6.74 6.35 2.82 4.58 9.18 0.0000 0.0003 
MKCAP ($mil) 8650 655 29530 181 3187 15367 1668 32067 296 12049 0.0030 0.0000 
FCF ($mil) 497.53 11.82 2,268.55 -15.04 127.00 1,225.93 31.96 3,883.58 -22.83 460.81 0.0003 0.0063 
ROA -16.61% 0.27% 0.814 -16.39% 4.77% -5.39% 0.68% 0.273 -9.28% 6.81% 0.0513 0.0371 
ROE -31.00% 3.40% 7.410 -22.30% 14.20% -6.10% 2.80% 1.416 -17.20% 15.10% 0.6480 0.7160 
P/B 0.09 0.025 0.313 0.005 0.079 0.044 0.008 0.116 0.001 0.04 0.0620 0.0000 
Leverage 24.96% 16.82% 0.329 1.17% 38.31% 19.83% 14.45% 0.210 1.96% 30.47% 0.0294 0.1979 
CAPEX 0.06 0.036 0.072 0.014 0.071 0.064 0.037 0.087 0.014 0.072 0.1920 0.8380 
Op ROS -1.12 0.101 13.064 -0.051 0.217 -0.933 0.119 8.922 0.004 0.249 0.8510 0.1350 
Cash/TA 0.15 0.083 0.176 0.024 0.212 0.158 0.099 0.178 0.03 0.22 0.6110 0.3280 
M/B 2.63 2.23 40.240 1.16 4.35 2.98 2.05 5.440 1.03 3.36 0.9050 0.0440 
Tobin’s q 2.52 1.68 2.05 1.107 3.162 1.813 1.081 1.693 0.856 2.045 0.0001 0.0000 
Prior 1 Yr -0.07 -0.236 1.001 -0.582 0.115 -0.103 -0.196 0.606 -0.492 0.129 0.6120 0.2320 





Table 4: Change in Market Capitalization around Event Dates  
This table reports the change in firm market values for the event dates surrounding securities class action lawsuit dates. All market capitalizations 
are calculated as the price*shares outstanding as reported in CRSP or DataStream and is presented in the thousands.  The change in market value 
is calculated as the beginning market capitalization minus the ending market capitalization. Percentage change is calculated as (beginning market 
capitalization minus the ending market capitalization) divided by beginning market capitalization.  Maximum Dollar Loss (MDL) is calculated as 
the value change in the defendant firm’s market capitalization from the trading day with the highest market capitalization during the class period 
to the trading day immediately following the end of the class period. Disclosure Dollar Lost (DDL) is calculated as the value change in the 
defendant firm’s market capitalization between the trading day immediately preceding the end of the class period and the trading day immediately 
following the end of the class period. Filing MV is the difference around the filing date, Dismissal MV is the difference around the dismissal 
announcement and Settle MV is the difference around the settlement announcement. Combined MV is the sum of the disclosure, filing and 
dismissal/settlement changes. 
 
  Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
Panel A: Foreign  Firms - US Market (N= 191)           
Maximum MV change over the class period (MDL) -5,070,329 -927,639 14,639,195 -2,767,917 -275,399 
Disclosure MV change (-1, +1) (DDL) -587,336 -77,870 2,357,604 -435,056 -9,351 
Filing MV Change (-1,+1) -48,121 -1,798 737,946 -33,956 7,731 
Dismissal MV Change (-1,+1) -8,635 -2,343 893,726 -70,066 23,328 
Settle MV Change (-1,+1) 31,207 301 338,470 -2,128 11,952 
Combined MV losses (-1,+1) -565,957 -53,277 2,433,984 -287,245 -3,387 
Maximum percent MV change over the class period (MDL)  -59.19% -62.94% 0.271 -81.54% -40.68% 
Disclosure percent MV change (-1, +1) (DDL) -18.43% -13.40% 0.202 -29.57% -4.55% 
Filing percent MV Change (-1,+1) -1.99% -1.39% 0.122 -5.58% 2.43% 
Dismissal percent MV Change (-1,+1) -1.43% -0.48% 0.065 -3.45% 1.63% 
Settle percent MV Change (-1,+1) 2.59% 0.53% 0.088 -1.50% 3.69% 
Combined percent change in MV losses (-1,+1) -17.93% -13.84% 0.273 -29.17% -1.81% 
Panel B: Foreign Firms - Home Market (N= 129)           
Foreign Maximum MV change over the class period (MDL) -16,968,963 -4,367,295 27,307,898 -19,661,649 -815,653 
Foreign Disclosure MV change (-1, +1) (DDL) -1,848,225 -312,529 3,910,944 -1,983,102 -3,748 
Foreign Filing MV Change (-1,+1) -484,442 -3,096 3,231,113 -118,538 43,495 
Foreign Dismissal MV Change (-1,+1) 294,445 91 1,630,855 -56,580 211,386 
Foreign Settle MV Change (-1,+1) 63,385 0 434,592 -3,220 18,311 
Foreign Combined MV losses (-1,+1) -2,053,470 -220,303 6,430,569 -1,930,224 0 
Foreign Maximum percent MV change over the class period (MDL)  -52.60% -52.14% 0.278 -76.07% -33.53% 
Foreign Disclosure percent MV change (-1, +1) (DDL) -15.73% -8.56% 0.210 -28.98% -1.08% 
Foreign Filing percent MV Change (-1,+1) -2.25% -0.42% 0.116 -4.48% 2.82% 
Foreign Dismissal percent MV Change (-1,+1) 0.39% 0.08% 0.048 -1.40% 2.66% 
Foreign Settle percent MV Change (-1,+1) 0.93% 0.00% 0.050 -1.33% 1.75% 
Foreign Combined percent change in MV losses (-1,+1) -16.33% -8.31% 0.282 -28.16% 0.00% 
Panel C: U.S. Firms - U.S. Market  (N=2218)           
Maximum MV change over the class period (MDL) -5,839,223 -780,087 19,696,007 -3,017,853 -254,797 
Disclosure MV change (-1, +1) (DDL) -543,228 -66,872 2,327,776 -291,994 -7,230 
Filing MV Change (-1,+1) -62,824 -1,928 1,389,816 -22,212 7,319 
Dismissal MV Change (-1,+1) -24,823 0 1,028,967 -12,806 25,267 
Settle MV Change (-1,+1) -4,835 204 465,368 -7,493 9,931 
Combined MV losses (-1,+1) -563,667 -54,126 2,883,044 -280,564 -3,750 
Maximum percent MV change over the class period (MDL)  -60.99% -65.84% 0.267 -82.19% -44.09% 
Disclosure percent MV change (-1, +1) (DDL) -18.19% -15.15% 0.337 -31.68% -3.40% 
Filing percent MV Change (-1,+1) -2.44% -1.04% 0.125 -5.71% 2.22% 
Dismissal percent MV Change (-1,+1) 0.57% 0.00% 0.067 -2.41% 2.58% 
Settle percent MV Change (-1,+1) 1.18% 0.10% 0.092 -2.22% 3.20% 
Combined percent change in MV losses (-1,+1) -18.46% -14.88% 0.355 -32.86% -1.83% 
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Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Associated with Announcements of Alleged Securities Law Violations, Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings and Resolution Announcements 
Panel A presents the market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from fray -135 to day -11. Mean and median abnormal returns for enforcement actions calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index for 
enforcement event dates. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to shareholders. Filing events are identified as the first date of a securities class 
action lawsuit filing. Settlement dates are the date the settlement is first announced in the press. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative abnormal returns for each enforcement event date window. Panel B presents 
the valuation effect in dollars for each enforcement period event and the combined dollars lost over all event dates. Daily economic effect is calculated as the abnormal return for each firm multiplied by the firm’s market 
capitalization on the previous day for all dates in the event window. The daily economic effects are cumulated over separate event windows as a measure of total losses. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and 
median between the foreign and domestic firm market reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold.. 
 
 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around case event dates 
Non-Sample firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits from 1996-2009 (N = 2218) NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to lawsuits 1996-2009  (N = 191) P-Values 
Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CAR 
(-1,1) -18.10% -15.44% 0.3749 -33.25% -2.48% -18.60% -12.44% 0.2279 -32.89% -3.97% 0.8550 0.8258 
(-10,1) -23.57% -20.84% 0.4329 -42.46% -4.02% -22.96% -18.76% 0.2746 -37.98% -5.10% 0.8469 0.4830 
(1,10) -11.99% -8.69% 0.2823 -25.89% 2.37% -8.34% -6.43% 0.2123 -18.87% 3.10% 0.0826 0.0813 
Filing CAR 
(-1,1) -4.23% -1.40% 0.1734 -7.49% 2.48% -3.22% -0.99% 0.1591 -7.23% 3.11% 0.4366 0.5089 
(-10,1) -9.18% -4.53% 0.4144 -22.98% 5.61% -10.23% -3.97% 0.2795 -21.46% 6.32% 0.7310 0.8508 
(1,10) -0.94% -0.70% 0.2007 -8.89% 6.73% 3.09% 1.25% 0.2009 -5.74% 8.69% 0.0077 0.0182 
Settle CAR* 
(-1,1) 0.93% -0.17% 0.1111 -2.88% 3.19% 2.54% 0.73% 0.1094 -2.00% 4.24% 0.2610 0.1888 
(-10,1) 2.28% 0.15% 0.2014 -5.58% 6.83% 1.17% -0.44% 0.1705 -5.96% 9.50% 0.6626 0.9293 
(1,10) 0.02% -0.22% 0.1711 -6.74% 5.14% 2.90% 1.65% 0.1716 -5.10% 6.78% 0.1911 0.2344 
Dismissal CAR** 
(-1,1) -0.20% -0.17% 0.0748 -3.03% 2.19% -0.86% -0.63% 0.0744 -2.58% 0.76% 0.5712 0.7598 
(-10,1) -0.02% -0.57% 0.1811 -7.20% 5.92% 0.99% 0.28% 0.1094 -4.06% 5.05% 0.7159 0.3611 
(1,10) 1.16% 0.18% 0.1440 -4.34% 5.94% 3.59% 2.14% 0.0897 -2.34% 6.42% 0.2754 0.0881 
Combined CAR 
(-1,1) -21.62% -17.40% 0.4193 -37.51% -2.48% -20.97% -14.09% 0.3200 -32.15% -2.25% 0.8332 0.3682 
(-10,1) -31.32% -25.51% 0.7716 -57.35% -3.11% -32.21% -19.48% 0.4615 -54.22% -1.66% 0.8737 0.4619 
(1,10) -12.31% -9.37% 0.3808 -31.03% 6.61% -3.81% -5.30% 0.3280 -18.30% 10.16% 0.0027 0.0025 
*Settlement CAR = 107 
**Dismissal CAR = 69 
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Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Associated with Announcements of Alleged Securities Law Violations, Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings and Resolution Announcements cont’d 
Panel A presents the market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11. Mean and median abnormal returns for enforcement actions calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index for 
enforcement event dates. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to shareholders. Filing events are identified as the first date of a securities class 
action lawsuit filing. Settlement dates are the date the settlement is first announced in the press. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative abnormal returns for each enforcement event date window. Panel B presents 
the valuation effect in dollars for each enforcement period event and the combined dollars lost over all event dates. Daily economic effect is calculated as the abnormal return for each firm multiplied by the firm’s market 
capitalization on the previous day for all dates in the event window. The daily economic effects are cumulated over separate event windows as a measure of total losses. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and 




Panel B: Dollars Lost (in thousands) at case event dates 
 
        
Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CDE 
(-1,1) -558,251 -69,712 2,391,270 -292,373 -6,328 -575,475 -70,179 2,120,739 -437,180 -6,300 0.9231 0.4067 
(-10,1) -739,428 -98,216 3,925,105 -395,505 -12,508 -812,471 -100,568 3,321,708 -487,915 -9,902 0.8026 0.8862 
(1,10) -344,333 -33,807 2,241,145 -192,294 2,852 -344,253 -27,576 2,040,539 -156,377 2,314 0.9996 0.4842 
Filing CDE 
(-1,1) -154,522 -2,821 2,260,448 -34,024 8,114 -183,924 -2,872 2,059,747 -30,797 10,472 0.8620 0.8211 
(-10,1) -427,921 -13,514 3,316,221 -166,095 10,294 -492,008 -9,452 3,146,591 -172,817 13,236 0.7967 0.6187 
(1,10) 13,424 -2,204 1,827,960 -34,367 26,053 141,881 644 1,088,682 -16,026 41,267 0.3386 0.0323 
Settle CDE* 
(-1,1) -23,952 -375 586,181 -13,814 8,801 20,751 394 183,437 -3,147 13,409 0.5377 0.0535 
(-10,1) 2,923 -736 1,378,938 -25,845 18,781 1,627 -916 310,151 -17,997 6,577 0.9939 0.6535 
(1,10) 36,707 -733 965,188 -23,206 21,916 4,457 914 266,794 -7,439 10,501 0.7869 0.4967 
Dismissal CDE** 
(-1,1) -5,721 -507 1,333,796 -21,140 17,192 -224 -1,600 1,438,556 -19,107 15,915 0.9790 0.7422 
(-10,1) -74,797 -2,138 2,790,973 -58,035 37,817 38,106 362 1,504,093 -36,402 143,957 0.7907 0.1801 
(1,10) 240,887 -238 2,578,702 -37,741 40,445 485,109 6,394 3,202,952 -38,732 87,680 0.5549 0.2587 
Combined CDE 
(-1,1) -704,608 -70,343 3,708,547 -335,345 -5,836 -740,686 -62,943 4,061,327 -422,282 -7,199 0.8970 0.7563 
(-10,1) -1,155,486 -125,815 5,548,216 -555,315 -13,051 -1,275,150 -98,100 6,230,609 -534,951 -10,926 0.7747 0.5950 
(1,10) -247,469 -36,216 3,204,444 -206,537 7,216 -87,815 -20,125 2,660,140 -137,371 17,679 0.5017 0.0405 
*Settlement CAR = 107 





Table 6: Market Reactions at significant case dates of the U.S. exchange as compared to the home market exchange for NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to lawsuits 1996-2009 
Market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11 are presented. Mean and median abnormal returns for enforcement actions calculated using the total return 
index for enforcement event dates as reported in DataStream. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to 
shareholders. Filing events are identified as the first date of a securities class action lawsuit filing. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative abnormal returns for each enforcement event 




Home Market Reaction (N=129) U.S. Market Reaction (N=129) Difference (p-values) 
 
Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CARS 
 
(-1,1) -15.80% -7.24% 0.228 -30.68% -0.53% -17.47% -11.37% 0.228 -30.60% -2.63% 0.0005 0.0002 
(-10,1) -17.81% -11.38% 0.271 -32.86% -0.84% -22.13% -17.89% 0.281 -36.96% -4.38% 0.0179 0.0024 
(1,10) -8.95% -4.19% 0.187 -16.38% 2.63% -7.36% -5.57% 0.212 -19.06% 4.34% 0.5846 0.9057 
Filing CARs 
 
(-1,1) -4.85% -0.07% 0.174 -3.95% 2.21% -3.85% -1.03% 0.169 -6.92% 2.40% 0.9845 0.4198 
(-10,1) -8.82% -1.19% 0.263 -11.74% 4.83% -12.33% -4.42% 0.383 -22.52% 5.84% 0.1146 0.1860 
(1,10) 1.54% 0.50% 0.116 -4.38% 5.52% 0.86% 0.78% 0.331 -5.84% 8.42% 0.2597 0.7667 
Combined CAR 
 
(-1,1) -17.94% -5.75% 0.341 -25.83% 0.36% -19.48% -13.09% 0.322 -30.53% -1.08% 0.0099 0.0009 
(-10,1) -23.83% -6.97% 0.462 -35.98% 1.95% -32.50% -17.62% 0.539 -54.12% -0.08% 0.0203 0.0044 
(1,10) -7.10% -1.93% 0.238 -17.94% 7.64% -4.89% -4.81% 0.415 -18.51% 10.31% 0.1880 0.8675 
 
 
Table 7: Market value conversions of market reactions at significant case dates of the U.S. exchange as compared to the home market exchange for NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms 
subject to lawsuits 1996-2009 
The valuation effect in millions of dollars for each enforcement period event and the combined dollars lost over all event dates. Daily economic effect is calculated as the abnormal return for each firm 
multiplied by the firm’s market capitalization on the previous day for all dates in the event window. The daily economic effects are cumulated over separate event windows as a measure of total losses. 
The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median between the home and U.S. market reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold. 
 
 Home Market Reaction (N=129) U.S. Market Reaction (N=129) Difference (p-values) 
 
Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CARS 
 
(-1,1) -3,486.500 -290.442 13300.000 -1806.592 -4.020 -854.213 -135.222 2672.094 -749.512 -4.137 0.0086 0.0001 
(-10,1) -4,790.898 -386.965 24900.000 -2178.513 -8.967 -1129.976 -119.771 4115.470 -770.841 -11.683 0.0522 0.0051 
(1,10) -2,343.589 -66.998 14300.000 -719.716 82.207 -493.218 -36.802 2556.153 -271.799 12.249 0.0769 0.0010 
Filing CARs 
 
(-1,1) -925.600 -1.082 9876.849 -180.005 74.071 -293.419 -4.005 2575.642 -65.533 16.223 0.3356 0.4959 
(-10,1) -3,249.737 -40.864 20700.000 -818.105 80.881 -698.817 -17.347 3959.403 -209.187 37.497 0.0962 0.2083 
(1,10) 278.869 -0.748 2830.437 -118.787 398.730 250.501 1.544 1287.908 -29.844 142.645 0.839 0.5008 
Combined CAR 
 
(-1,1) -4,367.094 -240.628 22300.000 -2082.672 -0.623 -1116.670 -121.766 5010.647 -809.793 -9.347 0.0397 0.0114 
(-10,1) -7,893.285 -330.212 44700.000 -3067.440 -3.006 -1780.601 -154.375 7730.435 -816.885 -13.160 0.0670 0.0643 





Table 8: Differences in the number of shares held in the home market and the U.S. market during the disclosure and filing event dates. 
Difference in SHROUT is calculated as the difference between the shares outstanding in the home market and the shares outstanding in the U.S. in millions of shares. Percentage home shares is the 
percentage the home market represents of total shares traded on both U.S. and home markets and is calculated as number of shares on the home market divided by total shares listed on both markets.  
 
Full Sample (N = 129) Non-Canadian Sample (N= 81) 
Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% 
Disclosure Date Window 
     Difference in shares outstanding (in mil) 2,229.80 19.14 8,797.03 0.00 771.99 3,603.6 294.9 10,988.6 24.8 1,531.8 
     Percentage home shares 66.28% 52.29% 24.76% 50.00% 94.08% 77.63% 91.16% 23.68% 52.41% 97.72% 
 Filing Date Window 
     Difference in shares outstanding (in mil) 2,255.37 33.65 8,355.44 0.00 867.43 3,483.35 351.54 10,198.48 34.61 1,502.00 




Table 9: Geographic Differences in CARs at significant case dates of the U.S. exchange as compared to the home market exchange for NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to 
lawsuits 1996-2009 by country of incorporation 
Market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11 are presented. Mean and median abnormal returns for enforcement actions calculated using the total return index for enforcement event 
dates as reported in DataStream. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to shareholders. Filing events are identified as the first date of a 
securities class action lawsuit filing. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative abnormal returns for each enforcement event date window. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median between the 
home and U.S. market reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold. Panel A1 contains CARs for sample firms incorporated in Europe, Panel A2 contains CARs for 
sample firms incorporated in Canada and Panel A3 contains CARs for sample firms incorporated in the Asia Pacific and Middle Eastern countries.  
 
U.S. Market CARs Home Market CARs Difference (p values) 
Panel A: Europe (N=65) 
Disclosure Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
(-1,1) -18.82% -8.80% 0.243 -32.36% -0.96% -15.10% -6.91% 0.223 -20.07% -1.40% 0.0103 0.006 
(-10,1) -20.66% -11.28% 0.282 -35.90% -3.46% -17.16% -11.28% 0.264 -31.13% -1.35% 0.0338 0.0736 
(1,10) -6.16% -3.31% 0.207 -18.52% 0.78% -5.55% -4.18% 0.205 -15.28% 3.06% 0.8122 0.9846 
Filing 
(-1,1) -3.70% -0.37% 0.177 -3.14% 4.19% -3.48% 0.51% 0.164 -2.47% 3.39% 0.7754 0.2356 
(-10,1) -9.07% -1.00% 0.301 -14.68% 5.55% -6.94% -0.16% 0.275 -13.36% 6.21% 0.0316 0.076 
(1,10) 3.16% 2.60% 0.165 -4.37% 8.69% 3.17% 1.80% 0.147 -2.01% 9.81% 0.9855 0.7812 
Combined 
(-1,1) -21.47% -8.98% 0.357 -26.12% -0.12% -17.63% -5.54% 0.332 -22.26% -0.26% 0.0253 0.0045 
(-10,1) -28.37% -10.57% 0.518 -43.24% -0.69% -22.39% -10.39% 0.471 -36.03% 0.97% 0.0076 0.0167 
(1,10) -1.87% -3.05% 0.244 -13.42% 9.95% -1.13% -1.42% 0.248 -15.49% 6.44% 0.6889 0.8943 
Panel B: Canada (N=45) 
Disclosure 
(-1,1) -19.70% -17.88% 0.270 -37.71% -2.67% -19.57% -17.20% 0.257 -37.05% -0.36% 0.9291 0.7821 
(-10,1) -21.53% -20.37% 0.350 -41.70% -0.23% -22.34% -18.43% 0.318 -39.73% -0.75% 0.6891 0.9325 
(1,10) -7.18% -5.62% 0.220 -14.83% 5.48% -7.41% -5.46% 0.194 -13.06% 3.83% 0.9169 0.7222 
Filing 
(-1,1) -5.39% -2.01% 0.142 -6.24% 1.32% -5.17% -0.71% 0.183 -3.90% 0.63% 0.8801 0.3674 
(-10,1) -13.07% -4.08% 0.252 -31.25% 4.39% -11.29% -2.00% 0.261 -19.11% 2.35% 0.4085 0.6901 
(1,10) 0.35% 0.38% 0.155 -6.79% 9.01% 0.64% 0.37% 0.145 -5.00% 7.42% 0.7817 0.7555 
Combined 
(-1,1) -24.28% -21.81% 0.322 -36.85% -2.30% -23.76% -19.78% 0.355 -28.97% 0.10% 0.7997 0.719 
(-10,1) -33.14% -18.21% 0.479 -61.15% -0.31% -33.34% -19.17% 0.451 -50.80% -1.01% 0.9501 0.6189 
(1,10) -6.66% -3.98% 0.277 -27.49% 11.40% -7.92% -2.37% 0.271 -21.59% 7.62% 0.5989 0.4849 
Panel C: Asia Pacific and Middle East (N=19) 
Disclosure 
(-1,1) -18.63% -12.88% 0.212 -21.62% -7.12% -11.83% -8.38% 0.192 -13.90% -1.03% 0.0063 0.0052 
(-10,1) -21.97% -16.40% 0.215 -34.81% -6.41% -13.50% -11.62% 0.180 -22.73% -3.02% 0.0034 0.0023 
(1,10) -11.32% -8.07% 0.239 -18.27% 1.84% -16.02% -4.90% 0.215 -21.94% -3.03% 0.5433 0.9588 
Filing 
(-1,1) -2.88% 0.46% 0.148 -5.00% 4.21% -3.08% -0.97% 0.158 -4.77% 5.91% 0.9058 0.8092 
(-10,1) -0.39% -2.91% 0.210 -9.77% 6.96% -1.14% -0.33% 0.200 -10.66% 9.07% 0.7297 0.7782 
(1,10) 9.89% -1.00% 0.336 -4.46% 6.75% -1.56% -2.78% 0.103 -6.20% 2.61% 0.1436 0.1165 
Combined 
(-1,1) -15.48% -11.93% 0.436 -22.32% -5.56% -12.74% -7.67% 0.356 -14.52% -0.09% 0.6138 0.0626 
(-10,1) -22.29% -22.75% 0.418 -48.29% 0.60% -14.58% -7.77% 0.371 -39.22% 3.21% 0.0871 0.0929 
(1,10) -7.46% -9.04% 0.510 -15.61% 7.58% -15.37% -9.43% 0.221 -23.50% 0.49% 0.1503 0.3812 
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Table 10: Market Exchange Control CAR comparisons  
Panel A presents the market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11 for the subset of sample firms that are incorporated in countries with exchange controls compared to those 
incorporated in countries without exchange controls. Panel B presents the difference between the home and U.S. market reactions for each subgroup. Mean and median abnormal returns for enforcement actions calculated using the 
value-weighted CRSP index for enforcement event dates. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to shareholders. Filing events are identified as 
the first date of a securities class action lawsuit filing. Settlement dates are the date the settlement is first announced in the press. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative abnormal returns for each enforcement event 
date window. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median between the foreign and domestic firm market reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero 
in bold. 
 
Panel A: U.S. Market comparisons between firms incorporated in countries with and without exchange controls at the time of filing 
Firms incorporated in a country without market exchange controls Firms incorporated in a country with market exchange controls P-Values 
N Mean Median StDev 25% 75% N Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CAR Disclosure CAR
(-1,1) 167 -17.550% -12.164% 0.2204 -30.389% -3.968% (-1,1) 24 -25.904% -24.162% 0.2685 -39.898% -4.416% 0.0932 0.2007 
(-10,1) 167 -21.679% -17.513% 0.2746 -36.964% -4.277% (-10,1) 24 -31.841% -27.637% 0.2638 -48.581% -14.365% 0.0902 0.0711 
(1,10) 165 -8.391% -5.781% 0.2048 -18.523% 3.205% (1,10) 24 -7.988% -10.102% 0.2636 -21.704% 0.605% 0.9310 0.4673 
Filing CAR Filing CAR 
(-1,1) 167 -3.142% -0.988% 0.1618 -6.716% 2.307% (-1,1) 24 -3.728% -0.076% 0.1418 -7.484% 4.735% 0.8665 0.7431 
(-10,1) 167 -10.819% -4.277% 0.2874 -24.030% 6.077% (-10,1) 24 -6.112% -2.981% 0.2173 -14.985% 7.265% 0.4419 0.4871 
(1,10) 167 1.266% 0.633% 0.1547 -6.920% 7.695% (1,10) 24 15.809% 1.560% 0.3760 -3.264% 16.952% 0.0008 0.1133 
Combined CAR Combined CAR 
(-1,1) 167 -20.000% -13.878% 0.3156 -30.425% -2.047% (-1,1) 24 -27.850% -25.804% 0.3489 -40.163% -8.902% 0.2617 0.1986 
(-10,1) 167 -31.597% -17.642% 0.4762 -52.250% -1.270% (-10,1) 24 -36.555% -29.622% 0.3451 -61.631% -12.025% 0.6235 0.2456 
(1,10) 167 -5.529% -5.707% 0.2639 -18.300% 10.155% (1,10) 24 8.186% -4.625% 0.6085 -19.211% 19.893% 0.0551 0.6544 
 
Panel B: Home and U.S. Market reaction comparisons 
U.S Market CARs Firms incorporated in a country with exchange controls Home Market CARs P-Values 
N Mean Median StDev 25% 75% N Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CAR Disclosure CAR
(-1,1) 24 -25.904% -24.162% 0.269 -39.898% -4.416% (-1,1) 24 -25.784% -24.089% 0.268 -39.839% -4.457% 0.2855 0.3313 
(-10,1) 24 -31.841% -27.637% 0.264 -48.581% -14.365% (-10,1) 24 -31.757% -27.785% 0.258 -48.714% -15.422% 0.7823 0.2301 
(1,10) 24 -7.988% -10.102% 0.264 -21.704% 0.605% (1,10) 24 -8.204% -8.677% 0.266 -22.617% 0.419% 0.3505 0.0758 
Filing CAR Filing CAR 
(-1,1) 24 -3.728% -0.076% 0.142 -7.484% 4.735% (-1,1) 24 -3.629% -0.339% 0.141 -7.360% 4.878% 0.1956 0.3758 
(-10,1) 24 -6.112% -2.981% 0.217 -14.985% 7.265% (-10,1) 24 -5.966% -2.957% 0.220 -15.149% 7.473% 0.3416 0.4751 
(1,10) 24 15.809% 1.560% 0.376 -3.264% 16.952% (1,10) 24 15.965% 3.234% 0.376 -3.430% 17.456% 0.2294 0.3606 
Combined CAR Combined CAR 
(-1,1) 24 -27.850% -25.804% 0.349 -40.163% -8.902% (-1,1) 24 -27.627% -25.349% 0.348 -40.111% -9.468% 0.1572 0.1229 
(-10,1) 24 -36.555% -29.622% 0.345 -61.631% -12.025% (-10,1) 24 -36.267% -29.637% 0.340 -60.052% -12.155% 0.4758 0.9090 
(1,10) 24 8.186% -4.625% 0.609 -19.211% 19.893% (1,10) 24 8.051% -4.307% 0.612 -19.816% 18.856% 0.6827 0.1702 
Firms incorporated in a country without exchange controls 
Disclosure CDE Disclosure CDE 
(-1,1) 167 -17.550% -12.164% 0.220 -30.389% -3.968% (-1,1) 167 -13.872% -12.010% 0.647 -30.083% -4.001% 0.4486 0.6305 
(-10,1) 167 -21.679% -17.513% 0.275 -36.964% -4.277% (-10,1) 167 -20.075% -16.751% 0.723 -36.679% -4.176% 0.7780 0.5969 
(1,10) 165 -8.391% -5.781% 0.205 -18.523% 3.205% (1,10) 165 -10.533% -5.636% 0.315 -19.066% 3.529% 0.1963 0.1497 
Filing CAR Filing CAR 
(-1,1) 167 -3.142% -0.988% 0.162 -6.716% 2.307% (-1,1) 167 -3.495% -1.134% 0.167 -6.558% 2.092% 0.2227 0.1040 
(-10,1) 167 -10.819% -4.277% 0.287 -24.030% 6.077% (-10,1) 167 -13.414% -4.466% 0.404 -23.036% 5.517% 0.1822 0.2006 
(1,10) 167 1.266% 0.633% 0.155 -6.920% 7.695% (1,10) 167 -1.372% 0.753% 0.332 -6.984% 7.670% 0.2007 0.0897 
Combined CAR Combined CAR 
(-1,1) 167 -20.000% -13.878% 0.316 -30.425% -2.047% (-1,1) 167 -15.401% -13.607% 0.728 -30.863% -1.880% 0.3626 0.3012 
(-10,1) 167 -31.597% -17.642% 0.476 -52.250% -1.270% (-10,1) 167 -31.901% -17.616% 1.015 -52.150% -1.380% 0.9390 0.4872 
(1,10) 167 -5.529% -5.707% 0.264 -18.300% 10.155% (1,10) 167 -10.539% -6.015% 0.594 -19.180% 10.307% 0.9390 0.4872 
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Table 11: Size-Matched Case and Firm Level Descriptive Statistics by Company Year 
Case Characteristic information for both sample and control with p-values of differences between the groups are presented. The class period is the length of time 
between the start of the wrongdoing by the corporation and the date which the information is discovered. Wherever possible, the court certified class period was used. 
The filing lag represents the number of days between the end of the certified class period and the original complaint filing in the securities class action lawsuit.  
Maximum Dollar Loss (MDL) is calculated as the percentage value change in the defendant firm’s market capitalization from the trading day with the highest market 
capitalization during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end of the class period. DDL and Disclosure Dollar Lost (DDL) is calculated as the 
percentage value change in the defendant firm’s market capitalization between the trading day immediately preceding the end of the class period and the trading day 
immediately following the end of the class period. MDL and DDL are used as estimates of the impact of the information revealed at the end of the class period.  
Firm characteristics from Compustat as measured for all firms subject to a securities class action lawsuit as reported on the Stanford Clearinghouse for the years 1996-
2009. Accounting information is reported for the year prior to the filing of the lawsuit. The p-values of t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median 
respectively are shown in the difference columns. Firm characteristics from Compustat as measured for all firms subject to a securities class action lawsuit as reported 
on the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse for the years 1996-2009. To capture all firms independently, unconsolidated cases were used to determine 
firms. Accounting information is reported for the year prior to the filing of the lawsuit. The p-values of t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median 
respectively are shown in the difference columns. ROA is calculated as Net Income divided by Sales. ROE is calculated as Net Income divided by Shareholder Equity. 
Leverage is calculated as Debt in Current Liabilities + Long-Term Debt divided by Total Assets. Market to Book is calculated as Market Capitalization divided by 
Stockholders Equity where market capitalization is the market price times common shares outstanding.  Operating Return on Sales is calculated as EBITDA divided 
by Sales. Price to Book is calculated as market price divided by total assets minus intangible assets. Change in sales is calculated as Current year’s sales minus last 
year’s sales divided by last year’s sales. Free cash flow is calculated as suggested by Lehn and Poulson (1989) where free cash flow is equal to operating income 
before depreciation minus total income tax minus gross interest expense minus total amount of preferred dividend minus total amount of common dividend.  
 
NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to lawsuits 1996-
2009 (N = 190) 
Matched U.S. firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits from 1996-
2009  ( N = 190) Difference 
Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Class Period 518.901 371 461.08 204 702 530.056 392.5 466.56 191 687 0.9838 0.7807 
Filing Lag 108.282 30.5 203.81 5 211 126.972 56 253.35 6 233 0.2604 0.2278 
IPO Vio 0.216 0 0.41 0 0 0.170 0 0.38 0 0 0.1049 0.1048 
GAAP Vio 0.422 0 0.50 0 1 0.445 0 0.50 0 1 0.6091 0.6080 
Inst Lead 0.399 0 0.49 0 1 0.440 0 0.50 0 1 0.3620 0.3608 
NumEst 9.183 6 10.05 3 11 13.189 11 8.92 6 20.5 0.0000 0.0000 
Dismissed (%) 33.03 0 0.47 0 100 34.86 0 0.48 0 100 0.6708 0.6698 
Settled (%) 61.47 100 0.52 0 100 55.96 100 0.53 0 100 0.2066 0.2024 
Turnover 0.259 0.155 0.44 0.058 0.271 0.213 0.155 0.19 0.092 0.274 0.1448 0.8579 
TA ($mil) 184687.3 1671.14 633874.50 240.792 23238.9 127545.700 1297.039 411790.5 248.715 14258 0.0023 0.8000 
TA (Log) 7.849 7.420 3.08 5.484 10.054 7.832 7.168 2.87 5.516 9.565 0.5791 0.6254 
Sales ($mil) 16414.170 800.045 37270.48 144.93 9950.7 15855.900 910.169 37327.19 177.626 8984 0.6987 0.5110 
Sales (Log) 6.845 6.522 2.85 4.746 9.202 6.953 6.632 2.62 5.048 9.095 0.0400 0.0229 
MKCAP ($mil) 15367.580 1668.06 32067.14 296.352 12049.6 23350.490 1250.467 56221.61 371.172 11335.74 0.0083 0.0396 
FCF ($mil) 1234.958 29.327 3881.21 -14.656 460 1475.983 39.3485 4931.04 -13.7835 517.3345 0.5135 0.3921 
ROA (%) -5.334 0.586 0.26 -9.281 6.523 -8.156 0.659 0.28 -10.435 5.405 0.2378 0.4369 
ROE (%) -6.100 2.800 1.42 -17.200 15.100 21.2 4.7 5.93 -15.8 15.9 0.5386 0.4688 
P/B (%) 4.40 0.80 0.12 0.10 4.00 4.80 1.10 0.09 0.100 4.200 0.4292 0.1074 
Leverage (%) 20.287 15.992 0.21 2.053 31.384 22.297 16.631 0.23 1.201 34.288 0.2603 0.0649 
CAPEX 0.064 0.037 0.09 0.014 0.072 0.063 0.042 0.07 0.018 0.09 0.5768 0.4443 
Op ROS -0.933 0.119 8.92 0.004 0.249 -0.246 0.137 2.41 0.017 0.261 0.3119 0.7862 
Cash/TA 0.158 0.099 0.18 0.03 0.22 0.153 0.065 0.19 0.026 0.214 0.8113 0.3277 
M/B 2.977 2.048 5.45 1.029 3.359 3.425 2.167 5.90 1.227 3.986 0.4481 0.2503 
Tobin's q 1.842 1.055 2.20 0.851 2.045 2.502 1.679 2.38 1.148 2.809 0.0111 0.000 
Prior 1 Yr -0.103 -0.196 0.61 -0.492 0.129 -0.142 -0.289 0.80 -0.576 0.026 0.5645 0.0915 





Table 12: Size-Matched Cumulative Abnormal Returns Associated with Announcements of Alleged Securities Law Violations, Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings and Resolution 
Announcements for matched sample 
Panel A presents the market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11. Mean and median abnormal returns for enforcement actions calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index for 
enforcement event dates. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to shareholders. Filing events are identified as the first date of a securities class 
action lawsuit filing. Settlement dates are the date the settlement is first announced in the press. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative abnormal returns for each enforcement event date window. Panel B presents 
the valuation effect in dollars for each enforcement period event and the combined dollars lost over all event dates. Daily economic effect is calculated as the abnormal return for each firm multiplied by the firm’s market 
capitalization on the previous day for all dates in the event window. The daily economic effects are cumulated over separate event windows as a measure of total losses. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and 
median between the home and U.S. market reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold. 
 
 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around case event dates 
Difference NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to lawsuits 1996-2009 (N = 190) Matched U.S. firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits from 1996-2009  ( N = 190) 
Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Medan 
Disclosure CARS     
(-1,1) -18.42% -12.41% 0.2272577 -32.36% -3.86% -18.60% -14.21% 0.225 -30.81% -3.20% 0.8636 0.9584 
(-10,1) -22.62% -19.01% 0.2769033 -37.88% -5.10% -25.58% -19.93% 0.2833 -40.61% -7.25% 0.4453 0.3976 
(1,10) -7.87% -6.28% 0.2170624 -18.74% 3.26% -13.79% -7.68% 0.2484 -24.71% 1.35% 0.0121 0.0851 
Filing CARs     
(-1,1) -2.97% -0.71% 0.1540639 -6.72% 3.11% -1.65% -0.40% 0.145361 -5.29% 3.54% 0.2182 0.2036 
(-10,1) -9.74% -3.77% 0.2774374 -21.39% 6.32% -10.33% -4.66% 0.2842738 -19.81% 4.78% 0.8741 0.9039 
(1,10) 3.38% 0.88% 0.1990743 -5.67% 8.69% -1.29% 0.34% 0.20027 -7.53% 6.85% 0.0168 0.0704 
Dismissal CARs (N=69)     
(-1,1) -0.79% -0.61% 0.0721539 -2.52% 0.80% -1.32% -0.64% 0.0605546 -4.84% 1.97% 0.1628 0.2273 
(-10,1) 1.22% 0.67% 0.1063106 -3.98% 5.76% -2.78% -2.45% 0.1719568 -10.32% 4.41% 0.0456 0.0586 
(1,10) 3.25% 1.95% 0.0891672 -2.34% 6.13% 1.57% 0.63% 0.0992056 -4.34% 6.13% 0.2323 0.2772 
Settlement CARs (N=107)     
(-1,1) 2.09% 0.19% 0.1093143 -2.37% 3.98% -0.43% -1.02% 0.0929819 -3.33% 1.50% 0.7025 0.6766 
(-10,1) 0.18% -0.45% 0.1767828 -7.02% 8.44% 2.22% -2.18% 0.2359636 -7.47% 6.06% 0.9907 0.7982 
(1,10) 2.57% 1.10% 0.1687036 -5.10% 5.16% -2.78% -1.11% 0.1200108 -7.24% 2.02% 0.0220 0.0230 
Combined CAR     
(-1,1) -19.66% -13.58% 0.3133712 -30.42% -0.99% -19.70% -16.30% 0.2942261 -34.01% -1.62% 0.8590 0.7993 
(-10,1) -30.41% -17.41% 0.4626839 -53.58% -0.69% -34.67% -24.45% 0.4851608 -51.12% -7.66% 0.4378 0.3984 




Table 12: Size-Matched Cumulative Abnormal Returns Associated with Announcements of Alleged Securities Law Violations, Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings and Resolution 
Announcements for matched sample cont’d 
Panel A presents the market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11. Mean and median abnormal returns for enforcement actions calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index for 
enforcement event dates. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to shareholders. Filing events are identified as the first date of a securities class 
action lawsuit filing. Settlement dates are the date the settlement is first announced in the press. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative abnormal returns for each enforcement event date window. Panel B presents 
the valuation effect in dollars for each enforcement period event and the combined dollars lost over all event dates. Daily economic effect is calculated as the abnormal return for each firm multiplied by the firm’s market 
capitalization on the previous day for all dates in the event window. The daily economic effects are cumulated over separate event windows as a measure of total losses. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and 
median between the home and U.S. market reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold. 
 
Panel B: Dollars Lost (in thousands) at case event dates 
 
NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to lawsuits 1996-2009 (N = 190) Matched U.S. firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits from 1996-2009  ( N = 190) Difference 
In thousands Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CDE     
(-1,1) -597580.2 -68283.8 2141403 -437179.8 -5581.664 -987466.8 -134442 4048820 -820575.3 -29604.64 0.1695 0.0005 
(-10,1) -832260.9 -100331 3321878 -487914.5 -9901.59 -2114324 -179148.2 1.02E+07 -1216243 -48112.11 0.0764 0.0000 
(1,10) -362805.2 -27408.71 2053954 -158413.1 2874.449 -436275.7 -51865.54 3782949 -408693.5 2851.628 0.8616 0.0248 
Filing CARs     
(-1,1) -181218.8 -2262.687 1992628 -29962.86 11012.96 289202.6 -1013.828 3550957 -47839.17 30656.77 0.1513 0.1303 
(-10,1) -505416.3 -8845.503 3100133 -170402.4 15017.1 -559499.9 -38731.43 5279281 -353833.1 16880.9 0.914 0.6411 
(1,10) 88068.09 723.5374 1246819 -12839.71 42789.14 -135352.9 -367.2011 3879294 -58806.03 57578.52 0.4589 0.8163 
Dismissed CDE     
(-1,1) -19245.8 -1251.814 1397086 -20632.35 9538.895 -97543.59 -10432.9 3986956 -196479.7 15978.31 0.7754 0.3341 
(-10,1) 56181.75 7826.706 1458534 -24066.84 156557.2 173888.7 -33436.69 6458176 -530654.3 17115.05 0.579 0.1365 
(1,10) 443704.9 5263.526 3136671 -38732.46 78898.21 625077 1855.339 5399176 -117673.9 93845.7 0.9239 0.9679 
Settlement CDEs     
(-1,1) 13097.71 83.18136 187881.1 -3601.857 11723.06 -147132.7 -1690.261 1457850 -31685.77 21320.06 0.2879 0.6377 
(-10,1) -632.0043 -1496.353 303615.2 -22758.21 6368.164 20044.86 -4409.716 3817793 -40964.62 45030.86 0.399 0.9036 
(1,10) -13701.93 624.5673 300150.9 -7529.163 10049.98 447057.8 -6591.11 2653197 -59593.71 27132.7 0.1653 0.0138 
Combined CDE     
(-1,1) -733349.7 -52123.25 3943715 -392015.7 -3906.621 -750683.5 -120712.8 6190943 -760921.1 -16287.98 0.9664 0.0147 
(-10,1) -1258302 -85354.27 6099910 -465295.6 -7131.597 -2542183 -255532.4 1.17E+07 -1486942 -61608.38 0.1355 0.0002 




Table 13: CARs for Dismissed and Settled Subsets 
Panel A presents the market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11 for the subset of foreign sample firms that have dismissed cases as compared to settled cases and the valuation effect 
in dollars for each enforcement period event and the combined dollars lost over all event dates for the subset of foreign sample firms that have dismissed cases as compared to settled cases. Panel B presents the market model event 
study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11 for the subset of control U.S. incorporated firms that have dismissed cases as compared to settled cases and the valuation effect in dollars for each 
enforcement period event and the combined dollars lost over all event dates for the subset of control U.S. incorporated firms that have dismissed cases as compared to settled cases. Mean and median abnormal returns for 
enforcement actions calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index for enforcement event dates. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to 
shareholders. Filing events are identified as the first date of a securities class action lawsuit filing. Settlement dates are the date the settlement is first announced in the press. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative 
abnormal returns for each enforcement event date window. Daily economic effect is calculated as the abnormal return for each firm multiplied by the firm’s market capitalization on the previous day for all dates in the event 
window. The daily economic effects are cumulated over separate event windows as a measure of total losses. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median between the foreign and domestic firm market 
reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold. 
 
Panel A: Foreign Firm CARs by outcome 
 
Sample Settled Cases (N = 107) Sample Dismissed Cases (N=69) P-Values 
N Mean Median StDev 25% 75% N Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CAR Disclosure CAR 
(-1,1) 107 -18.476% -12.867% 0.239 -33.884% -3.007% (-1,1) 69 -18.846% -12.233% 0.205 -31.576% -4.770% 0.9158 0.9480 
(-10,1) 107 -23.250% -20.072% 0.281 -39.550% -5.097% (-10,1) 69 -22.374% -18.268% 0.265 -35.493% -5.390% 0.8358 0.8277 
(1,10) 107 -8.405% -6.435% 0.229 -23.133% 4.153% (1,10) 69 -8.211% -6.203% 0.176 -16.115% 0.733% 0.9527 0.8474 
Filing CAR Filing CAR 
(-1,1) 107 -3.331% -1.245% 0.177 -7.899% 4.011% (-1,1) 69 -2.991% -0.411% 0.119 -5.108% 1.608% 0.8891 0.5397 
(-10,1) 107 -10.492% -5.112% 0.303 -25.003% 8.209% (-10,1) 69 -9.714% -3.424% 0.230 -11.353% 3.861% 0.8560 0.8510 
(1,10) 107 2.642% -0.242% 0.234 -8.154% 8.511% (1,10) 69 3.967% 1.943% 0.111 -2.685% 8.688% 0.6670 0.1122 
Combined CAR Combined CAR 
(-1,1) 107 -20.386% -14.082% 0.340 -32.199% -1.735% (-1,1) 69 -22.132% -14.088% 0.279 -31.493% -4.171% 0.7208 0.8063 
(-10,1) 107 -32.783% -21.370% 0.481 -56.648% -1.270% (-10,1) 69 -31.074% -16.215% 0.423 -41.679% -6.053% 0.8084 0.7605 
(1,10) 107 -4.876% -6.529% 0.368 -24.358% 10.135% (1,10) 69 -1.740% -2.614% 0.233 -14.591% 10.404% 0.5321 0.2863 
 
Panel B: U.S. Firm CARs by outcome 
 
Control Settled Cases Control Dismissed Cases P-Values 
N Mean Median StDev 25% 75% N Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CAR Disclosure CAR 
(-1,1) 1098 -17.084% -14.326% 0.418 -30.944% -1.948% (-1,1) 838 -19.891% -17.178% 0.282 -34.904% -4.131% 0.0800 0.0020 
(-10,1) 1098 -23.313% -20.842% 0.470 -42.640% -3.396% (-10,1) 838 -24.027% -20.843% 0.359 -42.452% -5.030% 0.6998 0.4651 
(1,10) 1098 -11.512% -9.200% 0.300 -26.573% 3.426% (1,10) 838 -12.809% -8.175% 0.249 -24.931% 0.874% 0.2879 0.4614 
Filing CAR Filing CAR 
(-1,1) 1098 -5.075% -1.774% 0.191 -8.960% 2.998% (-1,1) 838 -2.739% -1.053% 0.135 -5.335% 1.903% 0.0018 0.0403 
(-10,1) 1098 -10.578% -5.731% 0.454 -25.392% 5.525% (-10,1) 838 -6.717% -3.125% 0.333 -18.690% 5.673% 0.0309 0.0031 
(1,10) 1098 -0.778% -0.644% 0.222 -9.934% 7.395% (1,10) 838 -1.217% -0.841% 0.156 -7.293% 5.682% 0.6135 0.5387 
Combined CAR Combined CAR 
(-1,1) 1098 -21.164% -16.477% 0.462 -38.039% -1.389% (-1,1) 838 -22.433% -19.216% 0.329 -36.671% -4.894% 0.4756 0.0120 
(-10,1) 1098 -31.917% -26.443% 0.858 -57.903% -2.461% (-10,1) 838 -30.247% -23.913% 0.586 -55.739% -4.249% 0.6100 0.7079 
(1,10) 1098 -11.933% -9.862% 0.409 -31.475% 7.781% (1,10) 838 -12.989% -8.893% 0.324 -30.685% 4.612% 0.5167 0.9879 
90 
 
 Table 14: Cumulative Abnormal Return’s winsorized at five percent 
Panel A presents the market model event study results utilizing a 125-day trading period from day -135 to day -11 for which the CARs are winsorized at the five percent level. Mean and median abnormal returns for enforcement 
actions calculated using the value-weighted CRSP index for enforcement event dates. Disclosure events are identified as the date in the original case complaint in which the misleading information was disclosed to shareholders. 
Filing events are identified as the first date of a securities class action lawsuit filing. Settlement dates are the date the settlement is first announced in the press. Combined reaction is the summation of the cumulative abnormal 
returns for each enforcement event date window. Panel B presents the valuation effect in dollars for each enforcement period event and the combined dollars lost over all event dates. Daily economic effect is calculated as the 
abnormal return for each firm multiplied by the firm’s market capitalization on the previous day for all dates in the event window. The daily economic effects are cumulated over separate event windows as a measure of total losses. 
The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median between the foreign and domestic firm market reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold. 
 
Panel A Non-Sample firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits from 1996-2009  (N = 2218) NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to lawsuits 1996-2009 (N = 191) 
Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CAR Disclosure CDE 
(-1,1) -19.179% -15.820% 0.2087 -33.656% -2.899% (-1,1) -18.080% -12.867% 0.1955 -32.360% -3.968% 0.4936 0.6028 
(-10,1) -24.850% -21.577% 0.2614 -42.957% -4.488% (-10,1) -22.574% -18.758% 0.2505 -37.530% -5.097% 0.2586 0.2631 
(1,10) -12.522% -9.076% 0.2261 -26.062% 1.991% (1,10) -9.134% -6.539% 0.1948 -19.456% 3.102% 0.0503 0.0747 
Filing CAR Filing CDE 
(-1,1) -3.817% -1.406% 0.1147 -7.470% 2.498% (-1,1) -2.872% -0.863% 0.1091 -6.535% 3.509% 0.2836 0.3038 
(-10,1) -10.005% -4.501% 0.2433 -22.715% 5.602% (-10,1) -9.235% -3.767% 0.2360 -19.294% 6.623% 0.6809 0.6270 
(1,10) -1.065% -0.495% 0.1414 -8.820% 6.961% (1,10) 1.900% 0.755% 0.1322 -5.738% 8.511% 0.0063 0.0301 
Settle CAR Settle CDE 
(-1,1) 0.494% -0.261% 0.0632 -2.957% 2.908% (-1,1) 1.592% 0.732% 0.0650 -1.843% 3.981% 0.1911 0.1359 
(-10,1) 1.220% 0.146% 0.1275 -5.530% 6.780% (-10,1) 1.345% -0.439% 0.1303 -4.866% 9.500% 0.9411 0.9971 
(1,10) -0.296% -0.337% 0.1170 -6.746% 5.098% (1,10) 0.934% 1.351% 0.1056 -5.100% 6.777% 0.4248 0.2707 
Dismissal CAR Dismissal CDE 
(-1,1) -0.276% -0.171% 0.0526 -3.052% 2.187% (-1,1) -0.298% -0.631% 0.0498 -2.651% 0.721% 0.9796 0.6570 
(-10,1) -0.291% -0.641% 0.1141 -7.249% 5.904% (-10,1) 1.229% 0.277% 0.0877 -4.147% 4.346% 0.3978 0.3639 
(1,10) 0.609% 0.110% 0.1000 -4.508% 5.932% (1,10) 3.532% 2.441% 0.0778 -1.676% 6.421% 0.0671 0.0456 
Combined CAR Combined CDE 
(-1,1) -22.525% -18.351% 0.2627 -38.227% -3.202% (-1,1) -19.728% -13.964% 0.2474 -32.148% -2.161% 0.1642 0.1470 
(-10,1) -33.292% -26.443% 0.4182 -57.698% -3.885% (-10,1) -30.397% -19.151% 0.4127 -52.654% -1.336% 0.3674 0.2155 
(1,10) -13.153% -10.032% 0.2957 -31.736% 6.717% (1,10) -5.642% -5.164% 0.2617 -18.383% 10.176% 0.0009 0.0015 
Panel B Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median StDev 25% 75% Mean Median 
Disclosure CDE Disclosure CDE 
(-1,1) -356,318 -73,322 678,254 -304,930 -7,633 (-1,1) -382,633 -66,388 668,330 -437,180 -6,300 0.4936 0.6783 
(-10,1) -494,629 -103,476 964,222 -418,039 -14,582 (-10,1) -472,542 -100,095 897,263 -468,427 -11,113 0.7658 0.5630 
(1,10) -234,462 -34,539 554,883 -194,977 1,952 (1,10) -195,785 -27,576 488,261 -156,377 1,944 0.3631 0.3906 
Filing CDE Filing CDE 
(-1,1) -56,640 -2,846 246,391 -31,657 8,378 (-1,1) -38,334 -2,263 222,567 -28,373 11,013 0.3321 0.5407 
(-10,1) -248,818 -13,942 686,225 -166,220 10,278 (-10,1) -211,663 -7,870 624,212 -138,217 13,133 0.4799 0.4579 
(1,10) 1,655 -2,033 276,144 -33,804 27,732 (1,10) 33,526 577 259,684 -16,026 37,751 0.1330 0.0757 
Settle CDE Settle CDE 
(-1,1) -6,793 -453 72,417 -13,832 8,789 (-1,1) 11,775 394 64,184 -3,147 13,409 0.0514 0.0520 
(-10,1) -3,652 -740 141,826 -25,062 19,375 (-10,1) -1,328 -916 120,099 -17,997 6,368 0.9005 0.5383 
(1,10) 10,445 -843 156,786 -24,884 22,210 (1,10) 8,313 698 135,771 -7,529 10,050 0.9175 0.6243 
Dismissal CDE Dismissal CDE 
(-1,1) -10,015 -509 186,624 -21,194 17,332 (-1,1) -20,498 -1,600 196,182 -20,632 9,539 0.7257 0.6208 
(-10,1) -4,154 -2,207 405,976 -60,928 34,794 (-10,1) 119,203 9,141 437,272 -19,291 163,862 0.3901 0.2217 
(1,10) 47,423 -61 412,584 -37,741 39,591 (1,10) -3,161 4,770 462,487 -49,487 78,898 0.8978 0.1413 
Combined CDE Combined CDE 
(-1,1) -442,046 -78,659 891,111 -350,250 -7,805 (-1,1) -407,456 -57,888 789,330 -422,282 -7,199 0.6107 0.8224 
(-10,1) -764,469 -137,232 1,575,084 -583,847 -17,417 (-10,1) -709,850 -97,671 1,485,897 -496,408 -11,534 0.6506 0.3481 




Table 15: Sample with events removed that have noise in the plus-ten day window post filing 
The table reports the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the filing of a securities class action lawsuit for cases in which there are no other events in the +/- ten day window.  The 
filing date is measured as the date listed on the original filing complaint documents as reported by Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
Governance Analytics Class Actions. In situations where multiple lawsuits are filed the first lawsuit filing date is chosen for the issue in question. Market model parameters are estimated in the 125-
trading days ending 11 days prior to the announcement. The number of observations and the number of positive and negative CARs are presented for each window. Average cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) are reported in the 3-day announcement period (-1, +1), the eleven-day announcement period (-10, +1) and the nine-day announcement period (+1, +10) alongside median CARs for the same 
windows. The results of the standardized residual test in Patell (1976) are reported with p-values in parentheses indicating the significance of the mean is significantly different from zero. The cross-
sectional two-sided t-statistic of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) that control for event-induced increase in the variance of the abnormal returns around the announcement are reported as the 
StdCsect Z with the p-values in parentheses that indicate the significance of the mean. The generalized sign test in Cowan (1992) which controls for the normal asymmetry of positive and negative 
abnormal returns in the estimation period is reported with p-values in parentheses that indicate the significance of the percentage of positive CARs. The signed rank indicates the results of a Wilcoxon 
rank sum test for differences in the medians with p-values reported in parentheses indicating significance different than zero.  
 




(-1,+1) 114 46/68 -3.24% -1.59% -6.713 -2.923 -1.761 -950.5 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.078) (0.007) 
(-10,+1) 114 37/77 -12.94% -5.47% -11.687 -4.765 -3.447 -1461.5 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
(+1,+10) 114 51/63 1.52% -0.95% 0.61 0.46 -0.824 -142.5 






Table 16:  Change in U.S. market value at violation disclosure and legal and reputational penalties  
This table presents the calculation of the different penalties assessed at the disclosure of an alleged securities law violation for foreign sample firms as compared to U.S. control firms. Market penalties 
are defined as the dollar change in the U.S. market value in the three days surrounding the disclosure of a violation of a securities law that leads to a private securities class action filed where market 
value is calculated as the difference in the market capitalization on the day prior to the disclosure to the day after the disclosure as reported in CRSP. Legal penalties are defined as the settlement 
amounts where available plus any court costs that can be determined as listed in the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and ISS Governance Analytics Class Actions. Reputational penalties 
are calculated as the difference between the change in market value around disclosure and the legal penalties assessed during the case for each lawsuit for each firm. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the 
difference in mean and median between the foreign and domestic firm market reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold. 
 
Non-Sample firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits from 1996-2009  (N = 2218) NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to lawsuits 1996-2009 (N = 191) Difference (p-value) 
Penalties (millions) Mean Median StDev 25% range 75% range Mean Median StDev 25% range 75% range Mean Median 
Change in MarketVal 
571.02 73.61 2309.20 9.90 302.11 571.56 67.83 2319.57 8.26 435.06 0.9976 0.6652 (-1,+1) 
Legal Penalties 26.45 5.00 135.63 1.80 13.00 27.97 4.97 114.89 1.88 16.00 0.9099 0.5923 




Table 17: Determinants of Reputational Penalties  
This table presents cross-sectional Tobit regression results to estimate the determinants of the reputational penalties for domestic and foreign 
firms subject to private securities class action lawsuits for violations of U.S. securities laws. In Models 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the reputation penalties (RLoss). Independent variable definitions are listed in Appendix B. The sample includes all cases 
against firms that are cross-listed on the major U.S. exchanges with decided outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. The control 
includes all cases against domestic firms that listed on the major U.S. exchanges with decided outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. 
Model 1 does not include country-level variables for the foreign firms while Model 2 includes combinations of governance, economic and 
financial development variables. Coefficients reported are the changes in the mean of the latent dependent variable. Table 18 contains coefficients 
for the changes in the unconditional expected value of the observed dependent variable.  P-values are listed in parentheses. * Significant at the .10 
level on the basis of p-values, ** Significant at the .05 level on the basis of p-values and *** Significant at the .01 level on the basis of p-values.  
 
Model 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Variables Control Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample 
ClassPeriodLength -0.003*** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003* -0.003 -0.002 
(0.000) (0.060) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.044) (0.046) (0.072) (0.135) (0.200) 
FirstCase -0.144 -0.821 -1.302 -1.259 -1.124 -1.072 -1.222 -1.24 -0.247 -0.099 -0.397 
(0.793) (0.659) (0.493) (0.509) (0.558) (0.577) (0.523) (0.516) (0.897) (0.960) (0.838) 
IPOVio -1.211* -1.588 -3.022 -3.173 -2.83 -2.992 -2.97 -3.182 -4.101 -4.102 -3.788 
(0.059) (0.439) (0.207) (0.195) (0.240) (0.224) (0.215) (0.191) (0.130) (0.133) (0.163) 
GAAPVio 0.800* 4.509*** 5.699*** 5.671*** 5.618*** 5.586*** 5.655*** 5.677*** 4.243** 3.426** 3.329** 
(0.060) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.045) (0.049) 
OtherCase -0.526 6.376* 9.303*** 9.219** 9.221** 9.128** 9.302*** 9.132** 9.627** 9.188** 10.095*** 
(0.743) (0.071) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009) 
Turnover 1.738 0.167 0.462 0.482 0.413 0.435 0.433 0.462 0.299 -0.121 -0.574 
(0.114) (0.900) (0.740) (0.729) (0.767) (0.755) (0.756) (0.740) (0.829) (0.930) (0.683) 
ROA 0.541* -2.422 -2.649 -2.758 -2.5 -2.617 -2.587 -2.683 -3.038 -3.2 -2.42 
(0.067) (0.305) (0.270) (0.256) (0.299) (0.283) (0.282) (0.266) (0.201) (0.184) (0.319) 
LNAssets 0.489*** 0.904** 1.027** 1.032** 1.057** 1.062** 1.041** 1.036** 1.003** 0.862* 0.634 
(0.000) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.034) (0.073) (0.200) 
Leverage -1.915** -1.659 -1.534 -1.780 -1.639 -1.912 -1.578 -2.06 -4.576 -5.484 -4.609 
(0.013) (0.595) (0.649) (0.609) (0.627) (0.582) (0.640) (0.559) (0.202) (0.128) (0.202) 
FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.268) (0.252) (0.568) (0.542) (0.518) (0.490) (0.550) (0.524) (0.511) (0.669) (0.975) 
FIN -2.635*** -5.814** -4.825* -4.909* -4.987* -5.085* -4.889* -5.068* -6.798** -7.272** -6.282** 
(0.000) (0.023) (0.084) (0.080) (0.075) (0.071) (0.080) (0.072) (0.021) (0.015) (0.037) 
Tech 0.442 1.374 0.819 0.796 0.779 0.752 0.812 0.678 -0.463 0.020 0.140 
(0.369) (0.343) (0.606) (0.617) (0.624) (0.636) (0.609) (0.674) (0.783) (0.991) (0.934) 
Settled -1.854*** -4.089*** -5.342*** -5.338*** -5.287*** -5.281*** -5.301*** -5.327*** -4.960*** -5.176*** -5.097*** 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
IncControl 1.604 1.643 1.535 2.707 3.084 
(0.537) (0.528) (0.637) (0.384) (0.320) 
HQControl 0.763 0.686 
(0.742) (0.767) 
IncAllowClass -0.489 -0.537 3.697 
(0.768) (0.746) (0.104) 
HQAllowClass -0.802 
(0.631) 
IncAntiselfdeal 11.317*** 11.625*** 10.826*** 11.153*** 11.123*** 11.546*** 21.962*** 21.781*** 22.849*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
IncGovIndex 2.716 2.733 3.332 3.365 2.993 3.002 7.251 -0.093 0.696 
(0.274) (0.271) (0.213) (0.208) (0.253) (0.251) (0.157) (0.981) (0.861) 
IncCostMktCap -0.032* -0.034* -0.034* -0.035* -0.033* -0.035* -0.026 
(0.071) (0.069) (0.062) (0.059) (0.068) (0.059) (0.178) 
IncGDPperCap(Log) -6.108* -5.896* -5.860* -5.62 -6.005* -5.735 -7.526 
(0.076) (0.093) (0.090) (0.112) (0.082) (0.100) (0.149) 
PriCostMktCap 0.02 0.028 
(0.277) (0.152) 
PriGDPperCap(Log) -3.146 -3.272 
(0.279) (0.256) 
Region No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 12.383*** 15.675*** 33.862** 33.084** 31.444** 30.528** 32.748** 32.072** 24.66 7.432 7.869 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.018) (0.027) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024) (0.206) (0.596) (0.572) 
Sigma 8.961*** 7.594*** 7.484*** 7.481*** 7.474*** 7.470*** 7.481*** 7.474*** 7.111*** 7.205*** 7.145*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1936 176 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
χ2 196.290*** 60.743*** 70.944*** 71.032*** 71.327*** 71.432*** 71.053*** 71.285*** 87.052*** 83.678*** 86.359*** 






Table 18: Marginal Effects of Reputational Penalties  
Marginal effects on the latent variable are the coefficients of the Tobit. However, we are also interested in the changes in the unconditional expected value of the observed dependent variable. This table 

















 the change in the unconditional expected 
value of the observed dependent variable is calculated as 
ii xyE  /)(
*  and the change in the probability of being uncensored is calculated as
ii xyP  /)0(
* . The effects are presented for each model as 
specified in Table 17 
 
 
































ClassPeriodLengt -0.0028 0.0000 -0.0028 0.0000 -0.0032 0.0000 -0.0033 0.0000 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
FirstCase*  -0.1348 -0.0019 -0.7959 -0.0075 -1.2648 -0.0114 -1.2222 -0.0111 -1.092 -0.010 -1.041 -0.010 
IPOVio*  -1.1304 -0.0175 -1.5272 -0.0174 -2.8888 -0.0373 -3.0318 -0.0396 -2.708 -0.034 -2.862 -0.037 
GAAPVio* 0.7506 0.0108 4.3590 0.0433 5.5117 0.0547 5.4852 0.0543 5.435 0.054 5.404 0.053 
OtherCase* -0.4919 -0.0074 6.2785 0.0315 9.1967 0.0353 9.1138 0.0351 9.116 0.035 9.023 0.035 
Turnover 1.6317 0.0235 0.1612 0.0016 0.4470 0.0045 0.4666 0.0047 0.400 0.004 0.420 0.004 
ROA 0.5073 0.0073 -2.3406 -0.0237 -2.5619 -0.0259 -2.6681 -0.0269 -2.419 -0.024 -2.532 -0.025 
LNAssets 0.4594 0.0066 0.8742 0.0089 0.9938 0.0100 0.9981 0.0101 1.022 0.010 1.028 0.010 
Leverage -1.7976 -0.0259 -1.6033 -0.0163 -1.4840 -0.0150 -1.7217 -0.0174 -1.586 -0.016 -1.850 -0.019 
FCF 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fin* -2.4348 -0.0419 -5.4308 -0.0958 -4.5444 -0.0736 -4.6219 -0.0754 -4.694 -0.077 -4.782 -0.079 
Tech* 0.4158 0.0059 1.3312 0.0126 0.7938 0.0077 0.7712 0.0075 0.755 0.007 0.729 0.007 
Settled -1.7404 -0.0251 -3.9526 -0.0401 -5.1666 -0.0522 -5.1633 -0.0521 -5.115 -0.051 -5.110 -0.051 
IncControl*       1.560 0.014 1.598 0.014 
IncAllowClass*     -0.4732 -0.0047   -0.520 -0.005 
HQControl*           
HQAllowClass*           
IncAntiselfdeal   10.9459 0.1107 11.2451 0.1135 10.473 0.105 10.791 0.108 
IncGovIn
dex   2.6267 0.0266 2.6435 0.0267 3.223 0.032 3.256 0.033 
IncCost
MktCap     -0.0313 -0.0003 -0.0327 -0.0003 -0.033 0.000 -0.034 0.000 
IncGDPperCap(Log)   -5.9078 -0.0597 -5.7032 -0.0576 -5.669 -0.057 -5.438 -0.055 
PriCostMktCap           
PriGDPperCap(Log)           
Constant 11.6217 0.1677 15.150507 0.15369799 32.7527 0.3312 32.0023 0.3231 30.421 0.306 29.537 0.297 
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Table 18: Marginal Effects of Reputational Penalties cont’d 
Marginal effects on the latent variable are the coefficients of the Tobit. However, we are also interested in the changes in the unconditional expected value of the observed dependent variable. This table 

















 the change in the unconditional expected 
value of the observed dependent variable is calculated as 
ii xyE  /)(
*  and the change in the probability of being uncensored is calculated as
ii xyP  /)0(
* . The effects are presented for each model as 
specified in Table 17 
 






















ClassPeriodLength -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
FirstCase*  -1.187 -0.011 -1.205 -0.011 -0.241 -0.002 -0.096 -0.001 -0.386 -0.004 
IPOVio*  -2.841 -0.036 -3.041 -0.040 -3.920 -0.053 -3.910 -0.055 -3.621 -0.049 
GAAPVio* 5.470 0.054 5.491 0.054 4.123 0.038 3.323 0.032 3.232 0.031 
OtherCase* 9.196 0.035 9.028 0.035 9.539 0.031 9.093 0.033 10.003 0.033 
Turnover 0.419 0.004 0.447 0.005 0.291 0.003 -0.118 -0.001 -0.557 -0.005 
ROA -2.503 -0.025 -2.596 -0.026 -2.952 -0.028 -3.102 -0.031 -2.349 -0.023 
LNAssets 1.007 0.010 1.002 0.010 0.975 0.009 0.836 0.008 0.615 0.006 
Leverage -1.527 -0.015 -1.993 -0.020 -4.446 -0.042 -5.317 -0.053 -4.473 -0.043 
FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fin* -4.604 -0.075 -4.767 -0.079 -6.333 -0.122 -6.720 -0.139 -5.870 -0.109 
Tech* 0.786 0.008 0.657 0.006 -0.449 -0.004 0.020 0.000 0.136 0.001 
Settled -5.128 -0.052 -5.154 -0.052 -4.819 -0.045 -5.018 -0.050 -4.947 -0.048 
IncControl*     1.498 0.012 2.644 0.020 3.018 0.022 
IncAllowClass*           
HQControl* 0.740 0.007 0.665 0.006       
HQAllowClass*   -0.777 -0.008       
IncAntiselfdeal 10.759 0.109 11.170 0.112 21.337 0.201 21.116 0.209 22.175 0.214 
IncGovIndex 2.895 0.029 2.904 0.029 7.044 0.066 -0.091 -0.001 0.675 0.007 
IncCostMktCap -0.032 0.000 -0.034 0.000 -0.025 0.000     
IncGDPperCap(Log) -5.808 -0.059 -5.549 -0.056 -7.312 -0.069     
PriCostMktCap       0.020 0.000 0.027 0.000 
PriGDPperCap(Log)       -3.050 -0.030 -3.176 -0.031 
Constant 31.677 0.320 31.027 0.312 23.959 0.226 7.206 0.071 7.637 0.074 
 
* Indicates a dummy variable 
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Table 19: Winsorized Reputational Penalties Results 
This table presents cross-sectional Tobit regression results to estimate the determinants of the reputational penalties for domestic and foreign 
firms subject to private securities class action lawsuits for violations of U.S. securities laws. In Models 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the reputation penalties (RLoss) where RLoss has been winsorized at the five percent level. Independent variable definitions 
are listed in Appendix B. The sample includes all cases against firms that are cross-listed on the major U.S. exchanges with decided outcomes 
(settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. The control includes all cases against domestic firms that listed on the major U.S. exchanges with decided 
outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. Model 1 does not include country-level variables for the foreign firms while Model 2 includes 
combinations of governance, economic and financial development variables. P-values are listed in parentheses. * Significant at the .10 level on 
the basis of p-values, ** Significant at the .05 level on the basis of p-values and *** Significant at the .01 level on the basis of p-values.  
 
 Model 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Variables Control Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample 
ClassPeriodLength -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.142) (0.166) (0.165) (0.157) (0.156) (0.165) (0.181) (0.336) (0.596) (0.653) 
FirstCase 0.095 -1.229 -1.673 -1.633 -1.481 -1.431 -1.582 -1.650 -0.556 -0.650 -0.764 
(0.857) (0.510) (0.384) (0.395) (0.444) (0.460) (0.413) (0.393) (0.775) (0.741) (0.697) 
IPOVio -1.694*** -1.254 -2.904 -3.109 -2.698 -2.911 -2.846 -3.11 -4.133 -4.026 -3.927 
(0.007) (0.539) (0.220) (0.197) (0.257) (0.229) (0.230) (0.195) (0.122) (0.133) (0.142) 
GAAPVio 1.155*** 4.569*** 5.434*** 5.417*** 5.354*** 5.332*** 5.385*** 5.441*** 4.299*** 3.418** 3.306** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.040) (0.047) 
OtherCase 0.75 6.524* 8.942** 8.811** 8.845** 8.701** 8.936** 8.700** 8.629** 8.076** 8.705** 
(0.655) (0.059) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.031) (0.022) 
Turnover 2.394** -0.104 0.441 0.481 0.383 0.423 0.404 0.450 0.306 -0.172 -0.476 
(0.027) (0.938) (0.748) (0.726) (0.780) (0.758) (0.769) (0.743) (0.823) (0.900) (0.732) 
ROA 0.370 -1.855 -2.32 -2.503 -2.151 -2.341 -2.246 -2.394 -2.511 -2.552 -2.064 
(0.200) (0.424) (0.328) (0.297) (0.366) (0.331) (0.345) (0.315) (0.290) (0.286) (0.393) 
LNAssets 0.378*** 0.753* 0.918** 0.934** 0.947** 0.966** 0.932** 0.934** 0.928** 0.800* 0.635 
(0.001) (0.061) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.047) (0.090) (0.197) 
Leverage -2.263*** -0.674 -0.276 -0.676 -0.373 -0.807 -0.319 -0.992 -3.049 -4.2 -3.634 
(0.002) (0.827) (0.934) (0.844) (0.911) (0.815) (0.924) (0.776) (0.390) (0.236) (0.308) 
FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.239) (0.328) (0.574) (0.516) (0.525) (0.465) (0.556) (0.500) (0.606) (0.684) (0.975) 
FIN -2.513*** -4.933* -5.197* -5.430* -5.390* -5.649* -5.278* -5.641* -7.488** -7.736** -6.690** 
(0.000) (0.058) (0.069) (0.062) (0.061) (0.053) (0.066) (0.053) (0.013) (0.011) (0.033) 
Tech 0.460 1.837 0.877 0.813 0.835 0.764 0.871 0.672 -0.139 0.405 0.484 
(0.331) (0.207) (0.583) (0.612) (0.601) (0.633) (0.586) (0.679) (0.934) (0.811) (0.775) 
Settled -1.619*** -3.934*** -5.095*** -5.090*** -5.028*** -5.020*** -5.044*** -5.070*** -4.702*** -4.811*** -4.854*** 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IncControl 1.715 1.779 1.213 2.495 2.769 
(0.501) (0.486) (0.704) (0.411) (0.362) 
IncAllowClass -0.775 -0.834 2.712 
(0.643) (0.617) (0.260) 




IncAntiselfdeal 9.783*** 10.301*** 9.236*** 9.775*** 9.545*** 10.124*** 19.397*** 18.428*** 19.345*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
IncGovIndex 2.875 2.9 3.539 3.591 3.195 3.203 8.05 0.754 1.331 
(0.242) (0.237) (0.181) (0.175) (0.218) (0.216) (0.112) (0.846) (0.734) 
IncCostMktCap -0.023 -0.025 -0.024 -0.027 -0.023 -0.026 -0.017 
(0.213) (0.186) (0.187) (0.160) (0.202) (0.167) (0.391) 
IncGDPperCap(Log) -6.448* -6.109* -6.184* -5.807* -6.329* -5.946* -8.38 
(0.056) (0.077) (0.069) (0.094) (0.062) (0.083) (0.103) 
PriCostMktCap 0.025 0.03 
(0.175) (0.117) 
PriGDPperCap(Log) -3.713 -3.72 
(0.192) (0.189) 
Region No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 12.361*** 16.225*** 35.771*** 34.465** 33.201** 31.694** 34.496** 33.464** 27.955 11.03 11.098 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.012) (0.018) (0.027) (0.013) (0.016) (0.145) (0.424) (0.419) 
Sigma 8.416*** 7.410*** 7.317*** 7.309*** 7.304*** 7.295*** 7.312*** 7.299*** 6.952*** 7.011*** 6.984*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1936 176 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
χ2 187.582*** 50.844*** 65.014*** 65.230*** 65.468*** 65.719*** 65.164*** 65.602*** 80.499*** 78.565*** 79.845*** 




Table 20: Top settlement amounts from 1996- 200963 
This table presents the top fifteen settlement amounts from securities class action lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2009 as identified by the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. Results are ranked by order from largest to smallest and the filing date of the lawsuit is included 
with the settlement amount and country of incorporation of the firm at the time of the lawsuit filing. 
 
Rank Litigation Name Filing Date Settlement Amt Incorporated 
1 Enron Corporation 10/22/2001 $      7,242,000,000 United States 
2 WorldCom, Inc. 4/30/2002 $      6,156,100,714 United States 
3 Tyco International Ltd. 2/4/2002 $      3,200,000,000 Bermuda 
4 Cendant Corporation 4/16/1998 $      3,318,250,000 United States 
5 Nortel Networks Corporation (Nortel I & II) 2/16/2001 $      2,935,900,000 Canada 
6 Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. : Citigroup :WorldCom 5/14/2002 $      2,650,000,000 United States 
7 AOL Time Warner, Inc. 7/18/2002 $      2,500,000,000 United States 
8 Koninklijke Ahold NV : Royal Ahold Corporation  2/25/2003 $      1,100,000,000 Netherlands 
9 McKesson HBOC, Inc. 4/28/1999 $      1,042,500,000 United States 
10 American International Group, Inc. (AIG) 10/27/2000 $         992,000,000 United States 
11 UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 5/5/2006 $         925,500,000 United States 
12 HealthSouth Corporation 8/2/2004 $         804,500,000 United States 
13 Xerox Corporation 8/24/2000 $         750,000,000 United States 
14 Lucent Technologies, Inc. 1/7/2000 $         667,000,000 United States 
15 Wachovia Corporation 3/6/2009 $         627,000,000 United States 
 
                                                            
63 Taken from the top-ten list on Securities Class Action Clearinghouse found at  http://securities.stanford.edu/top_ten_list.html and settlement 
amounts as listed on Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance Analytics Class Actions 
98 
 
Table 21: Truncated Legal Penalties Results 
This table presents cross-sectional Tobit regression results to estimate the determinants of the reputational penalties for domestic and foreign 
firms subject to private securities class action lawsuits for violations of U.S. securities laws where the top and bottom five percent of legal penalty 
cases have been truncated. In Models 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the reputation penalties (RLoss). Independent 
variable definitions are listed in Appendix B. The sample includes all cases against firms that are cross-listed on the major U.S. exchanges with 
decided outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. The control includes all cases against domestic firms that listed on the major U.S. 
exchanges with decided outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. Model 1 does not include country-level variables for the foreign firms 
while Model 2 includes combinations of governance, economic and financial development variables. P-values are listed in parentheses. * 
Significant at the .10 level on the basis of p-values, ** Significant at the .05 level on the basis of p-values and *** Significant at the .01 level on 
the basis of p-values.  
 Model 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Variable Control Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample 
ClassPeriodLengt -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003* -0.003* 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.038) (0.057) (0.082) 
FirstCase -0.080 -1.306 -1.408 -1.265 -1.270 -1.106 -1.388 -1.419 -0.476 -0.289 -0.383 
(0.885) (0.481) (0.458) (0.506) (0.510) (0.567) (0.469) (0.458) (0.805) (0.883) (0.845) 
IPOVio -1.442** -1.814 -2.933 -3.347 -2.804 -3.215 -2.921 -3.389 -4.079 -3.903 -3.684 
(0.025) (0.358) (0.202) (0.154) (0.227) (0.174) (0.205) (0.148) (0.118) (0.136) (0.161) 
GAAPVio 0.766* 3.794*** 5.148*** 5.061*** 5.086*** 4.989*** 5.137*** 5.179*** 3.637** 2.773* 2.708 
(0.071) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.098) (0.105) 
OtherCase -0.367 6.816** 9.559*** 9.353*** 9.494*** 9.274*** 9.556*** 9.211*** 9.731*** 9.314** 9.722*** 
(0.828) (0.043) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Turnover 1.625 1.136 1.657 1.754 1.630 1.726 1.650 1.767 1.676 1.130 0.834 
(0.136) (0.405) (0.254) (0.228) (0.262) (0.235) (0.257) (0.225) (0.244) (0.433) (0.574) 
ROA 0.485* -2.022 -2.183 -2.515 -2.096 -2.427 -2.17 -2.413 -2.58 -2.693 -2.297 
(0.095) (0.369) (0.339) (0.277) (0.360) (0.296) (0.343) (0.293) (0.251) (0.236) (0.321) 
LNAssets 0.563*** 0.663* 0.704* 0.708* 0.726* 0.733* 0.707* 0.686* 0.692 0.575 0.473 
(0.000) (0.086) (0.086) (0.084) (0.079) (0.076) (0.087) (0.096) (0.131) (0.216) (0.325) 
Leverage -1.717** -1.000 -0.006 -0.623 -0.096 -0.742 -0.019 -0.983 -3.011 -4.213 -3.888 
(0.025) (0.739) (0.999) (0.852) (0.976) (0.825) (0.995) (0.772) (0.387) (0.225) (0.265) 
FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.330) (0.630) (0.825) (0.895) (0.874) (0.951) (0.833) (0.858) (0.980) (0.807) (0.700) 
FIN -2.914*** -3.569 -3.625 -3.819 -3.747 -3.96 -3.642 -3.980 -5.418* -5.695* -5.293* 
(0.000) (0.149) (0.182) (0.160) (0.170) (0.148) (0.181) (0.146) (0.062) (0.054) (0.076) 
Tech 0.359 0.893 0.607 0.444 0.567 0.395 0.604 0.207 -1.026 -0.689 -0.587 
(0.472) (0.532) (0.702) (0.780) (0.721) (0.805) (0.703) (0.899) (0.546) (0.691) (0.735) 
Settled -1.729*** -4.383*** -5.650*** -5.706*** -5.600*** -5.651*** -5.638*** -5.755*** -5.278*** -5.528*** -5.467*** 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
IncControl 1.055 1.175 0.289 1.358 1.732 
(0.689) (0.655) (0.930) (0.668) (0.588) 
IncAllowClass -1.347 -1.386 1.836 
(0.409) (0.396) (0.414) 




IncAntiselfdeal 9.036*** 9.857*** 8.756*** 9.569*** 9.000*** 9.834*** 18.77*** 18.69*** 19.40*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IncGovIndex 1.827 1.788 2.209 2.211 1.887 1.802 7.891 0.986 1.450 
(0.451) (0.459) (0.396) (0.394) (0.460) (0.479) (0.113) (0.804) (0.718) 
IncCostMktCap -0.025 -0.028 -0.026 -0.03 -0.025 -0.029 -0.022 
(0.161) (0.116) (0.148) (0.105) (0.161) (0.111) (0.260) 
IncGDPperCap(Log) -5.301 -4.49 -5.059 -4.196 -5.271 -4.477 -7.925 
(0.135) (0.220) (0.159) (0.258) (0.139) (0.216) (0.126) 
PriCostMktCap 0.021 0.024 
(0.260) (0.200) 
PriGDPperCap(Log) -3.810 -3.869 
(0.183) (0.176) 
Region No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 12.301*** 18.35*** 34.504** 31.625** 32.539** 29.351* 34.219** 32.159** 32.043 15.912 15.58 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.028) (0.029) (0.054) (0.019) (0.028) (0.108) (0.261) (0.270) 
Sigma 8.713*** 7.198*** 7.086*** 7.066*** 7.081*** 7.059*** 7.086*** 7.056*** 6.696*** 6.771*** 6.756*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2054 160 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 
χ2 193.53*** 54.605*** 64.825*** 65.51*** 64.985*** 65.71*** 64.83*** 65.936*** 81.617*** 78.94*** 79.614*** 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 
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Table 22: Change in market value at violation disclosure and legal and reputational penalties assessed after 
readjustments for financial misrepresentations 
This table presents the calculation of the different penalties assessed at the disclosure of an alleged securities law violation for foreign sample 
firms as compared to U.S. control firms. Market penalties are defined as the dollar change in the U.S. market value in the three days surrounding 
the disclosure of a violation of a securities law that leads to a private securities class action filed where market value is calculated as the 
difference in the market capitalization on the day prior to the disclosure to the day after the disclosure as reported in CRSP. Legal penalties are 
defined as the settlement amounts where available plus any court costs that can be determined as listed in the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse and ISS Governance Analytics Class Actions. Reputational penalties are calculated as the difference between the changes in 
market value around disclosure minus the legal penalties assessed during the case for each lawsuit for each firm minus any readjustment effect. 
The readjustment effect is calculated as the book value of assets of the largest incidence of the calculated write-offs during each year of the 
enforcement period multiplied by the median market-to-book ratio for all firms listed in Compustat with the same two-digit SIC code for the year 
corresponding to the write-off. The t-test and Wilcoxon-test of the difference in mean and median between the foreign and domestic firm market 
reactions respectively are shown in the difference columns with those significantly different than zero in bold. 
 
Non-Sample firms subject to Class Action Lawsuits from 
1996-2009  (N = 2218) 
NASDAQ or NYSE Cross-listing Firms subject to lawsuits 
1996-2009 (N = 191) Difference (p-value) 








range Mean Median 
571.02 73.61 2309.20 9.90 302.11 571.56 67.83 2319.57 8.26 435.06 0.9976 0.6652 Change in MarketVal (-1,+1) 
Legal Penalties 26.45 5.00 135.63 1.80 13.00 27.97 4.97 114.89 1.88 16.00 0.9099 0.5923 




Table 23: Determinants of Reputational Penalties after readjustments for financial misrepresentations 
This table presents cross-sectional Tobit regression results to estimate the determinants of the reputational penalties for domestic and foreign firms subject to 
private securities class action lawsuits for violations of U.S. securities laws. In Models 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the reputation 
penalties (RLoss) where reputational penalties are defined as the natural logarithm of the reputation penalties (RLoss) after the readjustment effect discussed by 
Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) is removed. Independent variable definitions are listed in Appendix B. The sample includes all cases against firms that are cross-listed 
on the major U.S. exchanges with decided outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. The control includes all cases against domestic firms that listed on the 
major U.S. exchanges with decided outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. Model 1 does not include country-level variables for the foreign firms while 
Model 2 includes combinations of governance, economic and financial development variables. P-values are listed in parentheses. * Significant at the .10 level on the 
basis of p-values, ** Significant at the .05 level on the basis of p-values and *** Significant at the .01 level on the basis of p-values.  
 
  1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
  Control Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample 
ClassPeriodLength -0.005*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** 
(0.000) (0.022) (0.043) (0.031) (0.044) (0.031) (0.043) (0.038) (0.020) (0.029) (0.021) 
FirstCase 2.451** -5.75 -7.842* -7.033* -7.931* -7.103* -7.889* -8.225* -8.119* -7.683* -7.216* 
(0.014) (0.149) (0.066) (0.095) (0.066) (0.095) (0.066) (0.055) (0.059) (0.077) (0.097) 
IPOVio -4.218*** -3.285 -2.617 -5.025 -2.68 -5.073 -2.625 -4.374 -4.085 -2.741 -3.188 
(0.000) (0.442) (0.613) (0.334) (0.606) (0.331) (0.612) (0.403) (0.491) (0.642) (0.589) 
GAAPVio -0.071 7.437** 8.533** 8.482** 8.590** 8.531** 8.570** 9.168** 6.291* 5.798 5.957 
(0.925) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.092) (0.125) (0.115) 
OtherCase 1.090 14.335** 18.774*** 17.425** 18.851*** 17.489** 18.790*** 17.280** 25.749*** 25.554*** 24.178*** 
(0.707) (0.032) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Turnover 3.652* -1.228 -3.805 -4.581 -3.714 -4.499 -3.721 -4.829 -2.767 -3.503 -3.239 
(0.060) (0.735) (0.479) (0.414) (0.490) (0.425) (0.491) (0.407) (0.589) (0.492) (0.535) 
ROA 4.637*** 38.724*** 36.092*** 34.337*** 35.865*** 34.165*** 35.950*** 36.291*** 33.974*** 34.429*** 33.146*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
LNAssets -0.744*** -1.173 -0.613 -0.627 -0.617 -0.629 -0.614 -0.657 0.176 0.129 0.422 
(0.000) (0.184) (0.534) (0.524) (0.531) (0.523) (0.533) (0.507) (0.869) (0.905) (0.705) 
Leverage -3.610*** 0.362 -5.689 -8.954 -5.688 -8.957 -5.686 -8.927 -9.395 -11.74 -12.707 
(0.010) (0.961) (0.507) (0.300) (0.507) (0.300) (0.507) (0.309) (0.292) (0.187) (0.152) 
FCF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.364) (0.456) (0.821) (0.605) (0.835) (0.616) (0.825) (0.669) (0.936) (0.881) (0.706) 
FIN -0.308 -2.162 -4.677 -5.43 -4.616 -5.382 -4.66 -5.813 -12.208* -10.739 -12.339* 
(0.797) (0.706) (0.493) (0.420) (0.499) (0.425) (0.495) (0.394) (0.084) (0.128) (0.087) 
Tech 0.427 -1.031 -3.787 -3.731 -3.751 -3.699 -3.773 -4.641 -8.806** -7.810** -8.261** 
(0.626) (0.733) (0.280) (0.279) (0.286) (0.285) (0.282) (0.187) (0.026) (0.048) (0.037) 
Settled -2.790*** -3.515 -6.045* -5.690* -6.081* -5.721* -6.081* -5.921* -4.464 -4.262 -4.37 
(0.000) (0.227) (0.075) (0.086) (0.074) (0.086) (0.074) (0.078) (0.196) (0.227) (0.212) 
IncControl -0.875 -0.713 -8.844 -7.060 -7.804 
(0.878) (0.900) (0.201) (0.288) (0.240) 
HQControl -0.538 -1.378 
(0.914) (0.782) 
IncAllowClass -7.795** -7.791** -5.632 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.264) 
HQAllowClass -6.413* 
(0.089) 
IncAntiselfdeal 12.340* 17.282** 12.683 17.558** 12.505* 16.106** 43.354*** 39.421*** 38.023** 
(0.097) (0.026) (0.103) (0.030) (0.100) (0.041) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) 
IncGovIndex -5.249 -4.323 -5.553 -4.562 -5.414 -4.993 16.226 6.368 5.4 
(0.337) (0.421) (0.340) (0.423) (0.341) (0.372) (0.153) (0.469) (0.532) 
IncCostMktCap 0.002 -0.023 0.003 -0.022 0.002 -0.015 0.027 
(0.966) (0.587) (0.950) (0.603) (0.958) (0.724) (0.546) 
IncGDPperCap(Log) 0.228 3.073 0.072 2.932 0.135 1.729 -14.48 
(0.976) (0.688) (0.993) (0.705) (0.986) (0.822) (0.216) 
PriCostMktCap 0.065 0.056 
(0.131) (0.194) 
PriGDPperCap(Log) -6.051 -5.802 
(0.372) (0.380) 
Region No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 12.148*** 19.611* 20.152 9.187 21.399 10.243 20.916 17.347 44.173 16.115 15.096 
(0.000) (0.055) (0.517) (0.766) (0.506) (0.749) (0.512) (0.581) (0.304) (0.602) (0.620) 
Sigma 14.933*** 13.925*** 14.008*** 13.707*** 14.011*** 13.709*** 14.010*** 13.824*** 12.742*** 12.768*** 12.675*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1936 176 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 
χ2 267.667*** 79.447*** 76.774*** 81.404*** 76.797*** 81.420*** 76.786*** 79.763*** 96.784*** 96.772*** 98.043*** 




Table 24: Marginal Effects of the Reputational Penalties after readjustments for financial misrepresentations 
Marginal effects on the latent variable are the coefficients of the Tobit. However, we are also interested in the changes in the unconditional 
expected value of the observed dependent variable. This table presents these coefficients and the changes in the probability of being uncensored. 

















 the change in the unconditional expected value of the observed 
dependent variable is calculated as 
ii xyE  /)(
*  and the change in the probability of being uncensored is calculated as
ii xyP  /)0(
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Classperiodlength -0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0039 -0.0003 -0.0036 -0.0003 -0.0038 -0.0003 
Firstcase*  -4.1415 -0.2213 -4.3059 -0.2335 -4.1635 -0.2498 -3.8571 -0.2365 -3.5872 -0.2241 
IPOvio*  -1.1205 -0.0734 -1.7762 -0.1222 -1.5919 -0.1225 -1.0820 -0.0825 -1.2435 -0.0963 
GAAPvio*  3.9701 0.2393 4.2060 0.2584 2.7594 0.1927 2.4921 0.1768 2.5596 0.1829 
Othercase*  12.7054 0.4485 11.3778 0.4308 19.0298 0.5639 18.6964 0.5677 17.4432 0.5578 
Turnover -1.6719 -0.1051 -2.1423 -0.1380 -1.1826 -0.0852 -1.4713 -0.1073 -1.3586 -0.0999 
ROA 16.1546 1.0154 16.1000 1.0368 14.5184 1.0460 14.4589 1.0540 13.9040 1.0220 
Lnassets -0.2759 -0.0173 -0.2914 -0.0188 0.0753 0.0054 0.0544 0.0040 0.1769 0.0130 
Leverage -2.5552 -0.1606 -3.9602 -0.2550 -4.0147 -0.2893 -4.9305 -0.3594 -5.3304 -0.3918 
FCF -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 
FIN*  -1.8671 -0.1280 -2.2250 -0.1593 -3.6613 -0.3209 -3.2988 -0.2871 -3.6002 -0.3215 
TECH*  -1.6125 -0.1053 -1.9323 -0.1304 -3.2921 -0.2567 -2.9130 -0.2280 -3.0537 -0.2417 
Settled -2.7327 -0.1718 -2.6268 -0.1692 -1.9076 -0.1374 -1.7897 -0.1305 -1.8332 -0.1347 
Incfantiselfdeal 5.6192 0.3532 7.1451 0.4601 18.5271 1.3349 16.5553 1.2068 15.9497 1.1723 
Incfgovindex -2.4331 -0.1529 -2.2149 -0.1426 6.9339 0.4996 2.6744 0.1950 2.2654 0.1665 
Incfcstmktcap 0.0010 0.0001 -0.0066 -0.0004 0.0116 0.0008 0.0273 0.0020 0.0234 0.0017 
Incfloggdppercap 0.0609 0.0038 0.7672 0.0494 -6.1878 -0.4458 -2.5413 -0.1853 -2.4338 -0.1789 
IncAllowClass*       -2.4801 -0.1739 
Inccontrol*    -2.9864 -0.2487 -2.4564 -0.2018 -2.6530 -0.2221 
HQcontrol*  -0.2392 -0.0152 -0.5932 -0.0392       
HQallowclass*  -3.0484 -0.1831       
Constant 9.3992 0.5908 7.6958 0.4956 18.8768 1.3601 6.7678 0.4934 6.3325 0.4654 
 
* Indicates a dummy variable
  
Model 1, Column 1 
  
Model 1, Column 2 
  
Model 2, Column 3 
  
Model 2, Column 4 
  
Model 2, Column 5 
  

































Classperiodlength -0.0031 -0.0001 -0.0037 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0036 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0036 -0.0002 
Firstcase*  1.4787 0.0632 -3.1343 -0.1625 -4.1136 -0.2200 -3.6229 -0.2023 -4.1656 -0.2224 -3.6628 -0.2043 
IPOvio*  -2.4857 -0.1095 -1.5113 -0.0934 -1.1173 -0.0732 -2.0235 -0.1411 -1.1422 -0.0749 -2.0400 -0.1424 
GAAPvio*  -0.0442 -0.0018 3.6972 0.2106 3.9528 0.2383 3.9033 0.2418 3.9785 0.2398 3.9251 0.2431 
Othercase*  0.6938 0.0274 9.5362 0.3591 12.6929 0.4483 11.5645 0.4347 12.7558 0.4494 11.6153 0.4357 
Turnover 2.2757 0.0929 -0.5972 -0.0352 -1.7098 -0.1075 -2.0438 -0.1321 -1.6685 -0.1049 -2.0064 -0.1297 
ROA 2.8895 0.1179 18.8324 1.1088 16.2200 1.0196 15.3192 0.9903 16.1126 1.0129 15.2360 0.9851 
Lnassets -0.4634 -0.0189 -0.5705 -0.0336 -0.2753 -0.0173 -0.2797 -0.0181 -0.2772 -0.0174 -0.2806 -0.0181 
Leverage -2.2499 -0.0918 0.1761 0.0104 -2.5566 -0.1607 -3.9948 -0.2582 -2.5553 -0.1606 -3.9942 -0.2582 
FCF 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 
FIN*  -0.1912 -0.0079 -1.0012 -0.0616 -1.8731 -0.1284 -2.1099 -0.1509 -1.8510 -0.1268 -2.0931 -0.1495 
TECH*  0.2676 0.0108 -0.4953 -0.0295 -1.6182 -0.1057 -1.5818 -0.1063 -1.6030 -0.1047 -1.5680 -0.1054 
Settled -1.7385 -0.0709 -1.7092 -0.1006 -2.7166 -0.1708 -2.5383 -0.1641 -2.7318 -0.1717 -2.5514 -0.1650 
Incfantiselfdeal   5.5454 0.3486 7.7101 0.4984 5.6980 0.3582 7.8301 0.5062 
Incfgovindex   -2.3589 -0.1483 -1.9285 -0.1247 -2.4948 -0.1568 -2.0343 -0.1315 
Incfcstmktcap   0.0008 0.0000 -0.0101 -0.0007 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0098 -0.0006 
Incfloggdppercap   0.1025 0.0064 1.3711 0.0886 0.0322 0.0020 1.3076 0.0845 
IncAllowClass*         -3.6869 -0.2232 
Inccontrol*      -3.6902 -0.2234 -0.3855 -0.0246 -0.3129 -0.0205 
HQcontrol*            
HQallowclass*            
Constant 7.5707 0.3089 9.537337 0.561528 9.0562 0.5693 4.0986 0.2649 9.6137 0.6044 4.5680 0.2953 
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Table 25: OLS Regression Results 
This table presents cross-sectional OLS regression estimators of the determinants of the reputational penalties for domestic and foreign firms 
subject to private securities class action lawsuits for violations of U.S. securities laws. Panel A contains OLS estimators for reputational penalties 
using only the reputational penalties that are above the censoring point of zero and Panel B contains OLS estimators for reputational penalties 
regardless of censoring. In Models 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the reputation penalties (RLoss). Independent 
variable definitions are listed in Appendix B. The sample includes all cases against firms that are cross-listed on the major U.S. exchanges with 
decided outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. The control includes all cases against domestic firms that listed on the major U.S. 
exchanges with decided outcomes (settled or dismissed) from 1996-2009. Model 1 does not include country-level variables for the foreign firms 
while Model 2 includes combinations of governance, economic and financial development variables. P-values are listed in parentheses. * 
Significant at the .10 level on the basis of p-values, ** Significant at the .05 level on the basis of p-values and *** Significant at the .01 level on 
the basis of p-values.  
 
Panel A: Above censoring reputational penalties       Panel B: All Cases 
1 1 2 2 2 2  1 1 2 2 2 2 
  Control Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample  Control Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample 
ClassPeriodL
ength -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.002*** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.011) (0.109) (0.181) (0.118)  (0.000) (0.065) (0.048) (0.104) (0.170) (0.221) 
FirstCase -0.027 -0.876* -0.910* -1.141** -1.105** -1.055* 
 
-0.095 -0.873 -1.165 -0.529 -0.379 -0.628 
(0.787) (0.054) (0.071) (0.029) (0.042) (0.052)  (0.829) (0.596) (0.500) (0.772) (0.839) (0.737) 
IPOVio -0.856*** -0.891* -1.104 -0.361 -0.337 -0.532 
 
0.072** -1.359 -2.302 -3.093 -3.15 -2.941 
(0.000) (0.088) (0.117) (0.642) (0.670) (0.509)  (0.036) (0.452) (0.287) (0.224) (0.221) (0.253) 
GAAPVio -0.217*** 0.287 0.183 -0.06 -0.158 -0.139 
 
0.627* 3.76*** 4.53*** 3.533** 2.840* 2.784* 
(0.006) (0.411) (0.650) (0.890) (0.727) (0.759)  (0.066) (0.002) (0.001) (0.027) (0.082) (0.088) 
OtherCase 0.030 0.730 0.756 0.251 0.152 -0.008 
 
-0.439 5.461* 7.513** 7.906** 7.556** 8.272** 
(0.923) (0.367) (0.392) (0.801) (0.882) (0.994)  (0.733) (0.084) (0.021) (0.030) (0.041) (0.027) 
Turnover 0.868*** -0.659** -0.662* -0.677* -0.780** -0.641 
 
1.519* 0.011 0.139 -0.029 -0.333 -0.667 
(0.000) (0.047) (0.079) (0.083) (0.050) (0.120)  (0.086) (0.993) (0.911) (0.982) (0.802) (0.622) 
ROA 0.077 1.357** 1.086* 1.244** 1.213* 1.030 
 
0.389* -1.718 -1.831 -2.099 -2.260 -1.685 
(0.216) (0.014) (0.072) (0.044) (0.055) (0.111)  (0.084) (0.415) (0.407) (0.360) (0.330) (0.475) 
LNAssets 0.592*** 0.497*** 0.536*** 0.715*** 0.683*** 0.722*** 
 
0.468*** 0.806** 0.933** 0.876* 0.775* 0.600 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.022) (0.014) (0.051) (0.089) (0.205) 
Leverage -0.830*** -0.809 -1.502 -1.410 -1.623 -1.778* 
 
-1.652*** -1.356 -1.608 -3.515 -4.145 -3.465 
(0.000) (0.313) (0.129) (0.173) (0.126) (0.096)  (0.007) (0.621) (0.602) (0.297) (0.218) (0.307) 
FCF 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.030) (0.144) (0.130) (0.465) (0.519) (0.368)  (0.226) (0.271) (0.475) (0.526) (0.653) (0.894) 
Fin -1.086*** -1.342** -2.023*** -2.73*** -2.50*** -2.70*** 
 
-2.22*** -4.96** -4.221* -5.545** -6.174** -5.411* 
(0.000) (0.038) (0.009) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.027) (0.092) (0.047) (0.028) (0.059) 
Tech 0.221** 0.519 0.302 0.252 0.445 0.365 
 
0.368 1.262 0.835 -0.043 0.341 0.402 
(0.014) (0.138) (0.460) (0.577) (0.333) (0.431)  (0.353) (0.326) (0.559) (0.979) (0.835) (0.806) 
Settled -0.112 -0.314 -0.255 0.095 0.126 0.107 
 
 -1.49*** -3.400*** -4.2*** -3.99*** -4.13*** -4.1*** 
(0.142) (0.375) (0.535) (0.827) (0.783) (0.815)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
IncControl -0.180 -0.809 -0.306 -0.475 
 
  1.464 1.476 2.285 2.523 
(0.793) (0.375) (0.718) (0.579)    (0.529) (0.633) (0.444) (0.397) 
IncAllowClass -0.800* -0.797 
 
  -0.552   2.766 
(0.081) (0.235)    (0.709)   (0.203) 
IncAntiselfdeal 1.174 3.818** 3.671** 3.243* 
 
  8.67*** 16.70*** 16.58*** 17.22*** 
(0.109) (0.031) (0.039)     (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
IncGovIndex 0.956 4.522*** 2.887** 2.491* 
 
  3.055 5.456 -0.247 0.200  
(0.173) (0.003) (0.020)     (0.204) (0.253) (0.947) (0.957) 
IncCostMktCap -0.007 -0.005 
 
  -0.029* -0.022   
(0.153) (0.397)     (0.082) (0.215)   
IncGDPperCap(Log) -0.398 -2.111 
 
  -4.608 -5.622   
(0.660) (0.151)     (0.145) (0.252)   
PriCostMktCap -0.001 -0.003 
 
    0.016 0.022 
(0.816)       (0.362) (0.237) 
PriGDPperCap(Log) 0.004 0.052 
 
    -2.477 -2.561 
(0.996) (0.946)      (0.376) (0.359) 
Constant 15.3*** 15.94*** 16.81*** 18.7*** 11.61*** 11.92*** 
 
13.6*** 15.86*** 28.0** 22.783 9.908 10.534 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.221) (0.464) (0.435) 
Region No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1634 148 139 139 139 139 
 
1936 176 165 165 165 165 
R-Square Adj 0.474 0.432 0.427 0.448 0.423 0.426  0.082 0.172 0.221 0.195 0.178 0.183 
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Table 26: Matched Logit Table  
This table reports logit regressions estimating the likelihood of a foreign firm suffering a larger reputational penalty than the size and industry matched domestic firm, using financial data, country-level, and firm-level characteristics 
as the key explanatory variables. The dependent variable =1 if the reputational penalty is greater than the matched firm and 0 otherwise. Independent variable definitions appear in Appendix B. All independent variables are 
measured in the year prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Two-tailed p-values for the coefficient estimates are reported underneath, and ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The 
marginal effects column shows the effects of a larger reputational penalties for the foreign firm to a one unit change in the variable of interest after standardizing the independent variables. Marginal effects are computed as: 
β*π(X)*[1-π(X)], where (X ) = eβ 'X (1 + eβ 'X ) and β’X is evaluated at the mean values of X. For the binary variables IncAllowClass, IncControl, Tech, Settled, OtherCase, GAAPVio, IPOVio and FirstCase, the marginal effect 
calculates the change from going from 0 to 1. 
 






















ClassPeriodLength -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
(0.373) (0.967) (0.601) (0.694) (0.785) 
FirstCase -0.5638 -0.1229 -0.5606 -0.1380 -0.5817 -0.1225 -0.4625 -0.1065 -0.4593 -0.1056 
(0.159) (0.204) (0.192) (0.371) (0.385) 
IPOVio -0.5375 -0.1172 -0.8818 -0.2171 -1.1354 * -0.2392 -1.454 * -0.3349 -1.4828* -0.3409 
(0.259) (0.131) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059) 
GAAPVio 0.2393 0.0522 -0.7548** -0.1858 0.3849 0.0811 0.1726 0.0398 0.3379 0.0777 
(0.456) (0.030) (0.312) (0.676) (0.444) 
OtherCase -0.5507 -0.1201 -0.1049 -0.0258 -1.1541 -0.2431 -1.0504 -0.2420 -0.9529 -0.2191 
(0.481) (0.895) (0.156) (0.264) (0.311) 
Turnover -0.1088 -0.0237 -0.5659 -0.1393 -0.4976 -0.1048 -0.5492 -0.1265 -0.4905 -0.1128 
(0.775) (0.370) (0.481) (0.370) (0.503) 
ROA -0.0365 -0.0080 0.5859 0.1434 -0.3718 -0.0783 0.0519 0.0120 0.0344 0.0079 
(0.946) (0.374) (0.557) (0.942) (0.961) 
LNAssets -0.1149 -0.0251 -0.0545 -0.0134 -0.0366 -0.0077 -0.0725 -0.0167 -0.0405 -0.0093 
(0.627) (0.847) (0.902) (0.821) (0.901) 
Leverage -1.743** -0.3800 -2.3033*** -0.5671 -2.7853*** -0.5868 -3.219*** -0.7415 -3.282*** -0.7545 
(0.017) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
FCF 0.001 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 
(0.252) (0.885) (0.465) (0.408) (0.650) 
TECH 0.0072 0.0016 -0.3175 -0.0782 -0.0158 -0.0033 -0.3425 -0.0789 -0.4632 -0.1065 
(0.986) (0.503) (0.975) (0.516) (0.404) 
Settled -0.8146** -0.1776 -0.1248 -0.0307 -0.7129* -0.1502 -0.5927 -0.1365 -0.5718 -0.1315 
(0.013) (0.704) (0.057) (0.142) (0.164) 
IncAntiselfdeal 0.8130 0.2002 1.0976 0.2312 6.756** 1.5561 5.6059* 1.2887 
(0.409) (0.306) (0.023) (0.068) 
IncGovIndex 0.6594 0.1623 0.4559 0.0961 2.3814 0.5486 1.6559 0.3807 
(0.370) (0.579) (0.188) (0.358) 
IncCostMktCap -0.0042 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0002 0.0032 0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0002 
(0.396) (0.856) (0.654) (0.884) 
IncGDPperCap(Log) -1.2545 -0.3089 -0.7738 -0.1630 -2.177 -0.5015 -1.3599 -0.3126 
(0.272) (0.497) (0.372) (0.595) 
IncControl 0.4406 0.0981 -0.5186 -0.1120 -0.5731 -0.1225 
(0.603) (0.639) (0.594) 
IncAllowClass  -0.260** -0.2601 -1.3416*** -0.2826 -1.5880* -0.3651 
(0.036) (0.010) (0.071) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region No No No Yes Yes 
N 175 165 165 165 165 
chi2 25.305 43.059* 43.107* 52.346 55.883* 






Figure 1: Mean and Median Abnormal Returns Surrounding Event Dates 
The table reports the mean and median abnormal return for each day in the +/- ten days surrounding the disclosure or filing of a securities class 
action lawsuit for the foreign sample of cases and the control of domestic cases.  The filing date is measured as the date listed on the original 
filing complaint documents as reported by Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
Governance Analytics Class Actions and the disclosure date is the date listed in the complaint in which it is claimed the information became 
publicly available. In situations where multiple lawsuits are filed the first lawsuit filing date is chosen for the issue in question. Market model 
parameters are estimated in the 125-trading days ending 11 days prior to the announcement using the market information as provided by CRSP. 
Abnormal returns are reported for days -10 through +10 around the disclosure (Panel A) or filing (Panel B) date.  
Panel A: Sample mean and median abnormal returns for the twenty days surrounding the disclosure date of the alleged violation of securities 





Figure 1: Mean and Median Abnormal Returns Surrounding Event Dates 
Panel B: Sample mean and median abnormal returns for the twenty days surrounding the filing date of the securities class action lawsuit as 





Figure 2: Mean and Median Abnormal Returns on Sample Firm Home Markets Surrounding Event Dates 
The table reports the mean and median abnormal return for each day in the +/- ten days surrounding the disclosure or filing of a securities class 
action lawsuit for the foreign sample firms in the U.S. market on which the firm lists and the home market, which is the market of the country in 
which the firm is incorporated. The filing date is measured as the date listed on the original filing complaint documents as reported by Stanford 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance Analytics Class Actions and the disclosure date is 
the date listed in the complaint in which it is claimed the information became publicly available. In situations where multiple lawsuits are filed 
the first lawsuit filing date is chosen for the issue in question. Market model parameters are estimated in the 125-trading days ending 11 days 
prior to the announcement using the market information as provided by DataStream. Abnormal returns are reported for days -10 through +10 
around the disclosure (Panel A) or filing (Panel B) date.  
Panel A: Sample mean and median abnormal returns for the twenty days surrounding the disclosure date of the alleged violation of securities 





Figure 2: Mean and Median Abnormal Returns on Sample Firm Home Markets Surrounding Event Dates 
Panel B: Sample mean and median abnormal returns for the twenty days surrounding the filing date of the securities class action lawsuit for the 







Figure 3: Abnormal Returns for noise removed sample 
The table reports the mean and median abnormal return for each day in the +/- ten days surrounding the filing of a securities class action lawsuit 
for cases in which there are no other events in the +/- ten day window.  The filing date is measured as the date listed on the original filing 
complaint documents as reported by Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance 
Analytics Class Actions. In situations where multiple lawsuits are filed the first lawsuit filing date is chosen for the issue in question. Market 
model parameters are estimated in the 125-trading days ending 11 days prior to the announcement. Abnormal returns are reported for days -10 
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